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AGENCY COSTS, CHARITABLE TRUSTS, AND CORPORATE
CONTROL:  EVIDENCE FROM HERSHEY’S KISS-OFF
Jonathan Klick*
Robert H. Sitkoff**
In July 2002 the trustees of the Milton Hershey School Trust an-
nounced a plan to diversify the Trust’s investment portfolio by selling the
Trust’s controlling interest in the Hershey Company.  The Company’s stock
jumped from $62.50 to $78.30 on news of the proposed sale.  But the
Pennsylvania Attorney General, who was then running for governor, op-
posed the sale on the ground that it would harm the local community.
Shortly after the Attorney General obtained a preliminary injunction, the
trustees abandoned the sale and the Company’s stock dropped to $65.00.
Using standard event study methodology, we find that the sale announce-
ment was associated with a positive abnormal return of over 25% and that
canceling the sale was followed by a negative abnormal return of nearly
12%.  Our findings imply that instead of improving the welfare of the needy
children who are the Trust’s main beneficiaries, the Attorney General’s inter-
vention preserved charitable trust agency costs of roughly $850 million and
foreclosed salutary portfolio diversification.  Furthermore, blocking the sale
destroyed roughly $2.7 billion in shareholder wealth, reducing aggregate so-
cial welfare by preserving a suboptimal ownership structure of the Company.
Our analysis contributes to the literature of trust law by supplying the first
empirical analysis of agency costs in the charitable trust form and by high-
lighting shortcomings in supervision of charities by the state attorneys gen-
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eral.  We also contribute to the literature of corporate governance by measur-
ing the change in the Company’s market value when the Trust exposed the
Company to the market for corporate control.
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INTRODUCTION
Domestic tax-exempt charitable organizations hold roughly $2.4 tril-
lion in assets and have roughly $1.2 trillion in annual revenues.1  These
impressive figures speak to the American impulse toward philanthropy.2
But the ugly secret about charitable organizations is that their lack of
1. See Treasury Inspector Gen. for Tax Admin., Dep’t of the Treasury, Performance
Measures and Improved Tracking Would Help the Exempt Organizations Function Better
Allocate Resources 1 (2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/tigta/auditreports/2008
reports/200810057fr.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
2. Measured as a share of Gross Domestic Product, charitable giving in the United
States is estimated to be “roughly three times larger than” in the second-place United
Kingdom.  Joel L. Fleishman, Public Trust in Not-for-Profit Organizations and the Need for
Regulatory Reform, in Philanthropy and the Nonprofit Sector in a Changing America 172,
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clearly defined owners invites deadweight losses arising from agency
costs.  True, the state attorneys general have formal authority to ensure
that the managers of such organizations efficiently pursue a bona fide
charitable purpose.3  In reality, however, the typical state attorney general
is an elected political official for whom the supervision of charitable orga-
nizations offers little political payoff.  Accordingly, scholars tend to as-
sume the existence of significant agency costs in charitable trusts and
other charitable organizations.4
A separate agency problem arises in the context of the public corpo-
ration.  The concern here is that the interests of the company’s managers
will diverge from those of the shareholders.  To align managers’ incen-
tives with the interests of shareholders, the law gives shareholders various
rights, including the right to sell their shares, which invites a takeover bid
if the company’s current management yields inferior returns.  An alterna-
tive mechanism for minimizing corporate agency costs arises when the
firm has a controlling shareholder or a large blockholder.5  A controlling
shareholder or a large blockholder is more likely than an ordinary share-
holder to have a concrete financial incentive to monitor actively and, if
necessary, to impose value-maximizing operations on the company’s man-
agers.  Indeed, a host of scholars and policymakers have come to embrace
the utility of monitoring by blockholders,6 and the incidence of such con-
trol blocks is increasing among public U.S. firms and is quite common
among public companies in Europe.7
175 (Charles T. Clotfelter & Thomas Ehrlich eds., 1999) [hereinafter Fleishman, Public
Trust].
3. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 391 cmt. a (1959) (“[A] suit to enforce a
charitable trust can be maintained by the Attorney General of the State in which the
charitable trust is to be administered.”); Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Governing Nonprofit
Organizations:  Federal and State Law and Regulation 305–24 (2004) (discussing power of
state attorneys general to oversee charitable trusts).
4. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 18.5, at 547 (7th ed. 2007)
[hereinafter Posner, Economic Analysis] (“[A charitable trust’s] board of trustees is self-
perpetuating and is accountable to no one for the performance of the enterprise . . . .
[T]he carrot is missing along with the stick.”  (citation omitted)); infra notes 219–221 and R
accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents:  The Promise of Institutional
Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 811, 813 (1992) [hereinafter Black, Agents] (describing
model of corporate governance in which major shareholders, generally large institutional
investors, have incentive to oversee management effectively).
6. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling
Shareholders, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 785, 785 (2003) (“[T]he presence of a large shareholder
may better police management than the standard panoply of market-oriented
techniques.”).
7. See John C. Coates IV, Ownership, Takeovers, and EU Law:  How Contestable
Should EU Corporations Be?, in Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe 677,
686, 687 fig.2 (Guido Ferrarini et al. eds., 2004) (showing frequent control of European
corporations by single shareholders); Clifford G. Holderness, A Survey of Blockholders
and Corporate Control, Econ. Pol’y Rev., Apr. 2003, at 51, 52–53 (discussing frequency of
substantial holdings by management and external blockholders in U.S. corporations).
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In 2002 the foregoing agency problems collided in a salient real
world event:  the attempted sale of the Hershey Company by its control-
ling shareholder, the Milton Hershey School Trust, a Pennsylvania chari-
table trust.  This paper uses the 2002 Hershey incident as a natural quasi-
experiment to investigate empirically:  (1) the agency costs that are inher-
ent in the charitable trust form; (2) the shortcomings in supervision of
charitable entities by the state attorneys general; and (3) the comparative
merits of takeovers (i.e., the market for corporate control) versus moni-
toring by controlling shareholders (i.e., the market for partial corporate
control) in minimizing agency costs in corporate governance.8  In so do-
ing, we make fresh contributions to the literatures of trust law and corpo-
rate law and to the technical literature on event study methodology.
Background
The largest confectionary outfit in North America, the publicly
traded Hershey Company (the “Company”) is the maker of such familiar
goodies as Almond Joy, Jolly Ranchers, Kit Kats, Milk Duds, Reese’s
Pieces, Twizzlers, York Peppermint Patties, and, of course, Hershey’s
Chocolate Bars, Chocolate Kisses, and Chocolate Syrup.9  The Company
is based in Hershey, Pennsylvania, a town that fancies itself “The Sweetest
Place On Earth.”10  In Hershey, Cocoa Avenue intersects with Chocolate
8. Although a handful of prior studies consider the 2002 Hershey incident, none of
these studies empirically investigates agency costs in the charitable trust form or addresses
corporate agency costs.  See Kenneth M. Eades et al., Hershey Foods Corporation:  Bitter
Times in a Sweet Place (2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=909738 (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (business school case study featuring Hershey incident); Evelyn
Brody, Whose Public?  Parochialism and Paternalism in State Charity Law Enforcement, 79
Ind. L.J. 937, 985–99 (2004) [hereinafter Brody, Parochialism] (examining Hershey
incident, as well as other events relating to charity governance, for evidence of increasing
state parochialism); Mark Sidel, The Struggle for Hershey:  Community Accountability and
the Law in Modern American Philanthropy, 65 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Sidel,
Struggle for Hershey] (analyzing Hershey incident as illustrative of behavior of various
institutional actors); Jennifer L. Komoroski, Note, The Hershey Trust’s Quest to Diversify:
Redefining the State Attorney General’s Role When Charitable Trusts Wish to Diversify, 45
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1769 (2004) (focusing primarily upon behavior of Attorney General in
Hershey incident).  A recent biography of Milton Hershey describes the 2002 incident but
offers no policy analysis.  See Michael D’Antonio, Hershey:  Milton S. Hershey’s
Extraordinary Life of Wealth, Empire, and Utopian Dreams 1–8, 255–67 (2006).  In an
unpublished manuscript, Harvey Dale uses the 2002 Hershey incident as one of three
case studies on distortions in prudent trust investment laws applicable to charitable
entities.  See Harvey P. Dale, Prudence Perverted:  Politics, Perceptions, and Pressures
11–29 (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review), available at
http://www.tiff.org/TEF/seminars/archive/files/2006/PrudencePerverted.pdf.  Finally,
several casebooks on trusts and estates note the Hershey incident in their treatment of
charitable trusts.  See, e.g., Roger W. Andersen & Ira Mark Bloom, Fundamentals of Trusts
and Estates 465–67 (3d ed. 2007); Lawrence W. Waggoner et al., Family Property Law:
Cases and Materials on Wills, Trusts, and Future Interests 15-38 to 15-39 (4th ed. 2006).
9. See The Hershey Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1–3 (Feb. 19, 2008)
[hereinafter 2008 Annual Report].
10. See Official Website—Hershey, PA, at http://www.hersheypa.com (last visited
Mar. 3, 2008) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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Avenue, the streetlights are shaped like Hershey’s Kisses, and tourists are
invited to stay in the Hotel Hershey or the Hershey Lodge while visiting
local attractions such as Hershey’s Chocolate World and Hersheypark.11
Also based in Hershey, Pennsylvania, is the Milton Hershey School
(the “School”), a boarding school that enrolls, feeds, and clothes about
1,700 needy students whose families have an average income of just
under $14,000.12  The School’s operations are funded by the Milton
Hershey School Trust (the “Trust”), a Pennsylvania charitable trust worth
roughly $8.8 billion,13 more than all but the five largest domestic univer-
sity endowments.14  The Hershey Trust Company (of Hershey,
Pennsylvania) is trustee of the Trust.15  The Company, the School, the
Trust, and the Hershey Trust Company were all founded about a century
ago by Milton S. Hershey.16
The fortunes of the Company, the Trust, and the School are deeply
intertwined.  The Trust owns roughly 30% of the Company’s shares and,
because of a dual class stock arrangement, controls over 75% of the votes
in the Company’s elections.17  The Trust’s stock in the Company, which is
worth over $4.7 billion, represents more than half of the Trust’s $8.8
billion corpus.  Hershey dividends account for more than 40% of the
Trust’s investment income.  Under the terms of the Trust’s governing in-
strument, the managers of the School are selected from the board of the
Hershey Trust Company and have the power to direct the investment and
disbursement policies of the Trust (hence we refer to the School’s man-
11. See Mary Davidoff Houts & Pamela Cassidy Whitenack, Images of America:
Hershey 115 (2000) (providing photograph of streetlights); Map of Hershey, PA, at
http://www.hersheypa.com/plan_your_trip/images/hershey_map.jpg (last visited Mar. 3,
2008) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
12. See Milton Hershey Sch., Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.mhs-pa.
org/content/?/about/frequently-asked-questions (last visited Mar. 3, 2008) (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).  The $14,000 figure is for a student from a “family of three
enrolling in August 2004–05.”  Id.; cf. Milton Hershey Sch., Admissions Criteria, at http://
www.mhs-pa.org/content/?/admissions/criteria (last visited Mar. 3, 2008) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (noting that School will consider financial need of applicants).
13. Hershey Trust summary statistics and the sources for those statistics are collected
in infra Table 1.  Unless stated otherwise, all figures are for the tax year ending on July 31,
2005.
14. The top five are Harvard ($25.5 billion), Yale ($15.2 billion), Stanford ($12.2
billion), Texas ($11.6 billion), and Princeton ($11.2 billion).  Number six is MIT ($6.7
billion).  See Nat’l Ass’n of Coll. & Univ. Bus. Officers, 2005 NACUBO Endowment Study,
Institutions Listed by Fiscal Year 2005 Market Value of Assets with Percent Change Between
2004 and 2005 Endowment Assets 1 (2006), available at http://www.nacubo.org/
documents/about/FY05NESInstitutionsbyTotalAssets.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
15. See Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, Second Restated Deed of Trust pmbl. (Nov. 15,
1976) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter 1976 Deed of Trust].
16. See infra Part I.
17. See 2008 Annual Report, supra note 9, at 85–87 (describing Company’s capital R
structure).
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agers and the Hershey Trust Company’s board collectively as the
“trustees”).18
The Trust’s heavy investment in the Company is not healthy for the
Trust or the Company.  For the Trust, holding an undiversified portfolio
makes the welfare of the School and the needy children it serves vulnera-
ble to swings in the performance of a single company.  The Trust, in
other words, is exposed to what financial economists call uncompensated
risk—risk for which there is no offsetting improvement in expected re-
turn and that could be avoided costlessly by diversifying the Trust’s invest-
ment portfolio.19  Indeed, the modern law of trust investment has come
to regard lack of diversification as close to a per se breach of fiduciary
duty.20
For the Company, the Trust’s controlling interest has two distorting
effects.  First, no matter how poorly the Company’s managers run the
Company, so long as the Trust maintains its controlling interest and the
trustees remain listless, the Company’s managers need not worry about
being displaced in a takeover.  Second, fear that taking on normal busi-
ness risks might impair the welfare of the needy children who depend on
a steady flow of dividends from the Company to the Trust has caused the
Company’s managers to forgo potentially lucrative business opportuni-
ties.  For example, Milton Hershey’s immediate successor was so worried
about the Trust’s exposure to volatility in the cocoa bean market that,
instead of expanding the business to meet exploding consumer demand
in the economic boom that followed World War II, he rationed the
Company’s products, failed to increase manufacturing capacity, and or-
dered the construction of silos to store an enormous reserve of cocoa
18. See 1976 Deed of Trust, supra note 15, ¶¶ 4–7, 10, 25 (describing procedure for R
selecting School managers from Hershey Trust Company board).
19. See Jonathan R. Macey, An Introduction to Modern Financial Theory 22–27 (2d
ed. 1998) [hereinafter Macey, Introduction] (describing potential to eliminate firm-
specific risk through diversification and lack of compensation for failure to do so); John H.
Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81 Iowa L.
Rev. 641, 647–48 (1996) [hereinafter Langbein, Trust Investing] (same).
20. See Unif. Prudent Investor Act § 3 & cmt. (1994), 7B U.L.A. 29–30 (2006) (“A
trustee shall diversify the investments of the trust unless the trustee reasonably determines
that, because of special circumstances, the purposes of the trust are better served without
diversifying.”); Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 90(b), § 90 cmt. g (2007) (“[T]he trustee
has a duty to diversify the investments of the trust unless, under the circumstances, it is
prudent not to do so.”).  Four “occasional exceptions,” none applicable to the Hershey
Trust, are noted in Jesse Dukeminier, Stanley M. Johanson, James Lindgren & Robert H.
Sitkoff, Wills, Trusts, and Estates 814 (7th ed. 2005).  By contrast, the 1999 Pennsylvania
enactment of the Prudent Investor Act excludes the trustees of trusts in existence prior to
1999 from the Act’s explicit duty to diversify.  See 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 7204(b) (West
2005); Act of June 25, 1999, No. 1999-28, sec. 6(b), 1999 Pa. Laws 212, 219.  However, the
Act’s duty of prudence, see 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 7203(a) (West 2005), which is
applicable to all trustees, will in most cases require diversification nonetheless.  Cf. In re
Estate of Janes, 681 N.E.2d 332, 336–39 (N.Y. 1997) (holding that failure to diversify
violated duty of prudence).
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beans.21  In part as a result of this missed opportunity, the Company still
lacks an international presence comparable to that of competitors such as
Mars, Nestlé, and Cadbury.22
The Trust’s concentration in the Company has also created an unfor-
tunate expectation in the town of Hershey that the trustees will retain
control over the Company indefinitely.  Indeed, after the trustees aban-
doned the 2002 effort to diversify the Trust’s holdings by selling the
Trust’s controlling interest in the Company, a local lawyer who organized
protests against the sale told the New York Times that “Our cash cow is
safe; we’re feeling really great.”23  This sentiment, however, obscures the
sad reality of the Trust’s exposure to uncompensated risk and the grow-
ing disconnect between the Trust’s value and its mission.  Only 1,700 chil-
dren benefit from the Trust’s $8.8 billion in assets.24  The quid pro quo
for charitable trust status, which the common law rewards with perpetual
existence and the public subsidizes through generous state and federal
tax exemptions,25 is that the trust must benefit society by properly ad-
vancing a bona fide charitable purpose.  It is hardly obvious that a trust
with so large a corpus and so small a mission warrants the tax subsidy.
The Natural Quasi-Experiment
Having recognized the Trust’s dangerous dependence on the
Company, the trustees developed a plan in 2002 to diversify the Trust’s
holdings by selling the Trust’s controlling interest in the Company.  The
Wall Street Journal broke the news of the trustees’ plan on July 25, 2002.26
The Company’s stock, which is traded on the New York Stock Exchange,
jumped to $78.30 from the previous day’s closing price of $62.50,27 imply-
ing that the capital markets saw vast potential in the Company that had
not been realized while the Company was under the control of the Trust.
However, the Pennsylvania Attorney General, who was then running for
governor and whose office supervises Pennsylvania charitable trusts,
brought suit to stop the sale on the grounds that it would lead to layoffs
and plant closings that would harm the central Pennsylvania community.
In September 2002, after the Attorney General obtained a preliminary
21. See Joël Glenn Brenner, The Emperors of Chocolate:  Inside the Secret World of
Hershey and Mars 198–200 (1999).
22. See id. at 294.
23. Francis X. Clines, Whiff of Chocolate, and the Sweet Smell of Success, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 19, 2002, at C6.
24. See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text. R
25. See Ilana H. Eisenstein, Comment, Keeping Charity in Charitable Trust Law:  The
Barnes Foundation and the Case for Consideration of Public Interest in Administration of
Charitable Trusts, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1747, 1759–68 (2003) (discussing tax exemptions and
inapplicability of rule against perpetuities associated with charitable trusts).
26. See Shelly Branch, Sarah Ellison & Gordon Fairclough, Sweet Deal:  Hershey
Foods Is Considering a Plan to Put Itself Up for Sale, Wall St. J., July 25, 2002, at A1
[hereinafter Branch et al., Sweet Deal].
27. We detail the source of our stock price data at infra notes 244–245 and R
accompanying text.
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injunction, the trustees abandoned the sale.28  The Company’s stock
dropped to $65.00 on news of the trustees’ surrender.
We use a standard event study econometric methodology to isolate
price movements in Hershey’s stock related to news of the sale from
movements owing to ordinary market volatility.29  We find that news of
the proposed sale was associated with a statistically and economically sig-
nificant increase in the Company’s value (in event study jargon, a “posi-
tive abnormal return”) of over 25%.30  News of the sale’s cancellation was
associated with a statistically and economically significant decrease in the
Company’s value (a “negative abnormal return”) of nearly 12%.31  The
magnitude of these abnormal returns is astonishing; “positive abnormal
returns of even 1 percent [are] considerable for competitive capital mar-
kets.”32  In dollars, our findings imply that blocking the sale destroyed
roughly $2.7 billion in shareholder wealth,33 suggesting a social welfare
loss owing to a suboptimal ownership structure of the Company and its
underlying assets.34  Moreover, instead of improving the welfare of the
needy children who are the principal objects of Milton Hershey’s benefi-
cence, the Attorney General’s intervention preserved charitable trust
agency costs on the order of roughly $850 million (about 15% of the
Trust’s 2002 value) and continued the Trust’s exposure to uncompen-
sated risk.35
Trust Law
Regarding trust law, this paper joins the small but growing empirical
literature by providing the first quantitative empirical analysis of agency
costs in the charitable trust form,36 furthering the application of agency
28. See infra Part II.A.
29. “The event study methodology is well-accepted and extensively used in finance.”
Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Empirical Studies of Corporate Law, in 2 Handbook of
Law and Economics 945, 947 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Stephen Shavell eds., 2007).
30. See infra Part III.C.2.
31. See infra Part III.C.2.
32. Bhagat & Romano, supra note 29, at 971. R
33. See infra note 299. R
34. The Company’s announcement in early 2007 of layoffs and restructuring tends to
confirm our finding of inefficiency in the Company’s operations.  See infra note 339 and R
accompanying text.
35. See infra note 300. R
36. There is no significant quantitative empirical literature regarding charitable
trusts.  With respect to private trusts, empirical analysis has been limited to trust investment
law, see, e.g., Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Did Reform of Prudent Trust
Investment Laws Change Trust Portfolio Allocation?, 50 J.L. & Econ. (forthcoming 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=868761 (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, Portfolio Allocation], and jurisdictional competition,
see, e.g., Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Perpetuities or Taxes?  Explaining the
Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 2465 (2006); Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M.
Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds:  An Empirical Analysis of
Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 Yale L.J. 356 (2005).  There have also been a handful of survey-
based studies.  See, e.g., Martin D. Begleiter, Does the Prudent Investor Need the Uniform
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cost analysis to charitable trusts.37  If the trustees had been managing the
Trust’s assets efficiently, the sale announcement should not have had a
very large positive effect on the value of Hershey shares not held by the
Trust.  Effective trustees would already have used their controlling vote
block to impose a value-maximizing strategy on the Company’s manag-
ers.38  Such efficiency-inducing efforts would have accrued to the benefit
of all shareholders in the form of a higher stock price.
Yet we find that publicly traded shares in the Company experienced
a large and statistically significant positive abnormal return when news of
the trustees’ plan to sell broke, and a large and statistically significant
negative abnormal return when the trustees abandoned the sale.  Regard-
less of the mechanism for the increase in the Company’s value on news of
the sale—for example, expectation of better management from or syner-
gies with a prospective buyer, overpayment by an empire-building buyer,
or release from the worry that aggressive pursuit of profit through higher
risk/return opportunities might imperil the needy children who depend
on the Trust—the implication of our results is the same.  The trustees not
only exposed the Trust to uncompensated risk, but they also left money
on the table that could have been realized for the benefit of the Trust’s
charitable purpose.
Our findings therefore provide the first quantitative empirical valida-
tion, albeit in a single case study, of prior theoretical claims of agency
costs in charitable trusts and inefficient management of charitable trust
assets.39  Our findings also highlight an additional but less often dis-
Prudent Investor Act—An Empirical Study of Trust Investment Practices, 51 Me. L. Rev. 27
(1999).
37. See, e.g., Robert A. Katz, Let Charitable Directors Direct:  Why Trust Law Should
Not Curb Board Discretion over a Charitable Corporation’s Mission and Unrestricted
Assets, 80 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 689, 703–12 (2005); Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the
Oversight of Charitable Organizations, 1999 Wis. L. Rev. 227, 230–52; Robert H. Sitkoff,
An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 621 (2004) [hereinafter Sitkoff,
Agency Costs]; see also Dukeminier et al., supra note 20, at 774–76 (describing increased R
role of fiduciary obligation in minimizing trust agency costs as well as difficulty in
identifying principal with regard to any given trust); Jonathan R. Macey, Private Trusts for
the Provision of Private Goods, 37 Emory L.J. 295, 315–20 (1988) (arguing that, although
charitable trust form contains significant agency costs, such costs are greatly reduced in
private trust form); A.I. Ogus, The Trust as Governance Structure, 36 U. Toronto L.J. 186
(1986) (analyzing agency costs and associated desirability of trust form in several potential
economic contexts); Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, Portfolio Allocation, supra note 36 R
(manuscript at 4) (discussing agency costs in private trusts); Stewart E. Sterk, Trust
Protectors, Agency Costs, and Fiduciary Duty, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 2761 (2006) (discussing
agency costs arising from addition to trust form of office of trust protector acting as agent
for interests of settlor).
38. See, e.g., Unif. Trust Code § 802(g) (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 589 (2006)
(providing that trustees with control over corporation “shall elect or appoint directors or
other managers who will manage the corporation or enterprise in the best interests of the
beneficiaries”).
39. See infra notes 219–222 and accompanying text.  Although there has been no R
significant empirical investigation of charitable trusts, see supra note 36, there is an R
empirical literature on not-for-profit firms.  For example, in John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay
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cussed concern.  Even if the Attorney General does intervene in the ad-
ministration of a charitable trust, the intervention might be designed to
promote the Attorney General’s political interests rather than the trust’s
charitable purpose.40  Indeed, the Attorney General’s intervention in this
instance preserved agency costs within the Trust on the order of roughly
$850 million.41
Accordingly, we provide an empirical grounding for policy analysis
of new developments in the supervision of charitable entities.42  For ex-
ample, some have argued that the IRS should be more active in policing
charities,43 almost half the states now give the donor standing concurrent
with the attorney general to enforce a charitable trust,44 and the 2000
Uniform Trust Code and the 2003 Restatement (Third) of Trusts liber-
alize the cy pres doctrine to allow modification of a charitable trust when
its assets grow out of proportion to its purpose.45  Further, inasmuch as
opponents of the sale argued that the sale would hurt the town of Her-
& Rodrigo S. Verdi, Agency Problems of Excess Endowment Holdings in Not-for-Profit
Firms 3–4 (Dec. 15, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=565241, the authors find evidence of agency costs in
the operation of not-for-profit firms that have excess endowments.  Although the context
and legal form is different, these results are consistent with ours.  In effect, the Hershey
Trust has an excess endowment, a subject we take up in Part IV.A.2 in connection with the
cy pres doctrine.  For a survey of the literature, see generally Anup Malani, Tomas
Philipson & Guy David, Theories of Firm Behavior in the Nonprofit Sector:  A Synthesis
and Empirical Evaluation, in The Governance of Not-for-Profit Organizations 181 (Edward
L. Glaeser ed., 2003).
40. See infra note 217 and accompanying text. R
41. See infra note 300 and accompanying text. R
42. Although far more charities take the corporate form than the trust form, see
Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 200 reporter’s note 1 (Preliminary Draft No. 4,
2007) (providing statistics), the law respecting supervision of charitable corporations
derives from the law of charitable trusts.  See id. § 200 cmt. b; Restatement (Second) of
Trusts § 348 cmt. f (1959) (“Ordinarily the principles and rules applicable to charitable
trusts are applicable to charitable corporations.”); 4A Austin Wakeman Scott & William
Franklin Fratcher, The Law of Trusts § 348.1 (4th ed. 1989) (“[M]any of the principles
applicable to charitable trusts are applicable to charitable corporations.”); see also Evelyn
Brody, Charity Governance:  What’s Trust Law Got to Do with It?, 80 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 641
(2005) (discussing interaction between governance requirements of charitable trusts and
not-for-profit organizations).
43. See infra note 309 and accompanying text. R
44. The list includes California and New York, see L.B. Research & Educ. Found. v.
UCLA Found., 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 710, 716–17 (Ct. App. 2005); Smithers v. St. Luke’s-
Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 723 N.Y.S.2d 426, 434–36 (App. Div. 2001), as well as the nineteen
U.S. jurisdictions (eighteen states and the District of Columbia) that have adopted Unif.
Trust Code § 405(c) (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 486 (2006), or some variant thereof.  See
Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Significant Differences in States’
Enacted Uniform Trust Codes, at http://www.utcproject.org/utc/DesktopDefault.aspx?
tabindex=0&tabid=1 (last updated Aug. 9, 2006) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter UTC Enactment Charts] (providing UTC enactment charts).
45. See Unif. Trust Code § 413(a) (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 509 (2006)
(authorizing cy pres “if a particular charitable purpose becomes . . . wasteful”);
Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 67 & cmt. c(1) (2003) (“[A]pplication of cy pres . . . is
[appropriate in] a situation in which the amount of property held in trust exceeds what is
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shey and the Company’s workers, our findings also bear on the propriety
of social investing by trustees and other fiduciaries.46  The $850 million
cost to the Trust of protecting the local “cash cow” by abandoning the
sale equates roughly to $67,000 per resident of Hershey, or $62,000 per
worker at the Company.47
Corporate Law
Regarding corporate law, our findings add to the intertwined litera-
tures relating to takeovers and controlling shareholders.  Specifically, the
aborted 2002 sale provides a natural quasi-experiment that allows us to
measure the difference in the Company’s value when the Company’s
managers were exposed to the market for corporate control in compari-
son to when the Company’s managers were under the thumb of the trust-
ees.  We find a large, statistically and economically significant positive ab-
normal return on news of the Trust’s probable divestment and a large,
statistically and economically significant negative abnormal return when
the sale was abandoned.
Accordingly, the evidence indicates that the concentration of vote
power in the hands of the trustees did not improve the value of the
Company relative to the value of the Company in the shadow of the take-
over market.  As such, our findings highlight the potential inefficacy of
disciplining by a controlling shareholder when that shareholder itself has
distorted incentives stemming from its own internal agency problems.
On this view, a hedge fund is likely to be a more effective monitor than a
pension or mutual fund.48  Our findings also lend modest empirical sup-
port for the view that the takeover market reduces corporate agency
costs.
Financial Econometrics
Because our study is by necessity limited to a single firm, a concern
might arise about the statistical power of our results.  To ameliorate this
concern, we undertake a host of robustness checks, several designed spe-
cifically to address the single-firm problem.  In so doing, we contribute to
the literature of financial econometrics by offering the first demonstra-
needed for the particular charitable purpose to such an extent that the continued
expenditure of all of the funds for that purpose . . . would be wasteful.”).
46. See generally John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Social Investing and the
Law of Trusts, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 72 (1980) (arguing that social investing decreases expected
returns from investment and therefore is prohibited by fiduciary duties of trustees).
47. See infra note 302 and accompanying text.  These figures jump to $214,000 and R
$199,000 if we consider the full $2.7 billion in shareholder wealth destroyed.  See infra
note 346 and accompanying text. R
48. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1021, 1062–70 (2007) (arguing that hedge funds
pursue profit-maximizing strategies superior to those of other institutional investors
because of less stringent regulatory constraints, superior incentive structures, and lesser
conflicts of interest).
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tion of the use of randomization inference as a robustness check for sta-
tistical inference in a single-firm event study.49
* * *
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows.  Building on
the foregoing statement of background, Part I frames the inquiry with
more details on Milton Hershey, the Company, the School, and the Trust.
Part II motivates the empirical analysis by examining the aborted sale in
light of current understandings of the supervision of charitable trusts and
corporate governance.  In so doing, Part II situates our analysis in the
existing literatures of trust law and corporate law, particularly agency cost
analyses of those subjects.  Part III presents our empirical analysis, which
includes a graphical analysis of the data, a more formal event study analy-
sis, and a nontechnical summary of our main findings.  Mindful of the
need for caution in generalizing from what is in effect a case study, Part
IV assesses the positive and normative implications of our findings for the
policy debates in corporate law and trust law identified above.  After a
short conclusion, three substantive appendices follow.
I. MILTON HERSHEY’S CHOCOLATE EMPIRE50
Milton Snavely Hershey was born in 1857 in central Pennsylvania.51
After apprenticing in a candy store, Hershey opened stores of his own in
49. Single-firm event studies appear in the academic literature and are routine in
securities litigation.  See infra notes 291–292 and accompanying text. R
50. More extensive treatments of Milton Hershey, the Company, the School, and the
Trust are readily available elsewhere.  For example, D’Antonio, supra note 8, is a recent R
and comprehensive biography of Milton Hershey.  Brenner, supra note 21, is also a recent R
and comprehensive biography, but Brenner examines Hershey and the Company in
juxtaposition to the Mars family and Mars Company.  See also Charles Schuyler Castner,
One of a Kind:  Milton Snavely Hershey, 1857–1945 (1983) (fawning biography published
by local literary guild); Nancy F. Koehn & Erica Helms, Candy Land:  The Utopian Vision
of Milton Hershey (2005) (Harvard Business School case study).  Houts & Whitenack,
supra note 11, is a photographic history of Milton Hershey and the Hershey entities that R
was sponsored by the Hershey Foundation.  James D. McMahon, Jr., Built on Chocolate:
The Story of the Hershey Chocolate Company (1998), is a Hershey Company-sponsored
study of the Hershey Company as well as of Milton Hershey and his philanthropic legacy.
McMahon was the curator of the Hershey museum.  Among the older sources, Joseph
Richard Snavely, a relative of Milton Hershey on Milton’s mother’s side, published a
number of biographical works.  See Joseph Richard Snavely, An Intimate Story of Milton S.
Hershey (1957); Joseph Richard Snavely, Milton S. Hershey:  Builder (1935); Joseph
Richard Snavely, The Hershey Story (1950) [hereinafter Snavely, Story].  The Hershey
Company published Joseph Richard Snavely, The Story of Hershey:  The Chocolate Town
(1953).  The Hershey Community Archives contains a wealth of information, including
unpublished books by Paul A.W. Wallace (a history professor at Lebanon Valley College
who was hired by the School to write a Hershey biography) and Samuel Hinkle (a former
executive of the Company).  See D’Antonio, supra note 8, at 175, 269 (describing Hershey R
Community Archives collection and providing biographical information regarding Wallace
and Hinkle); see also Katherine B. Shippen & Paul A.W. Wallace, Milton S. Hershey (1959)
(recounting Hershey’s life in children’s book based in part on Wallace’s commissioned
research).
51. See D’Antonio, supra note 8, at 12. R
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Philadelphia, Chicago, and New York, but each failed.52  Hershey then
returned home to Pennsylvania and opened a caramel business.  Here
Hershey’s luck improved.  Thanks to a large, serendipitous order from an
Englishman who happened upon Hershey’s caramel while passing
through town, a bridge loan approved against bank policy by a junior
loan officer, and a better taste owing to Hershey’s use in his caramel
formula of milk instead of the more common paraffin, Hershey’s caramel
business prospered.53  The business proved so successful that in 1900
Hershey was able to sell it for $1 million.  Crucially, however, Hershey
retained the Company’s fledgling chocolate division.54
Although disinterested in day-to-day business management, Hershey
had “a natural flair for experimentation” and a feel for “the intimate rela-
tionship between timing, temperature and taste.”55  For Hershey, there-
fore, the lure of chocolate was irresistible.  Chocolate—the rich, sensual,
and satisfying food derived from the cocoa bean—had long been a plea-
sure of the upper class.56  But because chocolate was so difficult to mass
produce and ship in an edible and economically viable form, few others
had ready access to it.57  Milk chocolate, a solid form of chocolate with a
pleasing taste that could be mass produced and widely distributed at bear-
able cost, was thus the holy grail for confectioners.  The trick was to in-
duce the water-based milk to combine with the fatty, oil-based cocoa.58
Having earlier succeeded with milk in his caramel formula, Hershey
began construction of the Hershey Chocolate Company’s main factory
and the surrounding town of Hershey in the heart of Pennsylvania’s dairy
country even before perfecting a viable milk chocolate recipe.59  The tim-
ing was tight, but after much experimentation Hershey eventually solved
the problem of combining milk and cocoa.  Hershey’s solution was to boil
the milk to the brink of souring, which explains the hallmark bitter,
harsh taste of Hershey’s milk chocolate.60  Although panned by chocolate
connoisseurs, who preferred the more subtle flavors of Cadbury, Lindt,
and Nestlé, Hershey’s grittier chocolate was the first encounter with the
52. See id. at 26–53.
53. See Brenner, supra note 21, at 74–80, 88; D’Antonio, supra note 8, at 54–58. R
54. See Brenner, supra note 21, at 88; D’Antonio, supra note 8, at 89–91. R
55. Brenner, supra note 21, at 77; see also id. at 73, 83 (describing Hershey’s aptitude R
for invention and planning, as well as his disinterest in ordinary business operations);
D’Antonio, supra note 8, at 29, 58 (noting Hershey’s “passion for experimentation”). R
56. See Brenner, supra note 21, at 91–102.  Dark chocolate might also have salutary R
health benefits.  See, e.g., Charalambos Vlachopoulos et al., Effect of Dark Chocolate on
Arterial Function in Healthy Individuals, 18 Am. J. Hypertension 785, 788–89 (2005)
(“[C]onsumption of dark chocolate may exert a beneficial effect of endothelial
function.”).
57. See Brenner, supra note 21, at 90, 92–93, 100. R
58. See id. at 91–92, 100–01.
59. See id. at 89–90, 105–08; D’Antonio, supra note 8, at 101–06. R
60. See Brenner, supra note 21, at 103–05, 109; D’Antonio, supra note 8, at 95–98, R
106–08.
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substance for many Americans.61  Hershey’s chocolate thus came “to de-
fine the taste of chocolate for” the American palate62—a process helped
along by Hershey’s production of “Field Ration D” during World War II,
a high-calorie, high-melting point chocolate bar developed for the Army
that garnered the Company an exemption from wartime rationing,63 and
by fawning press coverage of the corporate “utopia” that was the town of
Hershey.64  By the end of World War II, the Company dominated the
U.S. chocolate market.65
As with the caramel business, Hershey left the day-to-day operations
of the chocolate company to others and turned his attention elsewhere,
particularly to sponsorship of the Milton Hershey School,66 which he and
his wife Catherine founded for the benefit of orphan boys in 1909.67  In-
deed, because Milton and Catherine never had children of their own, the
boys enrolled in the School became their surrogate children.  “This was
especially true for Milton, who reviewed every application and helped to
choose the youngsters who got rooms at the homestead.”68  As Milton
later explained, “Well, I have no heirs; so I decided to make the orphan
boys of the United States my heirs.”69
The original 1909 Deed of Trust that created the School was quite
detailed.  The School—then known as the Hershey Industrial School—
was to “be permanently located in Derry Township,” the political subdivi-
sion of Pennsylvania in which the town of Hershey is situated, on farm
land conveyed to the Trust by Milton Hershey.70  The trust instrument
prohibited the use of Trust funds for any other purpose.71  The School
was to admit “poor, healthy, white, male orphans” between the ages of
four and eight.72  The Deed of Trust defined the term “orphan” to mean
“a child whose father is deceased.”73  Preference was given first to or-
phans from the three counties closest to the town of Hershey, then to
61. See Brenner, supra note 21, at 109–11. R
62. D’Antonio, supra note 8, at 108. R
63. See Brenner, supra note 21, at 8–10, 153. R
64. See id. at 131–32; D’Antonio, supra note 8, at 177–79. R
65. See Brenner, supra note 21, at 155 (noting that, in 1947, Hershey “provided 90% R
of the nation’s milk chocolate”).
66. See id. at 131–33; D’Antonio, supra note 8, at 169; see also Brenner, supra note R
21, at 137–38 (describing founding and oversight of similar school in Cuba). R
67. See Brenner, supra note 21, at 117. R
68. D’Antonio, supra note 8, at 128. R
69. Brenner, supra note 21, at 117. R
70. Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, Deed of Trust ¶ 11 (Nov. 15, 1909) (on file with the
Trust Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter 1909 Deed of Trust].
71. Id. ¶ 8.
72. Id. ¶ 13.  According to a family biography, the Hersheys limited enrollment in the
School to boys because Milton Hershey was of the view that girls were “useful in the home”
and hence more likely to be adopted.  Snavely, Story, supra note 50, at 126.  Contemporary R
social scientists had warned that needy boys, by contrast, were vulnerable to becoming
“shiftless and criminal men who would spawn another generation of undesirables.”
D’Antonio, supra note 8, at 129. R
73. 1909 Deed of Trust, supra note 70, ¶ 13. R
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those from the rest of Pennsylvania, and finally to those from the remain-
der of the United States.74
The purpose of the School was to produce productive members of
society.  The Hersheys instructed that:
[T]he main object in view is to train young men to useful trades
and occupations, so that they can earn their own livelihood.
Each and every scholar shall be required to learn, and to be
thoroughly instructed in some occupation or mechanical trade,
so that when he leaves the School . . . he may be able to support
himself.75
Once admitted, an orphan could stay at the school until the age of eigh-
teen.76  Students who went on to college were eligible for tuition assis-
tance.77  Graduates who did not plan on further education were given
“$100, a new wardrobe, and help in finding a job.”78
The School was also to feed, clothe, and board the orphans.  “All
orphans admitted to the School shall be fed with plain, wholesome food;
plainly, neatly, and comfortably clothed, without distinctive dress, and
fitly lodged.”79  From its founding and to the present day, the School has
provided room and board by placing each student in a home with several
other students supervised by a married couple who serve as
houseparents.80
In 1918, three years after Catherine died, Milton Hershey transferred
substantially all of his assets—including his stock in the Company, then
worth $60 million—to the Trust.81  The transfer was not publicly dis-
closed until the New York Times ran a story about it five years later.82  But
once the School’s dependence on the Company was known, the
Company’s managers took notice, becoming cautious and resisting new
methods in production and marketing out of worry that change could
imperil the steady flow of dividends to the Trust.83
Eventually, after falling behind its leading domestic competitor the
Mars Company in the 1970s, the Company was forced to embrace moder-
nity.84  The Company’s managers now speak of being “more conscious of
74. Id. ¶ 14.
75. Id. ¶ 17.
76. See id. ¶ 21.
77. See id.
78. Brenner, supra note 21, at 132–33. R
79. 1909 Deed of Trust, supra note 70, ¶ 17. R
80. See Milton Hershey Sch., Life in a Student Home, at http://www.mhs-pa.org/
content/?/student-life/life-in-the-student-home (last visited Mar. 3, 2008) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
81. See Brenner, supra note 21, at 134–35; D’Antonio, supra note 8, at 169. R
82. See M.S. Hershey Gives $60,000,000 Trust for an Orphanage, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9,
1923, at 1.
83. See Brenner, supra note 21, at 136–37, 230, 260–61; D’Antonio, supra note 8, at R
245–46.
84. See Brenner, supra note 21, at 259–78, 300–01; D’Antonio, supra note 8, at R
244–46.
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our stock price and what we have to do to improve the stock price, to give
value to our shareholders.”85  Thanks to better management, improved
marketing, and several successful acquisitions, the Company is again
number one in the North American confectionary market.86  In 2007, the
Company reported net sales of $5 billion and at year end had a market
capitalization of $8.9 billion.87  The Mars Company remains a close sec-
ond, however, and in 2007 the Hershey Company announced a plan to
streamline operations that will include domestic plant closings and layoffs
and the construction of a new factory in Mexico.88
Just as the Company has modernized, so have the Trust and the
School.  Since 1909, the original Deed of Trust has been modified to ex-
pand the age range for admission to four through fourteen (1933) and
then to four through sixteen (1970); to redefine “orphan” to include chil-
dren whose mothers are deceased (1933) and then to replace “orphan”
with “children” who do not receive “adequate care from one of his or her
natural parents” (1976); to drop the word “Industrial” from the School’s
name (1951); and, as is now typical for discriminatory trusts, to remove
the racial (1970) and gender limitations (1976).89
The School, which in the 1980s was called “terrible” by accrediting
officials, has evolved from an agrarian vocational institution to more of a
college preparatory school.90  Today the School sits on 3,200 “pristine
85. Brenner, supra note 21, at 317–18. R
86. See 2008 Annual Report, supra note 9, at 1. R
87. See id. at 15, 18, 85.  These calculations implicitly assume an equal valuation
between Class A shares, which are priced in the market, and Class B shares, which do not
trade in a liquid market.
88. See infra note 339 and accompanying text.  Soon thereafter, the CEO resigned R
and the Trust replaced several members of the Company’s Board of Directors.  See infra
notes 339–345 and accompanying text. R
89. See In re Petition of the Hershey Indus. Sch. for Modification of Trust, Equity
Docket No. 1096 (Ct. C.P. Dauphin County, Pa. Oct. 30, 1933) (decree granting
modification of trust) (on file with the Columbia Law Review); In re Petition of the Hershey
Indus. Sch. for Modification of Trust, No. 824-1951 (Ct. C.P., Orphans’ Ct. Div., Dauphin
County, Pa. Dec. 17, 1951) (decree granting modification of trust) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review); Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, Restated Deed of Trust ¶ 13 (Dec. 24,
1970) (on file with the Columbia Law Review); 1976 Deed of Trust, supra note 15, ¶ 13.  On R
modification of discriminatory trusts, see Dukeminier et al., supra note 20, at 742–43. R
90. See D’Antonio, supra note 8, at 250–54 (describing movement toward R
modernization following scathing accreditation review in 1989, as well as strong complaints
about such changes from alumni association).  This is not to say, however, that the
evolution was smooth.  On the contrary, the School’s alumni association accused the
School’s managers of conflicts of interest and other misdeeds.  See Kirkpatrick & Lockhart,
LLP, Findings and Conclusions of the Special Counsel (2000) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (examining alumni association’s allegation of breach of fiduciary duty by
trustees, but finding such allegations to be unfounded); Milton Hershey Sch. Alumni
Ass’n, Bias, Flaw, & Avoidance:  A Response to the K&L Report (2000) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (arguing that Kirkpatrick & Lockhart report demonstrates bias in
favor of trustees and failed properly to consider alleged breaches of fiduciary duty).  Some
of the association’s complaints led to an investigation by the state Attorney General.  See
D’Antonio, supra note 8, at 253–54 (noting Attorney General investigation and eventual R
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acres of rolling countryside” and boasts state-of-the-art facilities (includ-
ing the world’s second largest marble rotunda).91  The School clothes,
feeds, and provides health care for 1,700 students whose average family
income is under $14,000.92  The School also gives scholarships for college
tuition.93  All of the School’s operations are funded by the $8.8 billion
Trust.  Table 1 summarizes the Trust’s financial position and dependence
on the Company.
TABLE 1:  HERSHEY TRUST SUMMARY STATISTICS
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Trust Corpus
Total $4,593,255,021 $5,151,587,064 $5,816,887,358 $5,851,334,397 $7,095,503,724 $8,752,608,388
From HSY $1,969,448,811 $2,570,290,384 $3,341,036,837 $3,100,444,712 $3,578,929,577 $4,718,956,071
Percent
From HSY 43% 50% 57% 53% 50% 54%
Trust Investment Income (i.e., Interest and Dividends from Securities)
Total $118,099,233 $122,229,432 $118,569,196 $123,411,502 $130,661,524 $139,632,178
From HSY $41,255,383 $44,358,938 $47,888,318 $51,843,526 $62,734,729 $60,168,752
Percent
From HSY 35% 36% 40% 42% 48% 43%
Trust Ownership of and Voting Rights in Hershey Company94
Percent
Owned 32% 32% 32% 33% 30% 31%
Percent
Of Votes 77% 77% 77% 78% 78% 79%
Sources:  Milton Hershey Sch. & Sch. Trust, Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax (Form 990) for the fiscal
years ending in 2000 through 2005 (data as of July 31 of each year); The Hershey Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) for
the fiscal years ending in 2000 through 2005 (data as of December 31 of each year); Telephone Interview with Gayla M.
Bush, Vice President, The Hershey Trust Co. (Nov. 17, 2006).
settlement thereof through structural changes of board composition); infra note 124.  The R
trustees’ dealings with the Attorney General with regard to this matter played a role in
prompting the trustees to attempt to diversify.  See infra note 104 and accompanying text. R
91. Brenner, supra note 21, at 135; see also D’Antonio, supra note 8, at 244 R
(describing modern additions to facilities).
92. See Milton Hershey Sch. & Sch. Trust, Return of Organization Exempt from
Income Tax (Form 990), at Statement 8 (June 13, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 Return]
(describing services provided to student body); supra note 12 and accompanying text. R
Although the School’s Form 990 for the tax year ending on July 31, 2005 reports an
enrollment of only 1,300, we report the increased figure of 1,700 found on the web page
cited in supra note 12 because it is more recent. R
93. For the tax year ending on July 31, 2005, the Trust reported $5.3 million in
expenditures in connection with post-secondary education grants.  See 2006 Return, supra
note 92, at pt. II, l. 22 & Statement 5; see also id. at Statement 23 (describing qualifications R
for student grants).
94. The figures for the Trust’s ownership of and voting rights in the Company are
slightly overstated in that they include other shares held by the Hershey Trust Company
for some estates and trusts other than the Hershey Trust.  See The Hershey Co., Annual
Report (Form 10-K), at 66 (Mar. 7, 2005).  The Trust has a disproportionate voting share
relative to its ownership share on account of the Company’s dual class stock structure.  See
supra note 17 and accompanying text. R
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The Trust’s size is striking, particularly given the School’s small en-
rollment.  In spite of the Trust’s mushrooming corpus, the School
“served no more children at the start of 2005 than it did in 1963.”95
The Trust’s endowment is also remarkable for its breathtaking lack
of diversification.  Of the Trust’s $8.8 billion corpus, $4.7 billion (54%) is
in Company stock (representing 31% of all outstanding shares of the
Company).96  Close to half of the Trust’s income from interest and divi-
dends comes from its Hershey shares.  What is more, these figures under-
state the Trust’s diversification problem because the Trust’s other assets
include, among other local holdings, the Hershey Entertainment & Re-
sorts Company.97
The problem with an undiversified portfolio is that it entails uncom-
pensated risk—risk for which there is no offsetting improvement in ex-
pected return and that could be avoided costlessly by diversifying.98  To
understand why, imagine ten companies, each in a different industry and
each with different managers.  If all ten have the same expected risk and
return profile, then a portfolio of all ten stocks would have the same ex-
pected return as a portfolio of just one.  But there will be less variance in
the actual return of the ten-stock portfolio than in the portfolio of one,
because in the larger portfolio losers will be offset by winners.99  Thus the
95. D’Antonio, supra note 8, at 266.  The School’s current plan for enrollment R
growth, moreover, remains modest.  See infra note 324 and accompanying text. R
96. Because the Hershey Trust qualifies under the tax code as a supporting
organization, see I.R.C. § 509(a)(3) (2000) (describing qualifications for such treatment),
it is exempt from the 5% minimum distribution requirement, the excess business holdings
prohibition, and the other such rules of governance applicable to private foundations
adopted by Congress in the Tax Reform Act of 1969.  See James J. Fishman, The Faithless
Fiduciary and the Quest for Charitable Accountability 1200–2005, at 293–99 (2007)
[hereinafter Fishman, Faithless] (describing changes made by Tax Reform Act of 1969
applicable to private foundations); Fremont-Smith, supra note 3, at 264–80 (same); Brody, R
Parochialism, supra note 8, at 987–88 (noting Hershey’s exemption).  Indeed, the R
exemption evidently was created in part for the Hershey Trust.  See id. at 987–88 & n.230.
97. See 2006 Return, supra note 92, at Statements 9–11 (showing $231 million stake R
in Hershey Entertainment & Resorts Company and over $500 million spent on land,
buildings, and equipment).
98. For a more in-depth treatment of the perils of not diversifying with a focus on
trust portfolio management, see Langbein, Trust Investing, supra note 19, at 647–48. R
Although there is some literature that suggests that occasionally investors can increase
their return with a concentrated portfolio, see, e.g., Azriel Levy & Miles Livingston, The
Gains from Diversification Reconsidered:  Transaction Costs and Superior Information,
Fin. Markets, Institutions & Instruments, Aug. 1995, at 1, 46 (purporting to show that, in
certain circumstances, optimal portfolio for small investors may be very concentrated), that
notion does not bear on analysis of the Hershey Trust.  The trustees did not claim any
benefits from the Trust’s concentrated holding.  On the contrary, as we detail in Part II.A,
the trustees wanted to diversify.
99. Assuming returns in the ten firms are independent, the ten-firm portfolio would
have 1/10 the variance of a one-firm portfolio.  This is a simple application of the
calculation of variance, which holds that if you have a nonrandom factor, b, multiplying a
random outcome that has variance s2, the variance of the product will be b2s2.
Furthermore, the variance of the sum of c independent random outcomes, each with
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single-stock portfolio presents more risk, as measured by variance, with-
out an offsetting increase in expected return.
To be sure, an investor cannot diversify away general market risk (in
the jargon of financial economics, “systematic risk”).  But it is possible to
avoid most firm risk (“unsystematic risk”).100  The key to the risk-avoiding
magic of diversification, which can be achieved with investment in as few
as twenty stocks,101 is that unsystematic risk is often inversely correlated
across firms.  A breakthrough in solar power, for example, would nega-
tively affect an oil company, but would positively affect an energy-depen-
dent manufacturing concern.  In the case of the Hershey Company, and
so the Hershey Trust, firm-specific risk factors include volatility in the
cocoa and sugar markets.102
According to published accounts, the bursting of the technology
bubble and the Enron and Worldcom scandals sensitized the trustees to
the perils of an undiversified portfolio.103  In addition, the Pennsylvania
Attorney General’s office reportedly urged the trustees to diversify in
meetings held in December 2001.104
Nothing in the Deed of Trust requires the trustees to retain the
Trust’s stock in the Company.  On the contrary, the trust instrument gives
the trustees “full power and authority” over the Trust’s portfolio manage-
ment.105  As a matter of hornbook law, therefore, the trustees have the
authority to diversify the Trust’s investment portfolio if they determine
that diversifying is in the best interests of the Trust.106
variance s2, will equal cs2.  Thus, in the present example, the contribution of each
individual firm with return variance s2 to the portfolio will be (1/10)2 s2 = (1/100) s2
leading to a portfolio variance of 10 * (1/100) s2 = (1/10)s2.  For the first application of
this principle in the finance literature, see Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. Fin. 77
(1952).
100. See Langbein, Trust Investing, supra note 19, at 648. R
101. In the words of the leading finance text, “once you have a portfolio of 20 or
more stocks, diversification has done the bulk of its work.  For a reasonably well-diversified
portfolio, only market risk matters.”  Richard A. Brealey & Stewart C. Myers, Principles of
Corporate Finance 169 (6th ed. 2000); see also Macey, Introduction, supra note 19, at R
22–27 (reviewing risk and diversification in modern finance theory).
102. For examples of wild swings in these commodities and the effects of those swings
on the Hershey Company, see Brenner, supra note 21, at 137, 199–201, 231–42. R
103. See Branch et al., Sweet Deal, supra note 26. R
104. See id.; Sarah Ellison, Sale of Hershey Foods Runs into Opposition, Wall St. J.,
Aug. 26, 2002, at A3 [hereinafter Ellison, Sale of Hershey]; Robert Frank & Sarah Ellison,
Meltdown in Chocolatetown, Wall St. J., Sept. 19, 2002, at B1 [hereinafter Frank & Ellison,
Meltdown in Chocolatetown].
105. 1976 Deed of Trust, supra note 15, ¶ 5. R
106. See Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 310 illus. 1 (Tentative Draft No. 1,
2007).  This illustration, in fact, is based on the Hershey Trust:
The investment assets of the H School consist primarily of a controlling interest
in H Foods Corporation worth over $5 billion.  H Foods is a major employer in
the town of H.  The shares had been contributed by the donor upon his founding
of the H School, but the donor did not limit the ability of the H School governing
board to dispose of this investment in the company he had also founded.  The
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II. AGENCY COSTS AND THE ABORTED 2002 SALE
A. The Aborted Sale107
News of the trustees’ plan to sell the Trust’s controlling interest in
the Company first became public on Thursday, July 25, 2002, in a front-
page story with a two-column headline in the Wall Street Journal.108  Both
the Trust and the Company confirmed the Journal’s story that day.  The
subsequent media coverage, which credited the Journal with breaking the
story, reported that securities analysts were surprised by the announce-
ment.109  In the ensuing litigation, the trustees and the Attorney General
also credited the Wall Street Journal with making the sale plan public.110
According to the July 25 Journal story, the trustees were “keen to di-
versify” the Trust’s portfolio and had rejected alternatives to a sale “such
as a buyback or major recapitalization” in which the Company would buy
some of the Trust’s shares at a premium.111  The Journal also reported
that “People familiar with the matter say that Pennsylvania Attorney
General Mike Fisher’s office, while not advocating a sale of the company,
members of the H School governing board determine that it would be prudent
for the charity to diversify its investments, and therefore to dispose of the stock in
H Foods, and that not to do so would entail substantial financial risk that would
far outweigh the benefit of community good will.  Because the H school does not
have as a charitable purpose maintaining a controlling interest in H Foods for the
benefit of the town of H, the governing board may prudently diversify.
Id.
107. Our narrative of the aborted sale is presented in day-by-day detail to allow the
reader to evaluate our choices of event dates in the subsequent empirical analysis.  To
ensure that we did not miss important events, we examined every story in the Wall Street
Journal, New York Times, and Pittsburgh Post-Gazette that mentioned “Hershey” between June
25, 2002, and October 18, 2002.  We also examined the Company’s principal 2002 SEC
filings.
108. See Branch et al., Sweet Deal, supra note 26. R
109. See, e.g., Theresa Howard, Hershey Soars on Possibility of Sale of Controlling
Stake, USA Today, July 26, 2002, at 3B (describing surprise at announcement); Martha
Raffaele, Hershey, Trust Discuss Possible Sale, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, July 26, 2002, at W-1
(crediting Wall Street Journal with initially breaking story); Greg Winter, Hershey Is Put on
the Auction Block, N.Y. Times, July 26, 2002, at C5 (noting that analysts were “startl[ed]”);
see also D’Antonio, supra note 8, at 257 (noting that “the public remained in the dark” R
until July 25 Wall Street Journal story).
110. See Brief for Appellee, Opposing Appellants’ Application for Suspension of
Injunction Pending Appeal at 7, In re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, 807 A.2d 324 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2002) (No. 2111 C.D. 2002) [hereinafter Brief of Appellee] (citing stipulation
by both parties).  The only possible exception to the otherwise uniform view that news of
the sale broke on July 25 is a cryptic reference in the original July 25 Wall Street Journal story
to “rumblings in the food industry six to eight months ago that the trust was looking to
diversify its holdings and had hired an investment bank to advise it on a possible sale.”
Branch et al., Sweet Deal, supra note 26.  These rumblings, however, do not appear to have R
lessened the surprise of the July 25 story.  Further, if these rumblings did affect the price of
the Company’s stock prior to July 25, such an effect would be positive and so would work
against our finding of a large, positive abnormal return on July 25.  We take up the
possibility of leakage in Appendix B.
111. Branch et al., Sweet Deal, supra note 26. R
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has urged the Hershey trust to diversify.”112  The Journal story predicted a
“grim” reception for the trustees’ plan among Hershey residents and the
Company’s workers.113
Hershey residents and workers received the news grimly indeed.
With “tears in his eyes” the Company CEO Richard Lenny broke the news
to the Company’s employees at a 9 A.M. meeting.114  Lenny also recorded
a statement, which was broadcast on the internet every half hour, to the
effect that he “disagreed with the trust’s actions” and that he had offered
the Trust alternative means to diversify.115  The next day, Friday, July 26,
a local newspaper reported that “Hershey residents questioned why the
trust would need to sell Hershey Foods, wondered how the sale would
affect the village, and asked if a sale would be consistent with Milton
Hershey’s vision of social responsibility.”116  The chairman of the local
Township’s Board of Supervisors warned that “[t]he economics of the
region could be impacted severely” from loss of jobs.117  On Sunday, July
28, a local paper quoted the president of the School’s alumni association,
which had previously accused the trustees of conflicts of interest and
other forms of malfeasance,118 as saying that the trustees’ plan was
“despicable.”119
Investors took a more favorable view.  On Thursday, July 25, the day
of the Wall Street Journal’s first story, the Company’s common stock (ticker
symbol HSY) closed at $78.30, up $15.80 (more than 25%) from the prior
day’s closing price of $62.50.  A little over 19 million HSY shares traded
on July 25, about ten times as many as the day before.120  On Friday, July
26, the press ran stories speculating about potential buyers and possible
prices.121  HSY closed at $78.72 on Friday, July 26.  On Monday, July 29,
HSY closed at $79.49.
112. Id.; see also supra note 104 and accompanying text (describing statements made R
by members of Attorney General’s office prior to proposed sale).
113. Branch et al., Sweet Deal, supra note 26. R
114. Winter, supra note 109. R
115. Shelly Branch & Sarah Ellison, Few Hershey Kisses Behind Move to Sell, Wall St.
J., July 26, 2002, at B1.
116. Dan Shope & Keith Herbert, Hershey Wants to Swap Candy for Dough, Morning
Call (Allentown, Pa.), July 26, 2002, at A1.
117. Winter, supra note 109. R
118. See supra note 90; infra note 124.  Ironically, the resulting investigation by the R
Attorney General helped prompt the trustees’ interest in diversifying.  See supra note 104 R
and accompanying text.
119. Judy A. Strausbaugh, Hershey Sale May Force Town to Kiss Life Good-Bye,
Sunday News (Lancaster, Pa.), July 28, 2002, at D1.
120. We detail the source of our stock price data at infra notes 244–245 and R
accompanying text.  We obtained our trading volume data from the Hershey Company’s
web page.  See The Hershey Co., Investor Relations:  Historical Price Lookup, at
http://www.thehersheycompany.com/ir/pricelookup.asp# (last visited Mar. 3, 2008) (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
121. See, e.g., Neil Buckley, Juliana Ratner & William Hall, Nestlé and Kraft Head
Race to Buy Hershey, Fin. Times (London), July 26, 2002, at 23 (discussing potential for
Nestlé or Kraft to buy Hershey and mentioning proposed valuation); Gordon Fairclough &
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By Monday, July 29, local opposition to the sale began to organize.
The School’s alumni association asked D. Michael Fisher, the
Pennsylvania Attorney General and the Republican candidate for gover-
nor in the following November gubernatorial election, “to remove the
trust’s leadership for ‘fiscal waste and child-care incompetence.’”122  On
Wednesday, July 31, six former trustees (including the former Company
CEO Richard Zimmerman) made public statements in opposition to the
sale.123  Both Fisher and Ed Rendell, the ultimately victorious Democratic
gubernatorial candidate, openly opposed the sale.124
As part of a grassroots “Derail the Sale” campaign, a public rally
against the sale was held on Friday, August 2.125  Residents began display-
ing yard signs with slogans such as “The Hershey Trust—An Oxymoron”
and “Don’t Shut Down Chocolate Town.”126  John Dunn, a former
Hershey marketing executive, crafted the opposition’s message to ensure
favorable media coverage.127  By Monday, August 5, the editorial page of
the Lancaster New Era opined that “[i]t almost seems that the current
members of the trust are about the only people to think the sale is a good
idea.”128  HSY closed at $72.37 on Monday, August 5, down $7.12 (about
Erin White, Shake-Up in Candyland, Wall St. J., July 26, 2002, at B1 (noting Nestlé bidding
advantage arising from preexisting arrangement and speculating about effect of
simultaneous sale of other candy company upon bids for Hershey); Ameet Sachdev,
Hershey May Lure Kraft and Nestlé, Chi. Trib., July 26, 2002, Business, at 1.  The stories
continued thereafter.  See, e.g., Neil Buckley, Jeremy Grant & Juliana Ratner, Candy’s
Dandy but Strategy Remains the Key, Fin. Times (London), Aug. 2, 2002, at 24 (continuing
discussion of Nestlé and Kraft, but also mentioning other potential bidders such as
Cadbury Schweppes, Wrigley, and Mars); Elizabeth Olson, Nestlé Strikes $2.6 Billion Deal
to Buy Chef America, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 2002, at W1 (describing Nestlé’s commitment to
other acquisitions and noting that such transactions may impede ability to purchase
Hershey).
122. Shelly Branch, Sale of Hershey to Be Contested by School Alumni, Wall. St. J.,
July 29, 2002, at B10.
123. See Shelly Branch, Trust Pushing Sale of Hershey Faces Rising Level of Criticism,
Wall St. J., Aug. 1, 2002, at B6 [hereinafter Branch, Criticism].
124. See id. (noting Fisher’s opposition); Editorial, Trust Should Not Sell Hershey
Foods, Lancaster New Era, Aug. 5, 2002, at A6 [hereinafter Lancaster, Not Sell]
(describing concerns expressed about sale by both candidates).  At the same time that
Fisher announced his opposition to the sale, he also announced an agreement with the
trustees over the alumni association’s prior accusations of conflict of interest and other
such charges.  See Branch, Criticism, supra note 123; Peter Jackson, Hershey School R
Agrees to Rule Changes, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Aug. 1, 2002, at B-8; supra note 90. R
125. See Hershey Foods’ Board of Trustees Thinking of Selling the Company Has
Many Upset, CNBC News (Aug. 2, 2002), available in LEXIS (transcript of broadcast)
(describing rally and views of participants); Martha Raffaele, Joy in Candyland, Pittsburgh
Post-Gazette, Sept. 19, 2002, at E-1 [hereinafter Raffaele, Joy in Candyland] (describing
participation of community activists in “Derail the Sale” efforts).
126. D’Antonio, supra note 8, at 260. R
127. See id. at 259–60.
128. Lancaster, Not Sell, supra note 124; see also Stacey Hirsh, Hershey Residents R
Fear Worst if Company Sold, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Aug. 8, 2002, at E-8 (describing fears
of Hershey residents about adverse impact of sale upon community and local economy);
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9%) from the post-sale announcement high of $79.49 on Monday, July
29.
On Tuesday, August 6, Fisher met with several of the trustees to urge
them to reconsider their sale plan in favor of alternative modes of diversi-
fication.129  On Wednesday, August 7, the trustees held a special day-long
meeting to consider Fisher’s proposals and the merits of continuing the
sale.  That evening, after the stock market closed, the trustees issued a
release stating that they would continue to pursue the sale because they
believed it to be “in keeping with [their] fiduciary responsibility to pro-
tect and preserve the trust.”130  In the next day’s trading (Thursday,
August 8) HSY closed at $74.09, up $2.20 (3%) from the prior day’s clos-
ing price of $71.89.
Fisher then announced that he would turn to the courts.131  On
Monday, August 12, Fisher asked the local court with jurisdiction over the
Trust—ironically known in Pennsylvania as the Orphans’ Court—to issue
an order to the trustees to show cause why any sale of the Company
should not be subject to judicial approval.132  The court issued the order
to show cause the following Monday, August 19.133  Said a spokesman for
Fisher, “Ultimately, we hope that the court will require that any offer for
Hershey Foods be revealed to our office and the court and that any pro-
posed sale be subject to court approval.”134  HSY closed at $74.56 on
August 12 and $74.71 on August 19.
Later that week, on Friday, August 23, Fisher asked the court to en-
join the trustees from any sale pending the court’s resolution of the pro-
Thomas Hylton, Honor Hershey, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Aug. 11, 2002, at B-1 (arguing
that Trust owes duty to preserve special community in line with vision of Milton Hershey).
129. See Company News:  Hershey Trust Affirms Intention to Sell Candy Maker, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 8, 2002, at C3 [hereinafter Affirms Intention to Sell]; Sarah Ellison, Hershey
Trust Board Decides to Continue with Sale Option, Wall St. J., Aug. 8, 2002, at B6
[hereinafter Ellison, Decides to Continue]; see also Courtney Schlisserman, Fisher Urges
Hershey Trust Not to Sell, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Aug. 8, 2002, at E-8 (noting possibility
that “political pressure” would be brought to bear to defeat sale).
130. Affirms Intention to Sell, supra note 129; see also Ellison, Decides to Continue, R
supra note 129 (providing similar description of statement). R
131. See Company News:  Attorney General Says Court Must Decide Hershey Sale,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 2002, at C4.
132. See Brief for Appellants the Hershey Trust Company and the Milton Hershey
School in Support of Their Application for Suspension of Injunction Pending Appeal at
12, In re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, 807 A.2d 324 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002) (No. 2111 C.D.
2002) [hereinafter Brief of Appellant]; Brief of Appellee, supra note 110, at 5. R
133. See In re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, No. 712-1963 (Ct. C.P., Orphans’ Ct. Div.,
Dauphin County, Pa. Sept. 10, 2002), reprinted in In re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, 807 A.2d
at 328; Brief of Appellee, supra note 110, at 5 (noting grant of show cause petition by R
Orphans’ Court).
134. Marc Levy, Court Orders Hershey Trust to Defend Sale, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette,
Aug. 20, 2002, at E-2.
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priety of the trustees’ sale plan.135  HSY closed at $75.03.  Fisher’s office
also announced that it was drafting legislation that, if passed, would re-
quire the trustees of a charitable trust to weigh the effect on the commu-
nity in making investment decisions.136  The trustees filed their papers in
opposition to the injunction request on the following Monday, August
26.137  HSY closed at $76.80.  The Orphans’ Court scheduled a hearing
for Tuesday, September 3.138
At the September 3 hearing, with protestors outside the courthouse
“carrying signs and singing a Hershey’s chocolate jingle,”139 the main wit-
ness for the Attorney General was former Hershey CEO Richard
Zimmerman.  Zimmerman predicted that an acquiring company would
seek to cut costs first by eliminating jobs made redundant by the merger
and second by shutting down less efficient manufacturing plants.140
“And I suspect,” testified Zimmerman, “that one would start with the
[main Hershey] plant that’s nearly a hundred years old.”141  In
Zimmerman’s view, although these actions might improve the profitabil-
ity of the combined company, “there are very many more things in life
more important than money.”142
The trustees argued that the trust instrument authorized them to
divest the Trust’s holdings in the Company and that prudent investment
practice required diversification.143  Indeed, the trustees’ investment ad-
visor testified that the Trust’s heavy investment in the Company made its
portfolio “twice as risky as the typical college or university or independent
school portfolio.”144  The investment advisor also admitted, however, that
135. See Brief of Appellee, supra note 110, at 5–6; Brief of Appellant, supra note 132, R
at 12; see also Ellison, Sale of Hershey, supra note 104 (noting that Fisher had “asked the R
court to delay a sale until October”).
136. See Company News:  Delay Is Sought in Effort to Sell Hershey Food, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 24, 2002, at C4; Marc Levy, Hershey Sale Tough, Not Impossible, Sunday News
(Lancaster, Pa.), Aug. 25, 2002, at D1.  The proposed legislation was later enacted.  See
infra notes 193–198 and accompanying text. R
137. See Sarah Ellison & Robert Frank, Hershey Trust Contests Move to Halt Sale of
Chocolate Firm, Wall St. J., Aug. 27, 2002, at A4.
138. See In re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, No. 712-1963, 807 A.2d at 328.
139. D’Antonio, supra note 8, at 263.  On Monday, September 2 (Labor Day), the day R
before the hearing, a local paper ran a story about Milton Hershey’s “dream of building a
‘model town’” and the reliance of the community on the Company, which “is considered a
good corporate citizen and has an estimated annual budget of several million dollars for
charities.”  Hershey:  Candy Is Just the Beginning, Intelligencer J. (Lancaster, Pa.), Sept. 2,
2002, at B2; see also Andrew Ross Sorkin, Market Place:  Price Tag and Local Politics Damp
Interest in Hershey, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 2002, at C1 (suggesting that political
controversies surrounding any Hershey sale might drive away potential bidders).
140. See Brief of Appellee, supra note 110, at 9–10. R
141. Id. at 10.
142. Id. at 11.
143. See Brief of Appellant, supra note 132, at 20–21, 34–36. R
144. Id. at 15 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the Trust’s portfolio had always produced enough income for the School
in spite of its concentration in Hershey stock.145
The next day, Wednesday, September 4, the trial judge issued the
preliminary injunction with an opinion to follow.146  Both the timing and
the result of the judge’s decision appear to have been a surprise.  The
Wall Street Journal’s Wednesday story about the Tuesday hearing quoted
the judge as having said that he would rule by “week’s end” and reported
that “[m]any legal observers said the judge appeared unlikely to issue an
injunction.”147  In heavy trading (10 million shares, more than four times
the prior day’s trading volume), HSY closed on Wednesday at $72.51,
down $3.09 (4%) from Tuesday’s closing price of $75.60.
On Thursday, September 5, the trustees appealed and the appellate
court scheduled a hearing for Wednesday, September 11.148  In their
Thursday coverage of the trial court’s ruling, both the Wall Street Journal
and the New York Times reported that “legal experts” predicted that the
trial court would be reversed on appeal.149  HSY closed at $74.30 on
Thursday, up $1.79 (about 2.5%) from Wednesday’s closing price.  Mean-
while, Fisher praised the trial court’s ruling, saying that the injunction
would allow him “to represent the public’s interest” and would allow “the
court to determine how a sale could hurt this community.”150  On Friday,
September 6, HSY closed at $73.85.
On Monday, September 9, the parties filed their appellate briefs;151
HSY closed at $73.53.  The Attorney General conceded that the Trust was
“imprudently” undiversified “and that it would be ‘desirable’ for the
Trust to diversify its holdings,” but he also argued that “there was no testi-
145. In re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, No. 712-1963 (Ct. C.P., Orphans’ Ct. Div.,
Dauphin County, Pa. Sept. 10, 2002), reprinted in In re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, 807
A.2d 324, 332–33 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002).
146. See id. at 328.
147. Sarah Ellison & Christina Cheddar, Decision on Hershey Injunction Is Expected
by End of the Week, Wall St. J., Sept. 4, 2002, at B4.  After the hearing, Fisher told
reporters that he expected a ruling later in the week.  Pennsylvania Tries to Block Sale of
Hershey, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 2002, at C4.
148. See Appeals Court to Hear Arguments on Hershey, Wall St. J., Sept. 6, 2002, at
B6; Hershey’s Owners Seek Lifting of Injunction, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 2002, at C2.
149. See Sarah Ellison, Hershey Sale Is Temporarily Blocked, Wall St. J., Sept. 5, 2002,
at A3 (“[L]egal experts believe that the attorney general’s arguments might not hold up
under appeal . . . .”); Andrew Ross Sorkin, Court Ties Up Hershey Deal, for Time Being,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 2002, at C1 [hereinafter Sorkin, Ties Up] (“[M]ost legal experts
suggested that the injunction would be overturned.”). USA Today quoted a Philadelphia
lawyer “who filed a lengthy brief against the sale” as saying “[l]egally, it’s hard to say the
trust doesn’t have the discretion to sell.”  Gary Strauss & Thor Valdmanis, Judge Halts
Hershey Sale; Shares Dive 4%, USA Today, Sept. 5, 2002, at 1B.
150. Hershey Sale Blocked Temporarily by Judge, Chi. Trib., Sept. 5, 2002, Business,
at N3; Sorkin, Ties Up, supra note 149. R
151. Brief of Appellee, supra note 110; See Brief of Appellant, supra note 132.  Also R
on September 9, published reports indicated that Nestlé and Cadbury were in talks over a
possible joint bid for the Hershey Company.  See Robert Frank & Sarah Ellison, Nestlé,
Cadbury Discuss Terms of Possible Joint Bid for Hershey, Wall St. J., Sept. 9, 2002, at A3.
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mony that it needs to do so immediately, within the next few days or
weeks.”152  By contrast, “the current employees of Hershey Foods would
be worse off under an acquisition than they are now,” and the sale of the
Company “would seriously impair, if not destroy, the symbiotic relation-
ship which has existed for many decades among the company, the School
and its Trust, and the other institutions which together carry on Milton
Hershey’s unique vision.”153  The Attorney General argued that the bal-
ance of equities therefore favored upholding the preliminary injunc-
tion.154  “At its core,” the Attorney General explained, “this case raises the
question of whether the administrators of a charitable trust can operate
the trust to inflict injury and harm upon the public at large, which is the
ultimate beneficiary and real party in interest of all charitable trusts.”155
In response, the trustees argued that “‘the public’ benefit is not the
personal economic or social benefit that ‘the public’ derives from the
assets that the charitable trust holds—rather, ‘the public’ benefits from
the achievement of the specific charitable purpose for which the trust is
established.”156  Moreover, according to the trustees, nothing in the Deed
of Trust indicated that Milton and Catherine Hershey wanted the Trust
to maintain its ownership of the Company, or to undertake responsibility
for the economic health of the local community, or to provide continu-
ing employment for the Company’s workers.157  On the contrary, the
only interest named in the Deed of Trust was that of the School.158  The
Deed of Trust also gave the trustees “full power and authority to invest”
the trust assets.159  Accordingly, because “portfolio diversification is the
hallmark of any prudent investor,”160 because the Trust’s concentration
of investment in the Company made the Trust “twice as risky as the typi-
cal college or university portfolio,”161 and because nothing in the trust
instrument made the Trust’s investment in the Company “sacrosanct,”162
152. Brief of Appellee, supra note 110, at 11–12. R
153. Id. at 10.
154. See id. at 15.
155. Id. at 19.  Throughout his brief the Attorney General took the position that the
Trust’s ultimate beneficiary was the public at large.  See, e.g., id. at 5, 14, 19, 21, 22, 23, 26.
156. Brief of Appellant, supra note 132, at 23 (emphasis omitted). R
157. See id. at 25.
158. Id. at 13, 25; see 1909 Deed of Trust, supra note 70, ¶ 8 (requiring Trust’s R
income to be “exclusively devoted” to School).
159. Brief of Appellant, supra note 132, at 21 (quoting 1976 Deed of Trust, supra note R
15, ¶ 5). R
160. Id. at 34.  Elsewhere in their brief the trustees argued that “if recent events
involving the collapse of companies that were pillars of the communities in which they
were headquartered . . . reveal anything, they reveal that no company, no matter how
special and unique . . . , is immune from market forces and potential adverse economic,
business, or financial developments.”  Id. at 39 (emphasis omitted).
161. Id. at 36 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
162. Id. at 21.
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the trustees argued that it “was improper for the trial court to enjoin” the
sale process, which was both “lawful and prudent.”163
On Tuesday, September 10, the trial judge rendered a written opin-
ion explaining the issuance of the September 4 injunction; HSY closed at
$74.10.  Calling Zimmerman’s testimony “persuasive” and noting the
“symbiotic relationship among the School, the community, and the
Company,” the judge found that a sale of the Trust’s “controlling interest
in the Hershey Foods Corporation creates a likelihood that there will be
reduction in the work force and that relocations of plant operations and
closing of duplicate facilities will be matters of probable immediate con-
sideration by the acquiring company.”164  The injunction was therefore
necessary to prevent “the adverse economic and social impact” that would
result from a sale, “particularly in its effect on employees of the
[Company] and the community of Derry Township.”165  Put more bluntly
(and again quoting the trial judge), after paying a premium for the Com-
pany an acquirer would probably “introduce management efficiencies in
order to cut costs to achieve an acceptable return . . . . The likelihood is
great that these efficiencies will result in reduced work forces with a po-
tential for plant location changes.”166
The judge noted two other factors favoring the injunction’s issuance.
First, the Trust’s income had always exceeded the School’s operating ex-
penses.167  The judge therefore found that the proposed sale “appears to
be excessive and unnecessary for any foreseeable needs of the Trust.”168
Second, in the teeth of the volatility experienced by HSY on September 4
and 5, the judge rejected as “not . . . compelling” the argument that an
injunction would “cause significant fluctuations” in the Company’s stock
“that [would] result in possible loss to the School fund.”169  The Attorney
General made a similar argument in his appellate brief, adding also that
“nothing suggests that the stock will be priced differently even if a sale
does not occur.”170
The appellate court heard argument the next day, Wednesday,
September 11.  “Who in the courtroom,” the trustees’ lawyer asked, “has
not read in the paper what happens in today’s economy when you invest
too heavily in a single stock?”171  The Deputy Attorney General arguing
the case replied that “[t]here is absolutely no support, and in fact the
163. Id. at 36.
164. In re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, No. 712-1963 (Ct. C.P., Orphans’ Ct. Div.,
Dauphin County, Pa. Sept. 10, 2002), reprinted in In re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, 807
A.2d 324, 331–32 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002).
165. Id. at 331.
166. Id. at 329.
167. Id. at 332–33.
168. Id. at 334.
169. Id. at 333.
170. Brief of Appellee, supra note 110, at 29–30. R
171. Bill Sulon, Attorneys Debate Trust Company Role, Patriot-News (Harrisburg,
Pa.), Sept. 12, 2002, at D1.
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evidence contradicts, that there is a need to sell this company.”172  No
timeframe was set for the ruling; HSY closed at $73.55.
On Tuesday, September 17, 2002, while waiting for the appellate
court to render a decision, the trustees gathered in a hotel in Valley
Forge, Pennsylvania, for a previously scheduled two-day meeting.173  “De-
spite opposition from a handful of the 17 trustees,” the Wall Street Journal
reported that morning, “most . . . remain committed to at least exploring
the sale until a firm offer is on the table . . . .”174  HSY closed at $73.81 in
Tuesday’s trading.
The trustees had set a deadline of Saturday, September 14, for bids
for the Company.175  The top bid was from the Wm. Wrigley Jr.
Company:  $12.5 billion in cash and stock, or about $89 per share.  The
second best bid was a joint proposal from Nestlé and Cadbury, which was
valued at $10.5 billion, which works out to approximately $75 per share.
Wrigley also promised to keep the local Hershey factories open (a sad
irony given the Company’s 2007 announcement of layoffs).176  Because
the $12.5 billion price would be paid with both cash and stock, accepting
the Wrigley bid would not have entirely resolved the Trust’s diversifica-
tion problem.  But it would have reduced the Trust’s single-firm concen-
tration to the extent of the cash component of the deal.
According to subsequent media reports, the trustees’ Tuesday ses-
sion was “emotional,” “rancorous,” and “sometimes teary,” with the trust-
ees feeling “embittered” by what they perceived to be “pressure” from the
Attorney General’s office to diversify followed by the Attorney General’s
heated opposition.177  Having become the objects of calumny, the trust-
ees felt “overwhelmed by the outcry of protest from the community.”178
The chairman of the board of trustees, who had received death threats,
had been living with an armed guard assigned to his home.179  The trust-
ees deliberated for ten hours.  William Wrigley delivered a “moving”
speech in which he discussed the significance of adding Hershey to his
eponymous company’s name and promised a commitment to the
Hershey community.180  Just before midnight, however, the trustees an-
172. George Strawley, Hershey:  Attorney General Has No Right to Oppose Sale, Star-
Ledger (Newark, N.J.), Sept. 12, 2002, at 25.
173. See Sarah Ellison & Robert Frank, Hershey Trust to Meet Today, Consider
Alternatives to Sale, Wall St. J., Sept. 17, 2002, at B6 [hereinafter Ellison & Frank,
Alternatives]; Frank & Ellison, Meltdown in Chocolatetown, supra note 104. R
174. Ellison & Frank, Alternatives, supra note 173. R
175. Frank & Ellison, Meltdown in Chocolatetown, supra note 104. R
176. See Sarah Ellison & Nikhil Deogun, Hershey Trust Calls Off Sale of Firm, Wall St.
J., Sept. 18, 2002, at A3; Andrew Ross Sorkin, Hershey Trust Halts Auction Despite Offer of
$12 Billion, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 2002, at C1 [hereinafter Sorkin, Trust Halts]. On the
2007 announcement of layoffs, see infra note 339 and accompanying text. R
177. Sherri Day & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Candy Giants Both Show New Faces in Failed
Deal, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 2002, at C1; Ellison & Deogun, supra note 176. R
178. Sorkin, Trust Halts, supra note 176. R
179. D’Antonio, supra note 8, at 263. R
180. Frank & Ellison, Meltdown in Chocolatetown, supra note 104. R
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nounced that they had voted ten to seven to reject Wrigley’s bid and all
the other bids too.181
The trustees’ decision was met by Hershey residents and workers
with a mix of relief and joy.  “All I can say is hooray,” one resident told
the Associated Press.182  “I still want this company to be around for my
grandchildren, so they can work here when they’re old enough,” said an-
other.183  Kathy Taylor, a former town supervisor who helped spearhead
the “Derail the Sale” movement, offered a more blunt assessment to the
New York Times:  “Our cash cow is safe; we’re feeling really great.”184  In
something of an anticlimax, also on Wednesday the appellate court up-
held the trial judge’s injunction by a four to one vote.185
Investors took a dim view of the sale’s cancellation.  On Wednesday,
September 18, HSY closed at $65.00, down $8.81 (almost 12%) from
Tuesday’s closing price of $73.81.  Some 20 million HSY shares traded on
Wednesday, ten times the number that traded on Tuesday.
The trustees did not fare well in the aftermath.  On October 16, the
Orphans’ Court dissolved the injunction but ordered the trustees to give
the Attorney General’s office “prompt written notice” of any future inten-
tion to sell the Trust’s controlling interest in the Company,186 formaliz-
ing what the trustees had already promised in writing to do.187  The judge
also criticized the trust board as being too “large” and too “distant and
disconnected from the charitable interests they serve.”188  On November
14, Fisher announced that the seven trustees who had voted in favor of
continuing the sale, as well as three others who had opposed the sale,
would be stepping down in favor of four new board members, all hailing
from central Pennsylvania.189
Fisher, too, faced disappointment—at least initially.  His announce-
ment of the change in the trust board came a week after he lost the gu-
bernatorial election by almost 10%.190  Prior to the election, Fisher had
181. See Ellison & Deogun, supra note 176; Frank & Ellison, Meltdown in R
Chocolatetown, supra note 104; Sorkin, Trust Halts, supra note 176. R
182. Raffaele, Joy in Candyland, supra note 125. R
183. Id.
184. Clines, supra note 23. R
185. The majority held that it could reverse the judge only if there were “no
reasonable grounds” for the injunction, and a “review of the record and [the judge’s]
opinion does not immediately convince us no apparently reasonable grounds exists.”  In re
Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, 807 A.2d 324, 327 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002).
186. Sidel, Struggle for Hershey, supra note 8, at 29–30 (quoting In re Milton R
Hershey Sch. Trust, No. 712-1963, slip op. at Decree ¶ 2 (Ct. C.P., Orphans’ Ct. Div.,
Dauphin County, Pa. Oct. 16, 2002) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)).
187. See The Hershey Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 25 (Feb. 23, 2007); Sarah
Ellison, Hershey Foods’ Controlling Trust Says It Has “No Intentions to Sell,” Wall St. J.,
Sept. 27, 2002, at B5.
188. Tamar Lewin, 10 Board Members to Leave Hershey’s Charitable Trust, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 15, 2002, at A22.
189. See Sidel, Struggle for Hershey, supra note 8, at 31; Lewin, supra note 188. R
190. The 2002 Elections:  Northeast:  Pennsylvania, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 2002, at B12.
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run television ads in which he claimed to have saved over 6,000 Hershey
jobs.191  In 2003, however, President George W. Bush nominated Fisher
to be a circuit judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit.  The Senate confirmed Fisher’s appointment on December 9,
2003.192
The aborted sale also affected Pennsylvania law, which already devi-
ated from the national norm by exempting trustees of existing trusts from
an explicit statutory duty to diversify.193  On November 6, 2002, the
Governor signed an amendment to the Pennsylvania prudent investor
statute.  The amendment requires the trustees of a charitable trust “in
making investment and management decisions” to consider “the special
relationship of [a trust asset] and its economic impact as a principal busi-
ness enterprise on the community.”194  It also bars the trustee of a chari-
table trust “holding a controlling interest in a publicly traded business
corporation received as an asset from the settlor” from selling that con-
trolling interest without first notifying the Attorney General and the
Pennsylvania employees of the business.195  If the Attorney General chal-
lenges the sale, the amendment puts the burden on the trustee to “prove
by clear and convincing evidence” that the sale “is necessary to maintain
the economic viability of the corporation and [to] prevent a significant
diminution of trust assets or to avoid an impairment of the charitable
purpose of the trust.”196
The amendment constitutes a radical departure from orthodox prin-
ciples of prudent trust investment law.197  Nonetheless, it was well re-
ceived in Pennsylvania.  The State Senate majority leader captured the
local view:  “We have to be active and protect our economic assets.”198
191. Bill Sulon & Charles Thompson, Industry Representatives Assail Pennsylvania
Trust-Regulation Bill, Patriot-News (Harrisburg, Pa.), Oct. 29, 2002, at D1.
192. See The White House, Presidential Nomination:  Dennis Michael Fisher, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/nominations/490.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2008) (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).  Judge Fisher serves with Judge Marjorie O. Rendell, the
spouse of Ed Rendell, the Democratic Party candidate who beat Fisher in the gubernatorial
election.
193. See supra note 20. R
194. Act of Nov. 6, 2002, No. 2002-133, sec. 1, § 7203(c)(6), 2002 Pa. Laws 1101, 1101
(codified at 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 7203 (West 2005)).
195. Id. sec. 1, § 7203(d)(1), 2002 Pa. Laws at 1101.
196. Id. sec. 1, § 7203(d)(3), 2002 Pa. Laws at 1102.
197. Others have remarked upon the unusual nature of the Pennsylvania statute.  See,
e.g., Fremont-Smith, supra note 3, at 193 (“[The amendment] represents an unusual R
degree of interference with trustee discretion, not to say a perversion of the intent of many
donors.”); Sidel, Struggle for Hershey, supra note 8, at 44–48 (describing amendment as R
“position seemingly taken by no other state”); Dale, supra note 8, at 18–19 (describing R
skeptical commentary regarding amendment as “an understatement”); see also infra note
332 and accompanying text (discussing orthodox hostility, as embodied in Uniform R
Prudent Investor Act, to consideration by trustees of considerations other than
beneficiary’s interests).
198. Charles Thompson, Future Hershey Sale Obstacles OK’d, Patriot-News
(Harrisburg, Pa.), Oct. 10, 2002, at B1.
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As detailed in Table 1 above, in spite of occasional share repurchases
by the Company,199 the Trust remains overwhelmingly invested in the
Company and, hence, manifestly undiversified.
B. Charitable Trusts
A private trust is a fiduciary relationship in which the trustee holds
legal title to specified property, entrusted to him by the settlor, and man-
ages that property for the benefit of one or more beneficiaries.200
Hence, the trust presents the standard agency problem that arises when
risk-bearing (the beneficiaries) and management (the trustee) are sepa-
rated.201  To safeguard the beneficiary from mismanagement or misap-
propriation by the trustee, trust law supplies a set of default terms known
as fiduciary duties that prescribe the trustee’s level of care (the duty of
prudence) and proscribe misappropriation (the duty of loyalty).202  A
beneficiary who believes that the trustee acted disloyally or imprudently
may sue the trustee for breach of trust.  Moreover, because trust default
law makes it difficult for the beneficiary to remove the trustee, and be-
cause the beneficiary’s interest is typically inalienable (i.e., there is no
market for trust control), the threat of fiduciary litigation is the primary
force for aligning the interests of the trustee and the beneficiary—that is,
for minimizing agency costs in the modern private trust.203
199. See, e.g., 2008 Annual Report, supra note 9, at 33 (describing volume of shares R
repurchased by Company from Trust over preceding several years).
200. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 2 (2003); Dukeminier et al., supra note 20, R
at 485.
201. See Sitkoff, Agency Costs, supra note 37, at 623–25, 648–49. R
202. See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship:  Its
Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1045, 1047 (1991)
(noting relationship between potential harm arising from misappropriation and neglect
and corresponding trust law duties of loyalty and care); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & Econ. 425, 426 (1993) (arguing that,
because of impossibility of specifying contractual terms that address all future
contingencies in agency relationship, law imposes upon agent “duty of loyalty in pursuit of
the objective and a duty of care in performance”); John H. Langbein, The Contractarian
Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 Yale L.J. 625, 640–42, 655–60 (1995) [hereinafter Langbein,
Contractarian Basis] (describing shift toward fiduciary law, and away from limited trustee
powers, to safeguard beneficiary’s interests).
203. See Dukeminier et al., supra note 20, at 775 (“[T]he fiduciary obligation in trust R
law is not backstopped by the beneficiary’s ability to replace the trustee easily . . . or by
unfettered freedom to sell her beneficial interest . . . . Hence the fiduciary obligation in
trust law is the primary tool for minimizing agency costs . . . .”); Langbein, Contractarian
Basis, supra note 202, at 640–43 (noting that fiduciary duties provide primary means of R
“safeguard[ing] beneficiaries against abuse of [trustee] discretion”); Sitkoff, Agency Costs,
supra note 37, at 677–78 (arguing that “much of the governance burden” of modern trusts R
is placed “on the fiduciary obligation”); Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law, Corporate Law, and
Capital Market Efficiency, 28 J. Corp. L. 565, 570–71, 577–78 (2003) (“[J]udicial oversight
and the fiduciary obligation remain the beneficiaries’ principal recourse.”); see also
Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, Portfolio Allocation, supra note 36 (manuscript at 4), on which R
this paragraph draws.
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The paramount role of fiduciary law in minimizing agency costs in
trust governance explains the traditional rule that a private trust must be
for the benefit of an ascertainable beneficiary.204  Requiring an ascertain-
able beneficiary ensures that there is someone with an economic incen-
tive to enforce the trustee’s fiduciary duties.205
Unlike a private trust, however, a charitable trust must be for the
benefit of a charitable purpose such as advancing education or the relief
of poverty (hence the validity of the Trust)—not for a specific benefici-
ary.206  “Even if individuals receive direct benefits from a charitable trust,
such as scholarship grants, money, food, clothing, or any other direct as-
sistance, they are considered the ‘conduits of the social benefits to the
public and are not in reality the beneficiaries of the trust.’”207  Hence, for
a charitable trust there is no identifiable beneficiary with an economic
incentive and legal standing to ensure “that the trustee acts in accord
with the settlor’s charitable purpose and refrains from abuse or breach of
fiduciary obligation.”208  Evelyn Brody aptly frames the resulting agency
problem:  “In the case of an entity having no owners and established for
the benefit of indefinite beneficiaries, who is the principal on whom the
law can rely to monitor the agents and enforce the charitable
purposes?”209
The traditional answer to the problem of agency costs in charitable
trusts is to vest the state attorney general, as parens patriae, with standing
204. See Unif. Trust Code § 402(a)(3) (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 481 (2006) (“A
trust is created only if . . . the trust has a definite beneficiary . . . .”); Restatement (Third) of
Trusts § 44 (2003) (“A trust is not created . . . unless the terms of the trust provide a
beneficiary who is ascertainable . . . .”).
205. Empirical study suggests that trustee behavior is indeed sensitive to changes in
default trust fiduciary law.  See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, Portfolio Allocation, supra note 36 R
(manuscript at 9–12, 24–35).
206. The list of valid charitable purposes, which traces back to the Statute of
Charitable Uses, 43 Eliz., c. 4 (1601) (Eng.), is “(a) the relief of poverty; (b) the
advancement of knowledge or education; (c) the advancement of religion; (d) the
promotion of health; (e) governmental or municipal purposes; and (f) other purposes that
are beneficial to the community.”  Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 28 (2003).  Unif. Trust
Code § 405(a) (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 485 (2006) and Principles of the Law of
Nonprofit Orgs. § 210 (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2007) state virtually identical lists.  The
rules for qualifying as charitable under the tax code are similar, with differences that are
immaterial to this study.  See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (as
amended in 1990); see also Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 210 reporter’s notes
10–14 (describing requirements of federal tax law); Fremont-Smith, supra note 3, at R
238–300 (canvassing tax rules applicable to charitable entities).
207. Fremont-Smith, supra note 3, at 128.  Thus, in a December 2006 decision that is R
representative of traditional law, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirmed that the
School’s alumni association did not have standing to sue the trustees for breach of trust.
See In re Milton Hershey Sch., 911 A.2d 1258, 1263 (Pa. 2006).
208. Dukeminier et al., supra note 20, at 750. R
209. Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 Md. L. Rev. 1400, 1429
(1998).
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to enforce such trusts.210  Indeed, many states have broadened the attor-
ney general’s common law enforcement power to include the power to
investigate the operation of charitable entities.211  Most states also require
charitable trusts and other charitable entities to make regular reports to
the attorney general’s office (a disclosure requirement backstopped by
federal law applicable to tax-exempt entities).212  Furthermore, in many
instances, the state attorney general is a necessary party in litigation in-
volving a charitable trust or other charitable entity.213
The state attorney general, however, is a political official, typically
elected, with neither a personal financial stake nor, in the usual case, a
political stake in the operation of a charitable trust.  Most state attorneys
general assign few (if any) lawyers to supervision of charities.214  Unless
an alleged breach of trust obtains enough media attention to achieve po-
litical salience, actual scrutiny of a charitable trust by the attorney general
is unlikely.  As a result, it is the politically salient, egregious cases that
“trigger investigations,” not “reviews of annual reports.”215  In the usual
case there simply is not enough of a political payoff to the attorney gen-
eral to warrant the diversion of resources from other initiatives.216  The
mirror-image worry, recently developed nicely by Evelyn Brody, is that
when the attorney general does intervene in response to political pres-
sure, he or she will be tempted to promote his or her political interests at
210. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 391 (1959) (“A suit can be maintained for
the enforcement of a charitable trust by the Attorney General . . . .”).
211. See Fremont-Smith, supra note 3, at 317–18, app. at 476 tbl.1 (discussing trend R
toward expansion of powers of state attorneys general and providing comprehensive list of
such powers in each state); see also James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability,
62 Md. L. Rev. 218, 259–62 (2003) [hereinafter Fishman, Improving] (collecting
illustrative statutes); Craig Kaufman, Sympathy for the Devil’s Advocate:  Assisting the
Attorney General When Charitable Matters Reach the Courtroom, 40 Real Prop. Prob. &
Tr. J. 705, 725–26 (2006) (same).
212. See Fremont-Smith, supra note 3, at 315–17, app. at 476 tbl.1 (describing R
development of disclosure requirements and providing list of those of each state); see also
Susan N. Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities:  Trust Law, Corporate Law, and
Tax Law, 21 U. Haw. L. Rev. 593, 619–22 (1999) (collecting state and federal disclosure
rules).
213. See Fremont-Smith, supra note 3, at 318–19, app. at 476 tbl.1 (describing various R
forms of required notice to state attorney general of judicial proceedings and providing
comprehensive list of each state’s requirements); see also Kaufman, supra note 211, at 724 R
(collecting states that require state attorney general participation in judicial proceedings).
214. See Garry W. Jenkins, Incorporation Choice, Uniformity, and the Reform of
Nonprofit State Law, 41 Ga. L. Rev. 1113, 1128 (2007) (reporting fresh survey results).
215. Gary, supra note 212, at 622–24. R
216. See Dukeminier et al., supra note 20, at 760; John H. Langbein, The Uniform R
Trust Code:  Codification of the Law of Trusts in the United States, 15 Tr. L. Int’l 66,
67–68 (2001); see also Mary Grace Blasko et al., Standing to Sue in the Charitable Sector,
28 U.S.F. L. Rev. 37, 49 (1993) (“Lack of resources and lack of interest thus both
contribute to the current insufficiency of attorney general enforcement.”).
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the expense of the trust’s charitable purpose.217  Brody provides the apt
summation:  “Political cynics believe that ‘A.G.’ stands not for ‘attorney
general’ but for ‘aspiring governor.’”218
Accordingly, a diverse array of scholars have theorized that supervi-
sion of charitable trusts by the attorneys general is either lackadaisical, in
which case the trustees will lack an incentive to manage the trust’s assets
in an efficient manner,219 or perverse, entailing imposition of local politi-
cal preference irrespective of whether those preferences are “congruent
with the donor’s conception of the beneficiary class.”220  The prevailing
scholarly view, in other words, is that agency costs are rampant in charita-
ble trust governance.221
217. See Brody, Parochialism, supra note 8, at 968–79.  In Brody’s words: R
“Occasionally, though, we find the reverse problem:  a board trying to do the right thing,
but thwarted by an overreaching regulator.”  Id. at 975.
218. Id. at 946.
219. The literature typically credits Kenneth L. Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable
Dollar:  An Unfulfilled State Responsibility, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 433 (1960), as its foundation.
Karst wrote that “supervision and enforcement” by the attorney general “have been
irregular and infrequent.”  Id. at 437.
220. Brody, Parochialism, supra note 8, at 968. R
221. For example, Richard Posner argues that “neither the trustees nor the staff” of a
charitable entity has “a strong incentive to maximize value.”  Posner, Economic Analysis,
supra note 4, § 18.5, at 547.  Marion Fremont-Smith writes of “the failure of all but a R
handful of states to police [charitable] fiduciary behavior.”  Fremont-Smith, supra note 3, R
at 13.  Henry Hansmann observes that “in most states there has been little effort to exercise
even the substantial powers that the attorney general already has.”  Henry B. Hansmann,
Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 497, 601 (1981) [hereinafter
Hansmann, Reforming].  Harvey Dale has said that the state attorneys general “tend to
allocate their scarce regulatory resources to other more politically potent portions of their
domains.  In most states, the Charity Bureau of the Attorney General is inactive, ineffective,
overwhelmed, or some combination of these.”  Peter Swords, Nonprofit Accountability:
The Sector’s Response to Government Regulation, 25 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 413, 413
(1999) (quoting Dale).  Evelyn Brody observes that “as a practical matter, few state
attorneys general have the funding and inclination to engage in aggressive charity
enforcement.”  Brody, Parochialism, supra note 8, at 939.  Alex Johnson concludes that R
“attorneys general collectively have failed in their obligation to effectively monitor and
pursue breaches of duty” in charitable trusts.  Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Limiting Dead Hand
Control of Charitable Trusts:  Expanding the Use of the Cy Pres Doctrine, 21 U. Haw. L.
Rev. 353, 388 (1999).  Dana Brakman Reiser has noted the “significant resource and
structural issues unique to the nonprofit context” that make enforcement difficult.  Dana
Brakman Reiser, There Ought to Be a Law:  The Disclosure Focus of Recent Legislative
Proposals for Nonprofit Reform, 80 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 559, 561, 598–606 (2005).  Ronald
Chester laments that, in light of the ineffectiveness of “politically-influenced attorneys
general,” the “need for better policing methods for charities” is “increasingly obvious.”
Ronald Chester, Improving Enforcement Mechanisms in the Charitable Sector:  Can
Increased Disclosure of Information Be Utilized Effectively?, 40 New Eng. L. Rev. 447, 452
(2006) [hereinafter Chester, Improving Enforcement].  Susan Gary supposes that “[t]he
worst abuses receive attention, but many problems probably go undetected or
unaddressed.”  Gary, supra note 212, at 623. R
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Although there is anecdotal evidence that is consistent with the
widely held assumption of agency costs in charitable trusts,222 there exists
no quantitative empirical study of the issue.  The Trust’s 2002 aborted
sale of the Company provides an opportunity to undertake such a study.
Specifically, daily stock price data from before, during, and after the
aborted sale provide a measurement of the value of a prominent charita-
ble trust’s principal asset (i.e., a controlling interest in the Company)
while in the hands of the trustees as opposed to when that asset was for
sale on the open market.  These price data also allow for assessment of
the broader welfare effects of an intervention by a state attorney general
in a publicly salient case.
We posit that effective trustees would already have realized for the
Trust the benefits of holding a controlling interest in the Company by
using their controlling vote block to impose a value-maximizing strategy
on the Company’s managers.  Such efficiency-inducing actions would in-
ure to the benefit of all the shareholders in the form of a higher stock
price.  These assumptions yield a testable hypothesis:  After controlling
for general market trends, the sale announcement should not have had a
positive effect on the value of Hershey shares not held by the Trust.  On
the contrary, a sale would end the ability of the other shareholders to free
ride on the trustees’ value-inducing efforts.  Thus, if the trustees had
been successfully imposing a value-maximizing strategy on the Company’s
managers, we would expect if not a negative then at least a neutral price
effect from the sale announcement.  By contrast, a positive effect would
imply that the takeover threat associated with the market for corporate
control better disciplined the Company’s managers than the trustees in
spite of the trustees’ controlling vote block.
We must acknowledge, however, two important limitations in the
foregoing research design:  (1) a positive result might be consistent with
an alternative hypothesis, and (2) our study is by necessity limited to a
single charitable trust.  We consider each limitation in turn.
1. Alternative Hypotheses. — A positive finding is arguably consistent
not only with the charitable trust agency cost hypothesis that we state
above, but also with two alternative hypotheses:  (a) escape from the trust-
222. Perhaps the best known example concerns the egregious mismanagement of the
Hawaii Kamehameha Schools/Bishop Estate in the late 1990s.  See Dukeminier et al.,
supra note 20, at 763–66 (describing extensive misappropriation of trust assets and R
mismanagement by trustees of Bishop Estate); Samuel P. King & Randall W. Roth, Broken
Trust:  Greed, Mismanagement, and Political Manipulation at America’s Largest
Charitable Trust (2006) (same); see also Fishman, Faithless, supra note 96, at 3 n.1 R
(collecting “contemporary scandals involving charities”).  In a related vein, there have
been occasional studies detailing the insufficiency of resources allocated to charity
enforcement, see supra note 214, and studies of agency problems in not-for-profit firms,
see, e.g., Core et al., supra note 39, at 32–33 (finding agency costs to be primary force R
driving accumulation of excess endowments).
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ees’ non-profit-maximizing objectives, and (b) the control premium
phenomenon.223
a. Non-Profit-Maximizing Objectives. — The first alternative hypothesis
is that the trustees’ controlling interest depressed the stock price of the
Company not because the trustees were lax in monitoring the Company’s
managers, but rather because the trustees imposed policies that favored
the interests of the Trust to the detriment of the other shareholders.  On
this account, which comes in strong and weak forms, the sale announce-
ment would lead to an increase in the price of the Company’s stock by
freeing the Company’s managers to pursue a profit-maximizing strategy.
The stronger but less plausible form is that the trustees extracted
unequal distributions or other payments to the Trust not shared pro rata
with the other shareholders.  To have affected the stock price positively
on news of the sale, however, the fact of inequitable treatment must have
been publicly available.  Yet our review of the public record for the rele-
vant timeframe uncovered no evidence of such disproportionate extrac-
tion.  Further, an accepted principle of corporate fiduciary law holds that
a controlling shareholder may not secure a pecuniary or other benefit
from the company that is not shared proportionally with the company’s
other shareholders.224  Had other market participants known of such pri-
vate benefits, litigation likely would have ensued.
The weaker but more plausible version of this alternative hypothesis
is that the trustees imposed a cautious, risk-averse style of management
on the Company that favored stable dividends and low risk projects at the
expense of the sort of higher risk (but positive net expected value)
projects that in the long run are more likely to maximize the return on
the firm’s underlying assets.  For example, suppose the Company could
pursue project A or project B, but not both.  Project A offers a certain
return of $100 while project B offers a 60% chance of a $200 return
(hence an expected return of $120).  Diversified shareholders would pre-
fer project B because in the aggregate such shareholders will win often
enough to offset the less frequent occasions that they lose.225  However,
223. Given the Company’s dual class stock arrangement, see supra note 17 and R
accompanying text, it might be thought that changes in the relative voting and dividend
rules occasioned by the sale might affect the Company’s stock price.  However, the trustees
instructed the Company to solicit bids for a takeover that would be implemented by a
merger.  In such a merger, all the Company’s shares would be exchanged for cash or for
cash and stock in the acquiring company.  Because all Hershey shares would disappear at
the same time, there would be no change in relative rights among the Hershey
stockholders.
224. See Principles of Corporate Governance:  Analysis and Recommendations § 5.11
(1994); James D. Cox, Thomas Lee Hazen & F. Hodge O’Neal, 1 Corporations § 11.10
(2002).  As one of us has observed elsewhere, “dominant shareholders are held to all the
same fiduciary standards that ordinarily apply to management.”  Robert H. Sitkoff,
Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competition for Corporate
Charters, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1103, 1122 (2002).
225. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982); Sitkoff, Agency Costs, supra
note 37, at 655–57. R
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because the Trust is not well diversified, the trustees might prefer the
certainty of project A in spite of its lower expected value.226
When viewed in this manner, however, this alternative hypothesis is
revealed to be merely a reformulation of ours.  The trustees failed to max-
imize the value of the Trust’s most significant asset, its shares in the
Company, by sacrificing value for a reduced level of risk that could have
been achieved in an alternative fashion without any loss in value.227  If
the trustees judged the risk associated with a profit-maximizing Company
to be too great for the Trust to bear, then they could have sold the Trust’s
shares, realizing the increased price from the market’s expectation of the
Company’s switch to profit-maximization once free of the Trust’s control.
The trustees could then have invested the resulting larger Trust corpus in
a diversified portfolio with the desired balance of risk and return.
The key point is that regardless of the mechanism for the depressed
price of the Company’s stock—lax monitoring of the Company’s manag-
ers or imposition of something other than a profit-maximizing strategy—
the implication of a positive finding is the same.  The trustees unnecessa-
rily sacrificed value, reducing the assets available for the Trust’s charita-
ble purpose while at the same time exposing the Trust to uncompensated
risk.
b. The Control Premium Phenomenon. — The second alternative
hypothesis posits that a positive result could reflect the control premium
phenomenon.  A controlling interest in a publicly-traded company
sometimes has a control premium attached to it independent of any be-
liefs about the firm’s underlying value.  On this account, the trustees
might have been active, efficient monitors of the Company’s managers,
but owing to a potential buyer’s managers’ desire to build a larger em-
pire, to become too big to be a takeover target, or to acquire the
Company for some other reason, a buyer might nonetheless value a
control block in the Company more highly than the sum of the market’s
valuation of the individual shares.228  A purchaser also might be willing
226. See D’Antonio, supra note 8, at 246 (suggesting that trustees were “interested in R
minimizing risk and pressed the company for consistent performance rather than quick
profits”).
227. A closely related scenario involves the trustees failing to diversify because they
anticipated political opposition and judged the costs of a diversification effort to outweigh
its probable benefits.  On this account, for which we hasten to add that there is little
supporting evidence, the problem was not agency costs in the Trust’s management, but
rather defects in the political economy of the supervision of charitable trusts.  Either way,
the social welfare loss is the same and traces to structural weaknesses in the charitable trust
form.
228. In this account, the control premium stems from agency costs within the
acquiring firm.  See, e.g., Yakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, Risk Reduction as a Managerial
Motive for Conglomerate Mergers, 12 Bell J. Econ. 605, 606 (1981) (discussing
management incentive to diversify to protect the managers’ jobs); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Regulating the Market for Corporate Control:  A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer’s
Role in Corporate Governance, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1145, 1157 & n.24 (1984) (describing
several empire building models); Michael Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow,
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to pay a premium in anticipation of the synergies created by the
merger.229
However, the control premium possibility bears only on the mecha-
nism for, not the existence of, agency costs in the Trust’s management.
Because the trustees already had a controlling interest in the Company,
they should have exploited the existence of a potential control premium
for the Trust’s charitable purpose, if not directly by imposing superior
management on the Company (our original hypothesis), then indirectly
by selling the Company to a buyer that for whatever reason values control
more highly (this alternative hypothesis).  Under either scenario, the
trustees left money on the table that could have been realized for the
benefit of the Trust’s charitable purpose.
2. A Single Charitable Trust. — The second limitation in our research
design is that our study encompasses only a single charitable trust.  Here
the worry relates to our econometric methodology (i.e., internal validity)
and to the generalizability of our results (i.e., external validity).
With respect to internal validity, the concern is that, with only a sin-
gle trust, the noise to signal ratio might be such that we ascribe statistical
significance to what is in fact a random fluctuation in the data.  To ad-
dress this concern, we undertake a host of robustness checks, several of
which are designed specifically to address the problem of noise in a sam-
ple of one.230  We may also take comfort from the fact that the magni-
tudes of some of our findings are so large that, as a mathematical matter,
they cannot be artifacts of random fluctuation in the data.231
Regarding external validity, the concern is that our findings with re-
spect to the Trust might not be representative of other charitable trusts
more generally.  Here the tension is between the quality of the natural
quasi-experiment (the more unusual the circumstances, the better the
experiment) and the generalizability of the results.  Given the unique
shock of the trustees’ exposure of the Company to the market for corpo-
rate control, we must guard against reading our results more aggressively
than our research design can justify.
Accordingly, in our view a positive result would indicate agency costs
in the Trust structure and would tend to support the large body of theo-
retical literature that supposes agency costs in charitable trusts more gen-
erally.  We cannot, however, generalize about the magnitude of agency
costs in other charitable trusts from the magnitude of our specific
Corporate Finance and Takeovers, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 323, 323 (1986)
(arguing that management has an incentive to expand excessively because growth
increases manager power and compensation).
229. Strictly speaking, the synergy scenario might more properly be understood as an
agency cost arising from the charitable trust form.  If such synergies existed, value-
maximizing trustees would have used their control to force the Company to exploit those
synergies, for example by initiating a merger.
230. See infra Part III.C.4.
231. See infra Appendix C.
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Hershey finding, as each charitable trust operates in a different context.
Still, a very large positive finding might imply that the problem is worse
than previously believed, as the Trust has a high profile in Pennsylvania.
A negative result, by contrast, would indicate that this charitable trust was
well managed.  But given the Trust’s political salience in Pennsylvania, a
negative result would not negate the claim in the theoretical literature
that lower profile charitable trusts are often poorly managed.
C. Corporate Governance
Minimizing agency costs is also a central concern of corporate law.
In the corporate context, agency problems arise from what Berle and
Means famously dubbed the corporate form’s “separation of ownership
and control”—that is, the separation of the risk-bearing residual claim,
which is held by the shareholders, from managerial authority, which is
held by the directors and senior management.232  To align the incentives
of managers with the interests of shareholders, or at least to constrain the
extent to which managers can advance their own interests at the expense
of shareholders, the law gives shareholders information rights, the right
to sue, the right to vote on the composition of the board and to approve
certain critical transactions, and the right to sell their shares.233
With respect to the large, publicly traded corporation, the prevailing
scholarly view, which is supported by abundant empirical evidence, is that
shareholder litigation and other such control mechanisms are weak de-
vices for minimizing corporate agency costs when compared to the mar-
ket for corporate control (i.e., the threat of a takeover).234  Collective
action problems plague diffuse shareholders, leaving each individual
shareholder hesitant to engage in litigation, which is in effect a public
good.  A litigating shareholder will bear most of the litigation costs, but
because the typical shareholder owns a tiny percentage of the company,
the resulting gains from reducing corporate agency costs will accrue
232. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and
Private Property 69–70 (1932).  For more modern statements, see Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Corporation Law and Economics 35–38 (2002); Roberta Romano, Foundations of
Corporate Law, at v (1993).
233. See Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 407, 413–24 (2006).
234. Michael Jensen famously expressed this view in his 1993 Presidential Address to
the American Finance Association.  See Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial
Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems, 48 J. Fin. 831, 850 (1993).
For a recent review of the empirical literature, see Bhagat & Romano, supra note 29, at R
976–77, 978 tbl.3, 987–92; see also Gregg A. Jarrell, James A. Brickley & Jeffry M. Netter,
The Market for Corporate Control:  The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, J. Econ. Persp.,
Winter 1988, at 49 (describing empirical studies regarding market for corporate control);
Michael Jensen & Richard Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control:  The Scientific
Evidence, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 5 (1983) (same).
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mainly to the other shareholders.235  The same intuition applies to other
internal control mechanisms such as the right to vote.  No individual
shareholder has a real incentive to fight for controls that would benefit
all shareholders or to engage in the sort of active monitoring that leads to
informed voting.236
The analysis is different when one considers the potential disciplin-
ing force of the threat of a takeover.  If managers do not maximize the
return on a firm’s assets, the firm’s stock price will be depressed.  This
depressed stock price represents a profit opportunity for an investor or
group of investors that acquires a controlling interest in the firm and
replaces the existing management team with one that maximizes the re-
turn on the firm’s assets.  The payoff is the resulting appreciation in the
firm’s stock price.  Accordingly, by threatening managers with the loss of
their jobs in the event that they shirk or underperform, the market for
corporate control minimizes corporate agency costs.237  On this account
the right to vote and the right to sell are essential to good corporate gov-
ernance not in their own right, but because they facilitate the operation
of the market for corporate control.
An alternative disciplining mechanism arises when the firm has a
controlling shareholder or a minority blockholder.  Unlike a typical
shareholder, for whom diversification plus passivity is a rational strategy, a
controlling shareholder might have a sufficient financial incentive to
monitor actively and, if necessary, impose new management or new man-
agerial strategies on a company.238  Thus, some scholars and policymak-
ers have argued that increased activism by controlling shareholders will
improve corporate governance.239  On the other hand, the extent of the
235. For discussion of agency problems in shareholder litigation, see generally
Reinier Kraakman et al., When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 Geo.
L.J. 1733 (1994).
236. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26
J.L. & Econ. 395, 402 (1983) (“When many are entitled to vote, none of the voters expects
his votes to decide the contest.  Consequently none of the voters has the appropriate
incentive at the margin to study the firm’s affairs and vote intelligently.”).
237. See, e.g., Manne, supra note 37, at 238–39 (arguing that, with regard to for-profit R
corporations, enforcement of fiduciary duties is backstopped by possibility of takeover).
238. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate
Control, 94 J. Pol. Econ. 461, 463 (1986) (arguing that large blockholder, because it can
capture significant portion of increase in corporate value, will have incentive to monitor
management).
239. See, e.g., Black, Agents, supra note 5, at 813 (1992) (“Large institutions could R
overcome the incentives for passivity created by fractional ownership.”); Ronald J. Gilson &
Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director:  An Agenda for Institutional
Investors, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 863, 868 (1991) (describing increased activity by large,
institutional investors as “laudatory”).  For contrary analysis, see Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1735, 1752–53
(2006) (arguing that costs of widespread monitoring by institutional investors, costs of
initiating changes in management, and low probability of benefit undermine advantages of
blockholder activism); Thomas A. Smith, Institutions and Entrepreneurs in American
Corporate Finance, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 33–35 (1997) (arguing that institutional oversight is
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discipline provided by a controlling shareholder will depend on the con-
trolling shareholder’s incentives and, if the controlling shareholder is it-
self an entity, the quality of the controlling shareholder’s internal govern-
ance scheme.  On this view, an individual or a well-managed, profit-
maximizing hedge fund240 might be a more effective monitor than a pen-
sion fund241 or mutual fund run by managers with an attenuated stake242
in the ultimate performance of the fund.
The aborted 2002 sale of the Company by the Trust provides a fortui-
tous natural quasi-experiment on the comparative virtues of a controlling
shareholder versus the market for corporate control as alternative mecha-
nisms for minimizing corporate agency costs.  If the two mechanisms are
equally effective in disciplining management, we should find no differ-
ence in the value of the Company during the sale window and during the
periods immediately before and after that window.  By contrast, if the
market for corporate control is superior to the control provided by con-
centrated ownership, whether because blockholders are generally ineffec-
tive, because the managers of this particular blockholder (i.e., the trust-
ees) have poor incentives owing to the agency problems that are inherent
to the charitable trust form, or some combination of the two, we should
find that Hershey’s market value improves during the sale window.  If the
market for corporate control is inferior to control by the Trust in disci-
plining management, we should find that Hershey is worth less during
the sale window.
As in our analysis of charitable trust agency costs above, we must
again acknowledge potential limitations in our research design concern-
ing:  (1) alternative hypotheses and (2) reliance on observations of a sin-
gle firm.
impractical because of requirements of risk-increasing concentration of investment and
large initial expenditure); see also Roberta Romano, Less Is More:  Making Institutional
Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 Yale J. on Reg. 174,
187 (2001) (surveying empirical literature on institutional activism and concluding that, in
general, such activism does not improve shareholder wealth).
240. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 48, at 1062–70 (arguing that hedge funds have R
superior profit-maximizing strategies as result of less stringent regulatory constraints,
better-designed incentive structures, and more limited conflicts of interest).
241. Compare Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 Mich. L. Rev.
520, 606–07 (1990) (arguing that public pension funds are well suited to engage in
proshareholder activism), with Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in
Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 795, 799–831 (1993) (arguing
that public pension funds have their own perverse incentives to take positions potentially
in conflict with shareholder interests generally).
242. This point is made quite forcefully in Edward B. Rock, The Logic and
(Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 Geo. L.J. 445, 469–78
(1991) (emphasizing “potential divergence of interests between passive portfolio managers
and the beneficiaries of the funds they manage”); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity
Versus Control:  The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1277,
1338 (1991) [hereinafter Coffee, Liquidity] (proposing reforms to overcome fund
managers’ attenuated incentives to monitor actively).
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1. Alternative Hypotheses. — We cannot disentangle the role of the
Trust’s particular governance structure from the role of switching from a
controlling shareholder to the market for corporate control as alternative
explanations for the Company’s price dynamics in and around the sale
window.  Thus, if we have a positive finding—that is, if we find that the
Company is more valuable when subject to the takeover market than
when under the thumb of the trustees—we will know only that the mar-
ket rated the threat of a takeover as superior to control by this controlling
shareholder.  Although such a result would highlight the problem of
agency costs within a controlling shareholder’s organizational form and
would lend modest support to the takeover model, it would not resolve
whether the takeover market is preferable to another controlling share-
holder with better internal governance (for example, a hedge fund).
Further, to the extent that a positive finding is traceable to agency
costs in this controlling shareholder, per our discussion in the prior sec-
tion of alternate hypotheses relating to charitable trust agency costs, we
cannot determine the specific form of the Trust’s agency costs (e.g., lax
oversight by the trustees, imposition of something other than a profit-
maximizing strategy by the trustees, etc.).
In sum, our analysis will add to the stock of empirical knowledge on
controlling shareholders and the takeover market as alternative devices
for minimizing corporate agency costs, but the interpretation of our find-
ings must be sensitive to our inability to disentangle how much of our
findings are attributable to general versus specific features of the Hershey
incident.
2. A Single Firm. — As before, we must consider the possibility that
we might ascribe statistical significance to what is in fact random variation
in the data because we examine only a single firm.243
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
We examine the Company’s share prices before, during, and after
the period in which the trustees announced their intention to sell the
Trust’s controlling interest in the Company.  Our analysis proceeds in
four steps.  First, in Part III.A, we describe the nature and sources of our
stock market data.  Second, in Part III.B, we undertake a graphical analy-
sis of the data for the Company by itself and in comparison to its leading
competitors and to the stock market as a whole.  The stock price effects of
the trustees’ plan to sell and abandonment of the sale are so profound
that simple graphical depictions are highly suggestive.  Third, in Part
III.C, we present the results of a more formal event study econometric
analysis that measures stock price movements traceable to sale-related
events by isolating them from movements related to ordinary market vola-
tility.  Finally, in Part III.D, we offer a nontechnical summary of our main
243. See supra text accompanying notes 230–231. R
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empirical findings.  Readers interested in our results, but not the formal
methodology, will find Parts III.B and III.D of principal interest.
A. Data
We examine daily closing price data for the Company’s common
stock (ticker symbol HSY), the common stocks of Hershey’s closest com-
petitors that are traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and a
variety of market indexes, including the Standard and Poor’s 500 (S&P
500) and the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA).  Our timeframe in-
cludes the period during which the sale was considered (that is, between
July 25, 2002, and September 18, 2002), two years preceding the sale win-
dow, and two years following the sale window.  We include two years
before and after the sale window to put the observed price movements
during the window into historical perspective.
We obtained our stock price data from the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago Graduate School of
Business.244  We accessed these data through Wharton Research Data
Services,245 an interface maintained for academic use at the University of
Pennsylvania.
A problem with raw stock price data spanning several years is that
price movements may reflect nothing more than a stock split or a divi-
dend payment, neither of which affect shareholder wealth.246  To avoid
distortion from stock splits and dividends in our examination of stock
prices over time, in the graphical and event study analyses that follow we
use adjusted closing prices provided by CRSP that account for stock splits
and dividends.
B. Graphical Analysis
On July 25, 2002, the day the Wall Street Journal broke the news of the
trustees’ plan to sell, HSY closed at an unadjusted price of $78.30, an
increase of $15.80 (more than 25%) from the prior day’s closing price of
244. See Ctr. for Research in Sec. Prices, at http://www.crsp.com/ (last visited Mar. 3,
2008) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
245. See Wharton Research Data Servs., at http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu/ (last
visited Mar. 3, 2008) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).  Historical HSY data is also
available online at The Hershey Co., Investor Relations:  Historical Price Lookup, supra
note 120.
246. For example, suppose Company A has 100 shares trading at $10 per share.  Then
A makes a two-for-one stock split.  Assuming no other contemporaneous changes in A,
after the split there would be 200 shares trading at $5 per share.  Although A’s stock price
would have dropped by half, A’s shareholders would have twice as many shares, leaving
their wealth unchanged.  Alternatively, suppose Company B has 100 shares trading at $10
per share.  Then B pays a cash dividend of $5 per share.  Assuming no other
contemporaneous changes in B, after the cash dividend the 100 shares in B would trade at
$5 per share because there would be five dollars less per share worth of assets in the
company.  Yet the shareholders in B would be unharmed by the decline in the stock price,
as the decline would be offset by the payment of $5 per share to those shareholders.
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$62.50.  On September 18, 2002, the first trading day after the trustees
publicly abandoned their sale plan at close to midnight on September 17,
HSY closed at an unadjusted price of $65.00, a decrease of $8.81 (almost
12%) from the prior day’s closing price of $73.81.
While these price changes seem striking, it is possible that they are
only coincidentally related to news of the sale and its abandonment.  For
example, the increase at the beginning of the sale window might reflect a
preexisting upward trend in HSY, and the decline at the end of the sale
window might be picking up the beginning of a downward trend.  An-
other possibility is that these price movements, large though they may be,
were the result of normal random variation in the price of HSY—that is,
perhaps HSY is a volatile stock and this volatility manifested itself posi-
tively on July 25 and negatively on September 18.247  Still another possi-
bility is that these price changes could reflect general market movement
common to all similar stocks on those days.
To rule out the possibility that the identified price movements are
the result of existing trends or normal variation, we examine in Figure 1
the adjusted closing price of HSY during the sale window and for fifty
trading days before and after the sale window.  For a broader perspective,
Appendix Figure A1 presents 500 trading days before and after the sale
window, a practice we repeat for all the graphs in this section.
FIGURE 1: HSY PRICE HISTORY
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Figure 1 demonstrates that the price increase at the beginning and
the decrease at the end of the sale window were not artifacts of preexist-
247. As seen in the graphs that follow, as well as the subsequent regressions, HSY
returns are not particularly volatile, which suggests that this possibility is unlikely.
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ing trends.  On the contrary, the price of HSY was trending downward
before July 25, 2002, and began an upward trend not long after the trust-
ees abandoned the sale.248
Another possible explanation for the observed HSY price movements
is coincidental change in the chocolate market.  To examine this possibil-
ity, Figure 2 and Appendix Figure A2 add contemporaneous price move-
ments of three firms that compete with Hershey in the chocolate market:
Cadbury Schweppes (CSG), Tootsie Roll (TR), and Rocky Mountain
Chocolate Factory (RMCF).249  These firms250 represent Hershey’s princi-
pal NYSE-traded competitors with important chocolate products.251  We
consider the potential endogeneity problems with using the performance
of a competitor as a control in connection with our formal event study
analysis in Part III.C below.
None of Hershey’s chocolate market competitors experienced a
comparable stock price jump on July 25, 2002, and none dropped as
precipitously on September 18, 2002.252  Hence, we infer that the ob-
served HSY price movements on those dates were not related to peculiar
coincidental factors in Hershey’s primary product market.
The Company’s business is broader, however, than just chocolate.  In
2002 Hershey “also manufacture[d] and/or market[ed] grocery products
in the baking, beverage, peanut butter and toppings categories.”253
Thus, in Figure 3 (and Appendix Figure A3) we compare HSY price
248. Appendix Figure A1 shows that the price of HSY returned to the sale window
level about a year later, but per Appendix Figure A2, the subsequent upward trend in HSY
resembles the upward trend experienced contemporaneously by other chocolate
companies.
249. The RMCF stock price is plotted against the right hand axis in Figure 2 because
its price range during the entire period was substantially lower than that of the other
stocks.
250. A similar picture would emerge if we were to create a single portfolio of
Hershey’s competitors and plot that portfolio’s return against the HSY return.
251. We took our roster of Hershey’s chocolate rivals from Google Finance, The
Hershey Company:  Related Companies, at http://finance.google.com/finance?q=hsy (last
visited Mar. 3, 2008) (on file with the Columbia Law Review), and Yahoo! Finance, Hershey
Co.:  Competitors, at http://finance.yahoo.com/q/co?s=HSY (last visited Mar. 3, 2008)
(on file with the Columbia Law Review), which list these firms as Hershey’s primary publicly
traded competitors in the chocolate market.  The other obvious contenders are Mars and
Nestlé, but Mars is a privately held firm, so it has no public stock price data, and Nestlé is
not traded on the New York Stock Exchange.  While each of these competitors produces
more than just chocolate, we categorize them as chocolate competitors because they do
not reach the scale or scope of production of the firms that we categorize as food
competitors in the analysis that follows in Figure 3.
252. Although TR does appreciate on July 25, 2002, the increase is small relative to
the normal variation in TR’s price.  Likewise, RMCF appears to experience potentially
interesting price movement in the middle of the sale window, though this movement also
is small relative to the normal variation in RMCF’s price.  Our econometric analysis in Part
III.C yields results consistent with these interpretations.
253. The Hershey Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Mar. 26, 2003) [hereinafter
2003 Annual Report].
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FIGURE 2: HSY VS. CHOCOLATE COMPETITORS
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movements with those of ConAgra (CAG), Kraft Foods (KFT), and Tyson
Foods (TSN), Hershey’s principal food rivals.254
As in the chocolate market comparisons, we find no indication that
trends in the food industry drove the observed HSY price movements dur-
ing the sale window.  For each of the comparison stocks, prices are largely
flat throughout the sale window.  Accordingly, we infer that the observed
HSY price movements around the sale window were not related to pecu-
liar coincidental factors in the food industry.
Finally, we examine whether general market trends might explain
the observed HSY price dynamics.  In Figure 4a and Appendix Figure
A4a, we plot HSY against the Standard and Poor’s 500 market index (S&P
500 plotted against the right-hand axis).  In Figure 4b and Appendix
Figure A4b, we do the same for the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA
plotted against the right-hand axis).255
254. As in the chocolate market, we took our list of rival food firms from Google
Finance and Yahoo! Finance.  See supra note 251.  As before, some companies that would R
seem like good comparisons (e.g., Frito Lay) are not suitable because they are not publicly
traded.
255. A similar picture would emerge if we plotted HSY against CRSP’s value-weighted
market index, which is often used in the finance literature as a representative market
portfolio.  See, e.g., Laurence Schumann, State Regulation of Takeovers and Shareholder
Wealth:  The Case of New York’s 1985 Takeover Statutes, 19 RAND J. Econ. 557, 562
(1988).
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FIGURE 3: HSY VS. FOOD COMPETITORS
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FIGURE 4A: HSY VS. S&P 500
800
900
1000
1100
S&
P 500 C
losin
g Price
30
35
40
H
SY
 C
lo
si
n
g 
Pr
ic
e 
(A
dj
us
te
d)
5/
14
/2
00
2
11
/2
6/
20
02
7/
25
/2
00
2
9/
18
/2
00
2
Trading Day
HSY SP500
\\server05\productn\C\COL\108-4\COL401.txt unknown Seq: 48 12-AUG-08 14:51
796 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 108:749
FIGURE 4B: HSY VS. DOW JONES INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE
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The differences between HSY’s price dynamics and those of the mar-
ket indexes are not as striking as in the comparisons in Figures 2 and 3.
Both the S&P 500 and the DJIA experienced price appreciation toward
the beginning of the sale window and depreciation toward the end of the
sale window.  These market movements do not correspond precisely with
that of HSY, however, as the market indexes began their rise after July 25,
2002, and started their downward trend before September 18, 2002.  Fur-
ther, in neither case is the relative price change as great as that exper-
ienced by HSY.  Nonetheless, the observed comovement of the market
indexes and HSY casts some doubt on the causal relationship between the
Trust’s proposed sale and the movement of Hershey’s stock price.256  To
sort through these possibilities, in the next section we employ a more
formal event study econometric analysis that separates the effect of sale-
related news from general market trends.
C. Event Study Analysis
1. Introduction. — The comparisons of HSY and the market indexes
give us pause in attributing the HSY price dynamics during the sale win-
dow to sale-related news.  To untangle the effect of general market trends
from sale-related news, we make use of an event study methodology that
is well accepted in the literature of financial economics.
256. Although Hershey is included in the S&P 500, see Yahoo! Finance, Components
for S&P 500 Index, at http://finance.yahoo.com/q/cp?s=%5EGSPC&alpha=H (last visited
Apr. 5, 2008) (on file with the Columbia Law Review), it accounts for less than 0.2% of the
S&P 500 index.  The movement of the DJIA, which does not include HSY, follows the same
general pattern.
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Two ideas underpin the market model event study methodology that
we employ below.257  The first is the efficient capital markets hypothesis
(ECMH).  In its semi-strong version, the ECMH posits that the price of a
publicly traded security reflects all public information on the present
value of the future cash flow associated with ownership of the security.258
Hence, in a semi-strong efficient market, only nonpublic information
such as an unanticipated event will affect securities prices, and traders
cannot exploit publicly available information for gain.  Until recently, the
nearly universal view among financial economists was that the domestic
stock market is semi-strong efficient; and while some have begun to ques-
tion this view in the last few years, semi-strong efficiency remains the pre-
vailing view.259
The second idea is that in the short run the relationship between an
individual security and the market as a whole is relatively stable.260  On
this assumption, it is possible to assess in retrospect whether on a given
day a particular stock experienced an “abnormal” price movement, mean-
ing a change in price that deviates in a significant way from the stock’s
typical relationship with the market as a whole.  Importantly, we do not
claim that it is possible to predict a stock’s future price movements based
on past performance.  Rather, the claim is that on Tuesday we can judge
whether a particular stock’s price movement on Monday was “normal” or
“abnormal” for that stock in relation to the known movement of the mar-
ket as a whole on that same Monday.
Taken together, these two ideas imply that it is possible to assess em-
pirically the effect of an unanticipated event on a company’s stock price.
Consider a grossly simplified, stylized example.  Suppose that for 100 days
the price of Company A’s stock increased or decreased in perfect concert
with the market as a whole.  Then on day 101 A’s managers announce a
new business plan and the stock goes up 12%.  If the market as a whole
went up 5% on that day, so that a “normal” movement of A’s stock would
257. For a more detailed discussion of event study methodology, see Bhagat &
Romano, supra note 29, at 947–56, on which our discussion draws.  For a more technical R
discussion, see John Y. Campbell, Andrew W. Lo & A. Craig MacKinlay, The Econometrics
of Financial Markets 149–80 (1997); S.P. Kothari & Jerold B. Warner, Econometrics of
Event Studies, in 1 Handbook of Corporate Finance:  Empirical Corporate Finance 3 (B.
Espen Eckbo ed., 2007).
258. See Macey, Introduction, supra note 19, at 38–40, 43–45. R
259. See Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Markets Hypothesis and Its Critics, J. Econ.
Persp., Winter 2003, at 59, 59–60 (acknowledging arguments against efficient market
hypothesis, but concluding that stock market is generally efficient); see also Eugene F.
Fama, Market Efficiency, Long-Term Returns, and Behavioral Finance, 49 J. Fin. Econ. 283
(1998) (presenting systematic empirical examination of claims regarding market
inefficiency).  In all events, the ongoing debate over the validity of the ECMH concerns
matters that do “not invalidate the event study methodology.”  Bhagat & Romano, supra
note 29, at 948 n.1. R
260. See A. Craig MacKinlay, Event Studies in Economics and Finance, 35 J. Econ.
Literature 13, 15 (1997) (“The market model assumes a stable linear relation between the
market return and the security return.”).
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have been a 5% increase, we could attribute the “abnormal” difference of
7% to the unanticipated news of the new business plan.
2. HSY Event Study. — Implementation of the foregoing intuitions in
a market model event study may be broken down into five steps:261  (1)
define the event and identify the date or dates on which information of
the event became public; (2) measure the affected security’s actual return
on the dates of interest; (3) estimate the security’s expected return on the
dates of interest using historical data on the relationship of the affected
security to the market as a whole; (4) compute the abnormal return by
subtracting the expected return from the actual return; and (5) assess the
statistical significance of the abnormal return.  Once these five steps are
completed, it is possible to evaluate the economic significance, if any, of
the abnormal return on the dates of interest.  We take each step in turn.
(1) Our event is the aborted sale of the Trust’s controlling interest in
the Company.  Hence, we focus on the thirty-eight trading day sale win-
dow that began on July 25, 2002, and ended on September 18, 2002.
Within this window, we are particularly interested in (a) July 25, 2002, the
day that news of the sale was broken by the Wall Street Journal; (b)
September 4, 2002, the day that the trial court issued an injunction
against the sale; and (c) September 18, 2002, the first trading day after
the trustees abandoned the sale late in the evening on September 17.262
(a) The impact of the July 25 sale announcement tests our hypothe-
ses regarding agency costs in charitable trust governance and the compar-
ative virtues of a controlling shareholder versus the market for corporate
control in minimizing agency costs in corporate governance.  For the rea-
sons explained earlier, we predict a large, positive abnormal return on
that date.
(b) The impact of the September 4 injunction provides a test of the
welfare effects of the Attorney General’s intervention.  The September 4
injunction also provides a robustness check on our analysis of the July 25
sale announcement.  Because the injunction reduced the probability of a
sale, but did not extinguish the possibility of one, we predict a negative
261. Our five-step statement of the mechanics of an event study draws on the four-step
statement in Bhagat & Romano, supra note 29, at 948–51, except that for expositional R
clarity we have broken their step four into two separate steps.
262. See supra notes 108, 146, 181 and accompanying text.  We do not test the effect R
of the subsequent amendment to the Pennsylvania prudent investor rule, see supra text
accompanying notes 193–198, for two reasons.  First, prior to the amendment, the trustees R
committed in writing not to sell the Company without first notifying the Attorney General’s
office, and the trial court included this requirement in its October 16 order dissolving the
preliminary injunction.  See supra notes 186–187 and accompanying text.  Second, it is R
hard to isolate a clean event date for legislative enactments without introducing bias.  See
Bhagat & Romano, supra note 29, at 949 (describing potential effect of various R
announcements throughout legislative process).  Here the Attorney General made various
public announcements about supporting the legislation, which then passed each house of
the Pennsylvania legislature on different dates, and then was signed by the Governor on
still another date.  See Sidel, Struggle for Hershey, supra note 8, at 39–44. R
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abnormal return that is smaller in absolute magnitude than July 25’s ab-
normal return.
(c) The impact of the trustees’ September 18 abandonment of the
sale provides a second test of our agency cost hypotheses, both as a ro-
bustness check on our finding for July 25 and to exclude the con-
founding possibility that the fact of the sale announcement itself supplied
new information about the Company.263  We predict a negative abnormal
return that, given the prior injunction, falls in absolute magnitude be-
tween that of the September 4 and July 25 dates.264
Table 2 summarizes the key dates of interest and our predicted im-
pacts of the events of those dates.
TABLE 2:  KEY EVENTS AND PREDICTED IMPACTS
Date Event Predicted Impact
7/25/2002 Sale Announced Positive
9/4/2002 Sale Enjoined Negative
9/18/2002 Sale Abandoned Negative
(2) The next step, which is relatively simple, is to measure the actual
return of HSY during the sale window.  Actual return is routinely calcu-
lated as the price of the stock at time t + 1 minus the price at time t
divided by the price at time t.  Using adjusted daily closing prices, in the
third column of Table 3 we present HSY’s actual return for each trading
day within the sale window.
(3) The third step, estimating the security’s expected return, is more
complicated.  We use a statistical market model that, as is customary, as-
sumes that HSY’s expected return may be estimated as a linear function
of the return of the market as a whole.265  This relationship is expressed
as follows:
263. See infra notes 357, 359 and accompanying text. R
264. In theory, if there were no other indications during the sale window that the
trustees might abandon the sale, we would have expected the September 18 abnormal
return to equal the July 25 abnormal return, except oppositely signed.  However, the
Attorney General’s actions during the window, as well as those of the courts and members
of the local community, decreased the probability of a sale.  Inasmuch as this expectation
would have been capitalized (probabilistically) into the HSY price, we expect a large
negative abnormal return on September 18, but one that is smaller in magnitude to that
observed on July 25.
265. There are three notable alternatives to the statistical market model.  Two are
economic models (the capital asset pricing model and the arbitrage pricing theory) and
the third is another statistical model (the constant expected returns model).  See Bhagat &
Romano, supra note 29, at 950–51.  In general, the economic models introduce additional R
complexity without an offsetting improvement in the estimation.  See Campbell et al.,
supra note 257, at 153–57; Bhagat & Romano, supra note 29, at 950–51.  Moreover, unlike R
the market model, which accounts for broad market trends, the constant expected returns
model looks only to the historical price movement of the security at issue.  For simulations
indicating some shortcomings with the constant expected returns model, see Stephen J.
Brown & Jerold B. Warner, Using Daily Stock Returns:  The Case of Event Studies, 14 J.
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Where E(HSYt) is the expected return for HSY during time period t,
lHSY is an HSY-specific constant, fHSY is an HSY-specific coefficient (i.e., a
measure of how the HSY return has varied historically in relationship to
the market return), and Markett is the market return over timeframe t.
To compute the expected return for HSY during the sale window, we
multiply the market return during the window by fHSY and then add lHSY.
To estimate lHSY and fHSY, we perform an ordinary least squares re-
gression on actual HSY returns for some period before the sale window
(the “estimation period”) using the returns for a market portfolio as a
predictor variable.  For our market portfolio, we use the S&P 500.266  For
our estimation period, we use 100 trading days prior to the event (i.e., the
sale window), which is a common estimation period in event studies that
use a statistical model.267  In the fourth column of Table 3, we present
our estimated expected return for HSY during each of the trading days
during the sale window.  In unreported regressions we also used an esti-
mation period of 200 days before the sale window with similar results.
A potential criticism of using data prior to the sale window to esti-
mate expected returns during the sale window is that the sale window
might have coincided with a structural change in the relationship be-
tween HSY and the market portfolio.  If so, the historical relationship be-
tween HSY returns and the market return would no longer hold.  As a
check on this possibility, we also computed expected returns for HSY dur-
ing the sale window using estimation periods of 100 days after the sale
window, 200 days after the sale window, and a pooled model that in-
cluded 100 days before and 100 days after the sale window.  Each of these
alternate approaches yielded results similar to the 100-days-prior results
that we report below.
Another potential concern is that during the 100 trading days prior
to the sale window, Hershey factory workers went on strike (which lasted
from April 26, 2002, to June 8, 2002).268  To determine whether the strike
introduced bias into our analysis, we investigated a 100 day estimation
period that excluded the strike period as well as an estimation model that
included a control variable for days during the strike.  In both cases our
results were little changed,269 which is consistent with Hershey’s own eval-
uation of the effect of the strike.  In its quarterly filing with the SEC for
the period that included the strike, the Company reported that “[t]he
Fin. Econ. 3, 25–26 (1985).  The choice of expected return model did not affect the
results, however, as our findings were largely unchanged when we used a constant
expected returns model or one of the economic models.
266. The principal alternatives to the S&P 500 are the DJIA and the CRSP index.  The
results were largely unchanged, however, when we used these alternatives.
267. See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 29, at 951. R
268. See Union Vote Halts Hershey’s Longest Strike, N.Y. Times, June 9, 2002, § 1, at
26.
269. Further, the coefficient on the strike control was itself not statistically significant.
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work stoppage did not have a material impact on the Corporation’s re-
sults of operations for the second quarter.”270
(4) The next step is computing the abnormal return for HSY during
each trading day in the sale window.  The abnormal return is computed
by subtracting the expected return from the actual return.  The fifth col-
umn of Table 3 presents our abnormal return estimates.
(5) The final step is to assess the statistical significance of the abnor-
mal return.  By statistical significance we mean a measure of the likeli-
hood that the observed abnormal return reflects random variation rather
than the influence of the event under study.  A typical significance thresh-
old is 5%, with 2.5% of abnormal returns falling below a negative critical
value and 2.5% of abnormal returns falling above a positive critical value
that is symmetric to the negative critical value.  That is, if the HSY return
were to follow its historical relationship with the market return and not
be affected by an unanticipated occurrence, then on any given day its
observed abnormal return would fall between our positive and negative
critical values 95% of the time.  The alternative possibility that the day in
question experienced an abnormal return owing to random variation
would be only 5% likely.  Accordingly, if a given day’s abnormal return
falls outside of these critical values, we may infer that it is very unlikely
that the day’s abnormal return comes from the same distribution as the
abnormal returns from the estimation period.  Critical values may also be
computed for significance thresholds other than 5%, such as 1% or 0.1%
(implying 99% and 99.9% likelihood respectively).
In the sixth column of Table 3 we present the standardized abnor-
mal return for HSY during each day in the sale window.  The standard-
ized abnormal return is the ratio between the abnormal return and the
standard deviation of the abnormal returns during the estimation pe-
riod.271  For standardized abnormal returns that exceed 1.96 or are less
than -1.96, there is less than a 5% chance that the observed abnormal
return reflects random variation.  That percentage falls to 1% for stan-
dardized abnormal returns above 2.575 or below −2.575, and to 0.1% for
those above 3.277 or below −3.277.272  In Table 3 and the other tables
270. The Hershey Co., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 15 (Aug. 7, 2002)
[hereinafter Aug. 2002 Quarterly Report].
271. There is concern in the event study literature that the standard deviation of
abnormal returns during the estimation period is not a useful measure of variation because
of increased volatility around potentially important events.  See, e.g., Bhagat & Romano,
supra note 29, at 951 (discussing problem).  Hence, we examined a number of alternative R
measures of variation including the standard deviation of abnormal returns during the sale
window.  We also estimated expected returns using a GARCH model that uses a time series
technique that allows for a more general variance structure.  See James D. Hamilton, Time
Series Analysis 665–71 (1994).  Our results are not affected by these different measures of
variation.
272. These significance levels assume that the abnormal returns will be distributed
normally with a mean of zero.  But in a one-firm event study the abnormal returns might
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that follow, we denote statistical significance at the 5, 1, and 0.1% levels
with *, **, and *** notations respectively.
Our primary date of interest is July 25, 2002, the day in which the
Wall Street Journal broke the news of the trustees’ plan to sell.  As we have
seen, on July 25 the price of HSY jumped to an unadjusted closing price
of $78.30 from the prior day’s closing price of $62.50.  This increase
translates to an adjusted actual return of 0.253 on a day that,273 given the
movement of the market as a whole, HSY would have been expected to
experience a return of −0.002.  So the abnormal return for HSY on July
25 was 0.255, which translates to a standardized abnormal return of 21.25.
Accordingly, HSY experienced a large, abnormal positive return on the
date news of the trustees’ plan to sell became public, and it is extremely
unlikely that this finding reflects random variation instead of news of the
sale plan (the finding is statistically significant at less than the 0.1% level).
Indeed, excluding September 4 and September 18 (the dates on which
the sale was enjoined and abandoned), the standardized abnormal return
for July 25 was 8.5 times larger than the second largest and more than
twelve times larger than the third largest standardized abnormal returns
for any other day in the sale window.
Our second date of interest is September 4, 2002, the day that the
trial court enjoined the sale.  HSY dropped to $72.51 from the prior day’s
closing price of $75.60, which translates to an adjusted actual return of
−0.041.  The expected return for HSY was 0.006.  Hence, on September 4
HSY experienced an abnormal return of −0.047.  This result is statistically
significant at less than the 0.1% level (the standardized abnormal return
was −3.917).
Interestingly, the next day HSY experienced a positive abnormal re-
turn of 0.03 that is statistically significant at the 5% level.  Although we
did not hypothesize that there would be a large abnormal return on that
day, this finding could suggest a number of possibilities.  Perhaps the
September 5 return represents one of the rare instances where the abnor-
mal return falls outside of the critical values wholly by chance.  Or maybe
the market overreacted to the court’s decision, believing that it repre-
sented a larger setback to the trustees than it actually was.274  Perhaps
investors believed that the trustees would abandon the sale after the issu-
not be well approximated by the normal distribution.  We address this concern in Part
III.C.4 and in Appendix C.
273. Recall that in the graphs and econometric analyses we use adjusted closing
prices, not actual closing prices.  Hence, we report actual return in relation to the adjusted
price data.
274. There is an ongoing debate in the finance literature about whether investors
systematically overreact to bad news and if so whether sophisticated investors can profit
from this tendency by engaging in a contrary investment strategy (e.g., purchasing shares
in firms that depreciate after bad news).  The empirical evidence of this phenomenon is
mixed.  For one study finding such an effect, see H. Nejat Seyhun, Overreaction or
Fundamentals:  Some Lessons from Insiders’ Response to the Market Crash of 1987, 45 J.
Fin. 1363, 1386–87 (1990).
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TABLE 3:  HSY RETURNS DURING SALE WINDOW
Standardized
Date Event Actual Expected Abnormal Abnormal
7/25/2002 Sale 0.253 −0.002 0.255 21.250***
Announced
7/26/2002 0.005 0.006 −0.000 −0.000
7/29/2002 0.010 0.018 −0.008 −0.667
7/30/2002 −0.020 0.001 −0.021 −1.750
7/31/2002 0.007 0.003 0.004 0.333
8/1/2002 −0.031 −0.010 −0.021 −1.750
8/2/2002 −0.028 −0.008 −0.019 −1.583
8/5/2002 −0.021 −0.012 −0.009 −0.750
8/6/2002 0.009 0.010 −0.001 −0.083
8/7/2002 −0.015 0.007 −0.022 −1.833
8/8/2002 0.031 0.011 0.020 1.667
8/9/2002 −0.004 0.001 −0.005 −0.417
8/12/2002 0.011 −0.002 0.013 1.083
8/13/2002 −0.001 −0.008 0.007 0.583
8/14/2002 0.012 0.013 −0.001 −0.083
8/15/2002 −0.004 0.004 −0.000 −0.000
8/16/2002 −0.009 −0.001 −0.008 −0.667
8/19/2002 −0.004 0.008 −0.012 −1.000
8/20/2002 −0.003 −0.005 0.002 0.167
8/21/2002 0.002 0.004 −0.002 −0.167
8/22/2002 0.001 0.005 −0.003 −0.250
8/23/2002 0.003 −0.008 0.011 0.917
8/26/2002 0.024 0.002 0.021 1.750
8/27/2002 −0.003 −0.005 0.002 0.167
8/28/2002 −0.004 −0.006 −0.003 −0.250
8/29/2002 −0.001 −0.000 −0.001 −0.083
8/30/2002 −0.006 −0.001 −0.005 −0.417
9/3/2002 −0.002 −0.014 0.012 1.000
9/4/2002 Sale −0.041 0.006 −0.047 −3.917***
Enjoined
9/5/2002 0.025 −0.006 0.030 2.500*
9/6/2002 −0.006 0.005 −0.012 −1.000
9/9/2002 −0.004 0.003 −0.008 −0.667
9/10/2002 0.008 0.002 0.005 0.417
9/11/2002 −0.007 −0.000 −0.007 −0.583
9/12/2002 −0.010 −0.009 −0.002 −0.167
9/13/2002 0.014 0.001 0.013 1.083
9/16/2002 0.013 0.000 0.013 1.083
9/17/2002 −0.013 −0.007 −0.006 −0.500
9/18/2002 Sale −0.119 −0.002 −0.118 −9.833***
Abandoned
Note: ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05 (i.e., abnormal return is statistically significant at
the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% levels respectively).
ance of the injunction, but reevaluated those beliefs when the trustees
appealed immediately after the court decision.  In their September 5 cov-
erage of the trial court’s decision, both the Wall Street Journal and the New
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York Times stated that “legal experts” predicted that the injunction would
be lifted on appeal.275
In all events, the sum of the abnormal returns for September 4 and 5
is negative and so signed as we predicted for September 4.  These results,
moreover, undermine the trial court’s conclusion that issuing the injunc-
tion would not “cause significant fluctuations” in the Company’s stock.276
Our third date of interest is September 18, 2002, the first trading day
after the trustees abandoned the sale close to midnight on September 17.
On September 18, HSY dropped to $65.00 from the prior day’s closing
price of $73.81, which translates to an adjusted actual return of −0.119.
The expected return for HSY was −0.002.  Thus, on September 18 HSY
experienced a negative abnormal return of −0.118.277  This result, which
is statistically significant at less than the 0.1% level (the standardized ab-
normal return was −9.833), belies the Attorney General’s argument in his
appellate brief that “nothing suggests that the stock will be priced differ-
ently even if a sale does not occur.”278
Accordingly, for all three principal dates of interest, we find highly
statistically significant abnormal returns in the direction (that is, positive
or negative) predicted by our agency cost hypotheses.  The magnitude of
the abnormal returns associated with the sale announcement and then
the sale abandonment are striking:  25.5% and −11.8% respectively.
Apart from the three primary dates of interest and the day after the in-
junction, there are no other dates during the sale window with abnormal
returns that are significant at the 5% level or better.  Further, the five
abnormal returns that are significant at the 10% level (critical value
±1.65) are signed as one would expect in view of the events on and
around those days.279
To summarize and give greater context to our findings, in Figure 5a
we present Hershey’s cumulative abnormal returns (i.e., the sum of the
abnormal returns; “CAR”) for the sale window plus twenty-five trading
days before and after the sale window.280
275. See supra text accompanying note 149. R
276. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. R
277. The discrepancy between the reported abnormal return in column 5 and the
sum of the reported expected and actual returns in columns 3 and 4 (i.e., −0.119 − −0.002
= −0.118) is the result of rounding.
278. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. R
279. On both July 30 and August 1, as local opposition to the sale began to organize,
HSY experienced negative abnormal returns of 2.1%.  On August 7, while the trustees met
to consider Fisher’s proposed alternative modes of diversification, HSY experienced a
negative abnormal return of 2.2%.  That evening, after the stock market closed, the
trustees announced that they would press ahead with the sale.  The next day, August 8,
HSY experienced a positive abnormal return of 2%.  Finally, on August 26, the day the
trustees filed their papers in opposition to the Attorney General’s petition for a
preliminary injunction, HSY experienced a positive abnormal return of 2.1%.
280. Because in this Figure (and in Figures 5b and 5c below) we include abnormal
returns for twenty-five trading days before the sale window, in our expected returns
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FIGURE 5A: CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS
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Figure 5a demonstrates that HSY’s CAR during the sale window was
neither the continuation of a preexisting trend nor the start of a new
trend.  Consistent with our agency cost hypotheses, the company was sim-
ply more valuable to investors during the period when the market ex-
pected the trustees to sell the Trust’s controlling interest.
Interestingly, the CAR for Hershey remains above zero for some time
after the end of the sale window.  Assuming this finding is significant,281
the data do not allow us to isolate an explanation, except to say that the
increased Hershey CAR is probably not an artifact of secular trends in the
chocolate or food industries, as Figures 5b and 5c indicate that Hershey’s
competitors do not likewise exhibit systematically higher CARs after the
sale window.282  Early empirical work on failed mergers suggested that
regression we use as our estimation period the 100 trading days before the first trading day
plotted.
281. The CAR over the event window is statistically significant with a t statistic of 2.59
(i.e., the CAR divided by a measure of the CAR’s variance is 2.59, which exceeds the critical
value of 2.575 for significance at the 1% level).  However, when calculated from the
beginning of the event window through the end point in the graph above (October 22,
2002), the CAR drops below the threshold for statistical significance (t = 0.54).  Thus, at
some point during the month after the Hershey sale was abandoned, cumulative abnormal
returns dropped to the point where they were no longer statistically distinguishable from
zero.  As compared to a single day’s abnormal returns, CAR over a longer period is a less
volatile measure of the effect of the event, albeit with a corresponding loss in clean
identification of the event.
282. That Hershey’s competitors did not likewise experience increased CARs runs
counter to the empirical regularity that rival firms’ returns tend to go up after a firm in the
industry is involved in a takeover activity.  See B. Espen Eckbo, Horizontal Mergers,
Collusion, and Stockholder Wealth, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 241, 257–59 (1983); B. Espen Eckbo,
Mergers and the Market Concentration Doctrine:  Evidence from the Capital Market, 58 J.
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target firms often exhibit increased CARs after a failed merger.283  Later
work, however, discovered that these gains tend to dissipate over a longer
time horizon.284  The literature suggests two possible explanations for
these results:  (1) a “kick-in-the-pants” idea, in which a target firm’s man-
agement is inspired to implement a more efficient business strategy after
the failed takeover attempt, and (2) the market’s expectation that an-
other acquiring firm will attempt a takeover in the near future.285  We
conjecture that the former pertains here, but we can neither establish nor
reject our conjecture empirically.
3. Competitor-Based Controls. — As a check to rule out the possibility
that factors unrelated to the Hershey sale might explain the observed ab-
normal returns on the three primary days of interest, we performed a
similar abnormal return analysis for Hershey’s principal NYSE-traded
competitors identified in the earlier graphical analysis.286  The results are
presented in Table 4.
None of Hershey’s competitors experienced an unusually large ab-
normal return on September 4 or September 18, and there is no consis-
tent relationship between the abnormal returns of Hershey and its com-
petitors on September 5.  However, on July 25, the day the Hershey sale
was announced, three of Hershey’s competitors (CSG, TR, and CAG) ex-
perienced large, positive abnormal returns that were unlikely to have
come about by chance.  These results are amenable to at least two differ-
ent interpretations.
Bus. 325, 338 (1985).  Although early studies did not find evidence consistent with any
particular causal mechanism for this phenomenon, more recent work suggests that the
increase in competitors’ CARs stems from an expectation that other firms in the industry
will also become takeover targets.  See Moon H. Song & Ralph A. Walkling, Abnormal
Returns to Rivals of Acquisition Targets:  A Test of the “Acquisition Probability
Hypothesis,” 55 J. Fin. Econ. 143, 170 (2000).  Our finding that Hershey’s rivals did not
experience the typical increase in returns is consistent with this explanation, as the
Hershey takeover activity was prompted by the trustees, not by an external buyer that, after
failing to acquire the Company, might be expected to try to acquire one of Hershey’s
rivals.
283. See, e.g., Michael Bradley, Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for
Corporate Control, 53 J. Bus. 345, 368–72 (1980) (noting that shareholders of targets
“realized a significant capital gain in the wake of an unsuccessful tender offer”); Peter
Dodd & Richard Ruback, Tender Offers and Stockholder Returns:  An Empirical Analysis,
5 J. Fin. Econ. 351, 370 (1977) (“[U]nsuccessful targets realize abnormal returns in the
event month and normal returns thereafter.”).
284. See, e.g., Michael Bradley, Anand Desai & E. Han Kim, The Rationale Behind
Interfirm Tender Offers:  Information or Synergy?, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 183, 194 (1983)
[hereinafter Bradley, Desai & Kim, Rationale] (noting that abnormal returns from
unsuccessful bid dissipate after two years if no other bids materialize); Frank J. Fabozzi,
Michael G. Ferri, T. Dessa Fabozzi & Julia Tucker, A Note on Unsuccessful Tender Offers
and Stockholder Returns, 43 J. Fin. 1275, 1282 (1988) (“All average excess returns of the
period after withdrawal . . . are close to zero.”).
285. See J. Fred Weston, Juan A. Siu & Brian A. Johnson, Takeovers, Restructuring,
and Corporate Governance 144–45 (3d ed. 2001).
286. See supra notes 251, 254 and accompanying text. R
\\server05\productn\C\COL\108-4\COL401.txt unknown Seq: 59 12-AUG-08 14:51
2008] HERSHEY’S KISS-OFF 807
TABLE 4: STANDARDIZED ABNORMAL RETURNS—HSY AND COMPETITORS
Date Event HSY CSG TR RMCF CAG KFT TSN
7/25/2002 Sale 21.25*** 2.62** 6.17*** 0.30 3.25** −0.43 0.35
Announced
9/4/2002 Sale −3.92*** 0.38 0.75 −0.23 0.25 −0.14 −1.43
Enjoined
9/5/2002 2.50* 0.39 −2.37* −0.20 0.52 0.70 2.41*
9/18/2002 Sale −9.83*** −0.23 1.33 −0.09 −0.19 0.76 −0.30
Abandoned
Note: ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05 (i.e., abnormal return is statistically significant at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5%
levels respectively).
One possible interpretation of Table 4 is that news of the sale posi-
tively affected not only the Company’s value, but also the value of some of
its competitors.  There is, in other words, a potential endogeneity prob-
lem in using HSY’s competitors as controls because changes in HSY might
affect the value of the competitors, and vice versa.  For example, perhaps
the Company’s stock price was depressed because the Company was over-
producing above the efficient level to protect the jobs of its employees.
With new management, the Company might reduce its production to the
profit-maximizing level, thereby improving its value.  A reduction in the
Company’s output would also benefit at least some of its competitors, as
they would have less competition from the Company for individual
sales.287  A further endogeneity problem arises from the possibility that
one of these competitors might bid on HSY.
Although the foregoing interpretations are consistent with our
agency cost hypotheses (particularly the overproduction story), we do not
find them persuasive.  If CSG, TR, and CAG experienced positive abnor-
mal returns on July 25 because the market anticipated a decline in output
by Hershey, then those companies should have experienced negative ab-
normal returns on September 18, when the sale was cancelled, and possi-
bly also on September 4, when the sale was enjoined.  But only two of
those six abnormal returns were negative, both were relatively small, and
neither was statistically significant.  Unlike HSY, in other words, CSG, TR,
and CAG did not experience parallel negative abnormal returns on news
that HSY would not be sold.  The same evidence militates against the pos-
287. The scenario sketched above would be similar to the result identified in Brian
Knight, Are Policy Platforms Capitalized into Equity Prices?  Evidence from the Bush/Gore
2000 Presidential Election, 90 J. Pub. Econ. 751 (2005).  Knight examined the relationship
between daily market prices for firms that compete with Microsoft and the probability of a
Bush victory in the 2000 presidential election using the Iowa Electronic Markets for the
Bush victory probabilities.  Id. at 752.  He found that when the probability of a Bush win
was high, the share prices for Microsoft’s competitors declined significantly, presumably
reflecting a market expectation of more favorable treatment for Microsoft in the pending
antitrust litigation under a Bush administration than under a Gore administration.  Id. at
762.  But see George Bittlingmayer & Thomas W. Hazlett, DOS Kapital:  Has Antitrust
Action Against Microsoft Created Value in the Computer Industry?, 55 J. Fin. Econ. 329,
341–43 (2000) (finding that antitrust actions unfavorable to Microsoft hurt entire
computer industry, and that actions favorable to Microsoft helped).
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sibility that investors were pricing the possibility of acquiring HSY into the
competitors’ share prices.
The alternative, and in our view more likely, interpretation of Table
4 is that there were other market peculiarities on July 25, 2002.  For ex-
ample, there might have been an exogenous shock, unrelated to the news
of the sale, which affected the value of some chocolate and food compa-
nies.  On this account, the abnormal return experienced by Hershey on
July 25 might in part reflect the influence of the exogenous shock.  We
think that this is a more plausible interpretation because it is consistent
with the lack of statistically significant abnormal returns among Hershey’s
competitors on September 4 or September 18.  We hasten to add, how-
ever, that Hershey’s abnormal return on July 25 is far larger than those of
its competitors, and Hershey also experienced large, significant, abnor-
mal returns in the predicted directions on September 4 and September
18.  Hence, we remain confident that most of the observed HSY abnormal
return on July 25 is attributable to news of the sale.
To get a sense of how much of the HSY abnormal return on July 25
should be attributed to news of the sale, we estimated a market model in
which we regressed the HSY return on the S&P 500 return, as before, as
well as the returns for CSG, TR, and CAG.  This augmented estimation
model therefore accounts for correlation among these firms.288  The HSY
abnormal return for July 25, 2002, using this augmented estimation
model, is presented in Table 5.
TABLE 5:  HSY RETURNS
CONTROLLING FOR CORRELATIONS WITH COMPETITORS
Standardized
Date Event Actual Expected Abnormal Abnormal
7/25/2002 Sale 0.253 0.026 0.226 20.545***
Announced
Note: ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05 (i.e., abnormal return is statistically significant at
the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% levels respectively).
In Table 5, the standardized abnormal return for Hershey on July 25,
2002 is slightly smaller than in Table 3, but it is still quite large and highly
statistically significant.289  Accordingly, we conclude that news of the sale
was the primary explanation for the run up in HSY on July 25.
As in our analysis of HSY alone, another way to view the results is in a
graphical depiction of cumulative abnormal returns.  Figures 5b and 5c
plot the cumulative abnormal returns for HSY in comparison to its choco-
288. We used the 100 trading days before the Hershey sale window for our estimation
period, although, as before, the results are virtually unchanged if we use alternative
estimation periods.
289. The results of the augmented model for the other key dates of interest are
likewise consistent with those presented in Table 3.
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late market competitors and its food manufacturing competitors respec-
tively, each for the sale window plus twenty-five trading days before and
after the window.290
FIGURE 5B: CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS—CHOCOLATE COMPETITORS
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FIGURE 5C: CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS—FOOD COMPETITORS
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Figures 5b and 5c show that the pattern of HSY’s cumulative abnor-
mal returns bears little relation to that of most of its competitors.  Al-
though there is some comovement in the cumulative abnormal return of
290. As in Figure 5a, see supra note 280, in our expected returns regression for R
Figures 5b and 5c we use as our estimation period the 100 trading days before the first
trading day plotted.
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HSY with those of CSG, TR, and CAG at the beginning of the sale win-
dow, for CSG and TR this correlation does not continue through the rest
of the window, and there is no appreciable comovement in the periods
before or after the sale window.  With respect to CAG, although the rela-
tionship appears to persist even at the end of the sale window and be-
yond, CAG’s decline at the end of the sale window is not as pronounced
as that observed for HSY.  Moreover, HSY’s cumulative abnormal return
exceeds CAG’s during the sale window but trails CAG’s before and after
the window.  Accordingly, these graphs provide further evidence that
news related to the proposed sale, not generic chocolate or food market
forces, drove HSY’s abnormal returns during the sale window.
4. The Problem of a Single-Firm Event Study. — Our study is limited by
necessity to a single firm.  Although one-firm event studies appear in the
academic literature291 and are used routinely in securities litigation,292
they nonetheless pose special problems owing to the greater volatility ex-
perienced by a portfolio of one security than a portfolio of many securi-
ties.  In Appendix Table B1, for example, we find that six of the ten days
prior to the sale announcement experienced a statistically significant ab-
normal return.  Here the concern is that we might attribute statistical sig-
nificance to an abnormal return that in fact reflects nothing more than
random variation if the abnormal returns of the single firm are not well
approximated by the normal distribution.  In other words, our worry is
that the normal critical values used to determine statistical significance
(i.e., ±1.96, ±2.575, and ±3.277 for .05, .01, and .001 respectively) may not
be appropriate given the weakened signal to noise ratio in a single-firm
event study.
An initial answer to this concern is that the magnitudes of the abnor-
mal returns for July 25 (the sale announcement) and September 18 (the
sale cancellation) are so large that as a mathematical matter they are sta-
tistically significant in all possible abnormal return distributions.  This is
291. See, e.g., Stephen P. Baginski, Richard B. Corbett & William R. Ortega,
Catastrophic Events and Retroactive Liability Insurance:  The Case of the MGM Grand
Fire, 58 J. Risk & Ins. 247 (1991) (applying event study methodology to MGM Grand fire
and purchase of retroactive liability insurance); Frederick R. Warren-Boulton & Serdar
Dalkir, Staples and Office Depot:  An Event-Probability Case Study, 19 Rev. Indus. Org. 469
(2001) (applying event study methodology to proposed merger between Staples and Office
Depot); Mark Weinstein, Don’t Leave Home Without It:  Limited Liability and American
Express, 37 J. Legal Stud. (forthcoming 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=665741 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (applying event
study methodology to incorporation of American Express).
292. See, e.g., In re Xcelera.com Sec. Litig., 430 F.3d 503, 512–14 (1st Cir. 2005)
(discussing expert witness’s event study in securities fraud case); U.S. v. Grabske, 260 F.
Supp. 2d 866, 867–69 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (examining appropriateness of reliance upon event
study with relation to restatement of income and revelation of fraud); see also In re
Imperial Credit Indus., Inc. Sec. Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1014 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (stating
that plaintiffs’ expert’s report was “deficient for failure to provide an ‘event study’ or
similar analysis”).
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an application of Chebyshev’s inequality that we detail more formally in
Appendix C.
However, reliance on Chebyshev’s inequality assumes that we have
correctly estimated the HSY abnormal returns.  That assumption is prob-
lematic if the observed volatility of HSY in the 100 days prior to the event
is not a reliable indicator of the volatility that HSY would have exper-
ienced during the event period but for the event.  Here the limitation to
a single firm is worrisome if the firm’s volatility (that is, the variance in
HSY’s abnormal returns) could be changing over time.  Accordingly, we
must consider the possibility that the variance we estimated in the presale
period was coincidentally low relative to other periods.
As an initial check against this worry, as detailed above, we also com-
puted HSY’s abnormal returns with reference to the observed volatility of
HSY in a variety of alternative estimation windows.  Some of those alterna-
tives used only days after the sale window.  Others were pooled models in
which we used days before and after the sale window.293
As a further cautionary measure, we undertook a randomization in-
ference robustness check by performing event studies (i.e., performed
steps 2 and 3 as described in Part III.C.2 above) on HSY’s returns for 600
days randomly chosen during the three years before and after the sale
window.294  We then calculated the standardized abnormal returns for
each of those dates (i.e., performed step 4 as described in Part III.C.2
above) to determine how frequently various standardized abnormal re-
turn levels occurred in the random sample.  Next, we used these values to
generate a probability density function.  This randomization inference
approach has been used in other applications,295 but we believe that we
are the first to use it in an event study in the law and economics
literature.
The estimated probability distribution, superimposed over a stan-
dard normal distribution, is presented in Figure 6a.
293. See supra text preceding and accompanying notes 269–270. R
294. We used the Eventus software available through Wharton Data Services and the
CRSP value weighted index as our market portfolio.  For the output from this analysis, see
Jonathan Klick & Robert H. Sitkoff, Eventus Hershey Output (Aug. 23, 2007), at http://
mailer.fsu.edu/~jklick/HSYrobust.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
295. See, e.g., John J. Donohue III & Daniel E. Ho, The Impact of Damage Caps on
Malpractice Claims:  Randomization Inference with Difference-in-Differences, 4 J.
Empirical Legal Stud. 69, 90–96 (2007) (applying randomization inference methodology
to study of malpractice caps); Daniel E. Ho & Kosuke Imai, Randomization Inference with
Natural Experiments:  An Analysis of Ballot Effects in the 2003 California Recall Election,
101 J. Am. Stat. Ass’n 888, 893–98 (2006) (using randomization inference methodology in
study of 2003 California recall election).
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FIGURE 6A: DISTRIBUTION OF ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR HERSHEY
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Although the HSY-specific probability distribution appears roughly
to approximate the normal distribution, the two are not perfectly congru-
ent.  Using the estimated probability distribution, we computed a set of
HSY-specific critical values or significance thresholds.  These HSY-specific
critical values are not perfect, of course, because some of the 600 ran-
domly chosen days might in fact have experienced an abnormal return
owing to unanticipated events on those days.  Nonetheless, these HSY-
specific critical values provide a useful check on whether our findings are
artifacts of normal volatility rather than news of the sale.
Using our Figure 6a HSY-specific critical values, the observed HSY
abnormal return on July 25, the date the sale plan was made public, was
still highly statistically significant (less than 0.1% level).  The observed
HSY abnormal return on September 18, the first trading day after the sale
was abandoned, also remained strongly significant, though somewhat less
so (0.2% level, still highly significant).  By contrast, the significance level
of the observed HSY abnormal return on September 4 (the date of the
injunction) fell to the 9% level.  Accordingly, assessing statistical signifi-
cance in relation to our estimated HSY-specific probability function
largely confirms our earlier results using the normal distribution.  Al-
though the September 4 date falls below the conventional threshold of
5% for statistical significance, the results for the date the sale was an-
nounced and the date the sale was abandoned remain strongly
significant.
We performed a similar analysis using the abnormal returns from
event studies on 100 randomly chosen days for each of Hershey’s six com-
petitors identified above during the three years before and after the sale
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window.296  The results of this analysis provide us with another bench-
mark against which to compare HSY’s abnormal returns.  For example,
perhaps during this general time period abnormal returns for companies
in this general industry are not well approximated by the normal distribu-
tion because of industry-wide increased volatility or structural changes in
the market.  While the distribution in Figure 6a addresses this worry, a
second comparison is useful to put our major results into additional con-
text.  Figure 6b presents the estimated probability distribution from our
examination of Hershey’s competitors superimposed over a standard nor-
mal distribution.
FIGURE 6B: DISTRIBUTION OF ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR
HERSHEY COMPETITORS
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Using the critical values from the distribution depicted in Figure 6b,
the statistical significance of the abnormal returns presented in Table 3
associated with news of the trustees’ plan to sell and the abandonment of
the sale are literally off the chart.  No competitor in the sample had a
296. As before, we used the Eventus software and the CRSP value weighted index as
our market portfolio.  For the output from this analysis, see Jonathan Klick & Robert H.
Sitkoff, Eventus Competitor Output (Aug. 23, 2007), at http://mailer.fsu.edu/~jklick/
COMProbust.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).  Note that this analysis does not
actually include 600 data points as would be expected with six firms and 100 randomly
chosen days.  During a few of the randomly chosen days early in the sample, RMCF and
KFT were not traded on the NYSE, leaving us with 556 observations on which we could
base this analysis.  RMCF was newly listed during our sample period and KFT was private
during the early part of our period.  While it would have been possible to restrict date
selection to only those days during which all firms traded, doing so has the potential to
introduce a bias into our analysis, so we opted to allow for the selection of days where some
of the firms were not trading.
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standardized abnormal return greater than 8.9, but HSY’s standardized
abnormal returns on July 25 and September 18 (the sale announcement
and termination dates) were 21.25 and 9.83 respectively.  Further, the sta-
tistical significance of the abnormal return on the day of the injunction
goes from 9% in the prior analysis (using the distribution of Figure 6a) to
1.3% using the distribution of Figure 6b.  Hence, under this approach,
we find no reason to suspect that HSY’s abnormal returns on the days of
interest were the result of mere random variation.297
D. Summary of Empirical Findings
The evidence presented above is strongly consistent with our hypoth-
esis of agency costs in charitable trust governance.  The evidence is also
strongly consistent with the widely held belief that supervision of charita-
ble trusts by state attorneys general is deficient.  Indeed, in this case the
Attorney General’s intervention was counterproductive, both reducing
aggregate social welfare and imposing unnecessary agency costs on the
Trust.  Finally, the evidence indicates that the capital markets rated the
threat of a takeover as superior to the Trust’s controlling position for
minimizing agency costs in the Company.  We summarize the evidence
and our specific findings here.
Graphical examination of Hershey’s stock price, both by itself and in
comparison to that of its main NYSE-traded competitors, strongly sug-
gests that news of the trustees’ plan to sell the Trust’s controlling interest
in the Company led to an increase in the Company’s stock price.  Graphi-
cal analysis likewise strongly implies that abandonment of the sale led to a
decrease.  However, comparison of Hershey’s stock price dynamics with
those of broad market indexes reveals some comovement of Hershey’s
stock with the market as a whole, leading us to apply more rigorous meth-
odology to isolate the effects of the proposed sale from other effects.
Using a standard event study econometric analysis that isolates stock
price movement attributable to sale-related news from general market
trends, we find that Hershey’s stock experienced a large and statistically
significant positive abnormal return on news of the sale and a large and
statistically significant negative abnormal return on the trustees’ aban-
donment of the sale.  These findings endure across a variety of specifica-
tions and numerous robustness checks.298  In most specifications we also
297. Our approach of benchmarking abnormal returns to a distribution generated
from HSY during periods outside the sale window and to a distribution generated from
HSY’s competitors bears some similarity to the bootstrapping methods introduced in John
D. Lyon, Brad M. Barber & Chih-Ling Tsai, Improved Methods for Tests of Long-Run
Abnormal Stock Returns, 54 J. Fin. 165 (1999).  We thank Dan Rubinfeld and Max
Schanzenbach for stimulating our thinking on alternative benchmarks and bootstrapping.
298. Indeed, our findings regarding the effect of the sale announcement and sale
abandonment were significant in all specifications at better than the 99.8% level and in all
but one at the 99.9% level.
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find that the trial court’s issuance of the preliminary injunction against
the sale led to a statistically significant negative abnormal return.
Put into numerical terms, we find that news of the trustees’ plan to
sell the Trust’s controlling interest in the Company was associated with a
statistically significant positive abnormal return of 25.5%.  This finding
implies that the Company was worth $2.7 billion more on the open mar-
ket than when under the control of the trustees.299  Accordingly, in this
case the existence of a controlling shareholder was manifestly inferior to
the market for corporate control as an alternative mechanism for mini-
mizing corporate agency costs.
Regarding trust law, our findings imply agency costs arising from the
Trust’s charitable trust form on the order of $850 million,300 about 15%
of the 2002 value of the Trust.301  Although the trustees controlled more
than three-quarters of the shareholder votes in the Company, they failed
to impose a value-maximizing strategy on the Company’s managers.  As
we have seen, the market judged the Company as being $2.7 billion (or
25.5%) more valuable when the Company’s managers were expected to
be subject to the market for corporate control instead of supervision by
the trustees.
Moreover, instead of reducing the agency costs associated with the
Trust’s charitable trust form, the Attorney General’s intervention made
those agency costs permanent.  Without any offsetting financial benefit to
the Trust, the Attorney General forced the Trust to retain an asset that
was worth $850 million more on the open market than in the hands of
the trustees.  While the sale’s detractors argued that the sale would hurt
299. The $2.7 billion figure is the product of a back-of-the-envelope calculation that
reflects 25.5% (our point estimate of Hershey’s abnormal return) of Hershey’s market
capitalization of $10.7 billion on July 25, 2002.  The 95% confidence interval implies that
the loss lies within the range of $2.4 billion and $3 billion.  We computed Hershey’s
market capitalization by multiplying the number of outstanding shares by Hershey’s July
25, 2002, closing price of $78.30.  Our share volume data, which reflects the number of
shares outstanding on July 26, 2002, comes from Aug. 2002 Quarterly Report, supra note
270, at 1. R
An alternate measure of the social cost might be possible using the negative abnormal
return that occurred when the sale was abandoned.  We hesitate to use this measure,
however, because at various dates in the sale window the abandonment of the sale was
probabilistically capitalized into the HSY price.  This can be seen most clearly on the day
the court issued a preliminary injunction against the sale.  Thus, using this alternate
measure requires subjective judgments about what total abnormal return we can attribute
to expectations that the sale would be abandoned.  The first public disclosure of the
proposed sale is a cleaner and better identified shock to Hershey’s exposure to the market
for corporate control.
300. As with our $2.7 billion figure, this $850 million figure reflects a back-of-the-
envelope calculation that extrapolates from our point estimates.  Specifically, $850 million
is the rounded-down product of multiplying the percent of outstanding HSY stock held by
the Trust in 2002 as noted in supra Table 1 by the $2.7 billion figure computed in supra
note 299.  The 95% confidence interval implies that the loss lies within the range of $760 R
million and $940 million.
301. See supra Table 1.
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other stakeholders, such as the residents of Hershey and the Company’s
employees, one wonders whether their gain offsets the preservation of
such enormous agency costs.  The $850 million in Trust assets destroyed
translates roughly into $67,000 per resident of Hershey, or $62,000 per
employee of the Company—plus the Trust’s exposure to uncompensated
risk was continued.302
Given the analysis in Appendix Table B1 regarding potential leak-
age, the foregoing estimates may well understate the true measure of
agency costs and hence the social welfare loss.  If we included the abnor-
mal returns for the three-day potential leakage period before the an-
nouncement, our estimates would be roughly 8% higher.303
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY ANALYSIS
A. Charitable Trusts
We have shown that the Trust’s principal asset, its stock in the
Company, was worth $850 million more (about 15% of the Trust’s 2002
value) on the open market than when in the hands of the trustees—a
damning indictment of the trustees’ inability to use their voting control
of the Company to maximize value.  We have also shown that the Attor-
ney General’s intervention to block the sale of the Company forced the
Trust to maintain an undiversified and smaller portfolio.  Our analysis
therefore provides the first quantitative empirical evidence of agency
costs in the charitable trust form and the inadequacy of supervision of
charitable trusts by state attorneys general.  Further, our findings high-
light the related but less often remarked upon concern that, even if the
attorney general does intervene in the administration of a charitable
trust, such intervention might be designed to promote the attorney gen-
eral’s political interests at the expense of the trust’s charitable purpose.
302. The population and employment figures used in this computation come from
the 2000 Census and filings by the Hershey Company with the SEC.  See U.S. Census
Bureau, Profile of General Demographic Characteristics:  2000:  Hershey CDP, PA,
available at http://censtats.census.gov/data/PA/1604234144.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (indicating Hershey population of 12,771); 2003 Annual Report,
supra note 253, at 4 (claiming roughly 13,700 full-time employees). R
303. Still another alternate measure of the loss to shareholders (including the Trust)
from abandoning the sale might be derived from Wrigley’s $12.5 billion bid.  That bid
translates to $89 per share, which is $26.50 or 42.4% more than HSY’s closing price of
$62.50 on July 24, 2002, the day before news of the sale broke.  Using these figures (see
supra notes 299–300 for discussion of methodology), the total loss to shareholders R
amounts to roughly $5.1 billion, of which the Trust’s share is $1.6 billion.  However, we are
skeptical of using the Wrigley bid for this purpose.  While Wrigley’s $12.5 billion bid might
represent the value of the Hershey Company’s assets under the control of Wrigley’s
management, a portion of that sum might also reflect agency costs in the Wrigley
corporate structure.  For example, the bid might include a control premium that Wrigley’s
management was willing to pay for the purposes of empire building or takeover protection.
See supra Part II.B.1.b.  As such, the Wrigley bid is a less reliable benchmark for assessing
the welfare effects of terminating the sale than our estimate of the Hershey Company’s
abnormal return on July 25.  The same analysis applies to the use of other bids.
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As such, our findings provide an empirical grounding for at least three
policy debates in the law of trusts:  (1) the utility of alternative modes of
charitable trust supervision; (2) the authorization of cy pres of charitable
trusts on the ground of “wastefulness”; and (3) the propriety of social
investing by trustees and other fiduciaries.
1. Alternative Modes of Supervision. — Although it is widely believed
that the supervision of charitable trusts by the state attorneys general is
inadequate, there is disagreement over the reasons and best remedy for
that inadequacy.  According to one view, supervision is inadequate be-
cause of insufficient resources.304  Proponents of this view contend that
increasing the budget for charitable supervision and perhaps also increas-
ing the mandatory disclosure obligations of charitable organizations will
improve oversight.305  Another view holds that state attorneys general are
lackadaisical monitors of charities because active supervision has little po-
litical payoff outside of isolated incidents where the charity’s public sali-
ence makes imposing local preferences politically expedient.306  On this
view, increased funding and disclosure will have minimal effect because
the problem is structural.  Instead, alternative modes of supervision by
people or entities with better incentives are required.
Our findings tend to support the latter view.  As we have seen, even if
the attorney general does intervene, the attorney general’s political inter-
ests might not be congruent with the best interests of the trust or social
welfare—here to the tune of $850 million and $2.7 billion respectively.
More broadly, no amount of additional funding or increased disclosure
will ameliorate the underlying structural problem that the attorney gen-
eral is typically a political officer whose ambition toward higher office
provides either little incentive to supervise charitable trusts or, as in the
case of the Hershey Trust, perverse incentives to impose local political
preferences.307  In either scenario, monitoring by the state attorneys gen-
304. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 221, at 389 (“I attribute the failure of the attorneys R
general not to lack of interest or improper motive, but to the lack of funds devoted
specifically to this purpose.”); see also Brody, Parochialism, supra note 8, at 951 & n.50 R
(collecting studies on few resources allocated to charity enforcement).
305. See Gary, supra note 212, at 639–41, 646 (urging increased disclosure and R
proposing increased funding); Johnson, supra note 221, at 390 (proposing that charitable R
trusts pay fee proportional to size of corpus to fund attorney general’s supervision); see
also Chester, Improving Enforcement, supra note 221, at 475 (arguing that increased R
disclosure will not increase private enforcement absent relaxation of standing
requirements); Fishman, Improving, supra note 211, at 270–72 (discussing recent federal R
disclosure requirements); Reiser, supra note 221, at 580–606 (analyzing legislative R
proposals for increased disclosure requirements for charitable trusts).
306. See, e.g., Brody, Parochialism, supra note 8, at 947–49 (“The incentives of this R
nearly universally elective office impel the incumbent to ignore cases that are politically
dangerous and to jump into matters that are politically irresistible but implicate only
‘business’ decisions of charity managers.”  (footnote omitted)).
307. See id. at 991–92 (discussing Attorney General’s problematic role in Hershey
affair); see also Mark Sidel, The Nonprofit Sector and the New State Activism, 100 Mich. L.
Rev. 1312, 1334–35 (2002) (reviewing Norman I. Silber, A Corporate Form of Freedom:
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eral is inadequate to ensure that resources held by tax-exempt and, there-
fore, publicly-subsidized charitable trusts are deployed in efficient pursuit
of a bona fide charitable purpose for the public good.
To be sure, we do not claim that all charitable trusts host the same
magnitude of agency costs as the Hershey Trust.  Nor do we claim that all
interventions by state attorneys general are as maladroit as the interven-
tion here.  Instead our claim is that our results tend to validate the as-
sumption in the theoretical literature, heretofore based chiefly on quali-
tative anecdotal evidence, of the prevalence of agency costs in charitable
trusts and the failure by state attorneys general adequately to superintend
such trusts.308  Further, by showing that the Attorney General’s interven-
tion here reduced the value of the Trust and continued its exposure to
uncompensated risk, our findings tend to support the view that the incen-
tives of the state attorneys general may well be misaligned with the best
interests of the charitable organizations that they superintend.  Our find-
ings, therefore, offer tentative support for alternative modes of supervi-
sion by agents with better incentives.
Legislators and academic commentators have proposed a variety of
alternative forms of monitoring.  For example, some have contended that
the role of the IRS in supervising the operation of charitable entities
should be expanded.309  Others have argued for an independent federal
agency, perhaps on the model of the Securities and Exchange
Commission.310  Almost half the states have given donors standing con-
The Emergence of the Nonprofit Sector (2001)) (discussing potential disadvantages of
“[a]ctivist state authorities”).
308. See supra notes 218–222 and accompanying text. R
309. For discussion, see Evelyn Brody, A Taxing Time for Bishop Estate:  What Is the
I.R.S. Role in Charity Governance?, 21 U. Haw. L. Rev. 537, 543–48 (1999); Gary, supra
note 212, at 644–45; see also supra note 96 (describing exemption of Trust from various R
IRS requirements).
310. See, e.g., Joel L. Fleishman, The Foundation:  A Great American Secret:  How
Private Wealth Is Changing the World 256–59 (2007) [hereinafter Fleishman, Foundation]
(“My strong recommendation, therefore, is that the first important action to increase
foundation accountability be the establishment by Congress of such an NASD-like private,
nonprofit organization . . . with sufficient resources to oversee the entire U.S. civic
sector . . . .”); Fleishman, Public Trust, supra note 2, at 188–91 (“If we were starting from R
scratch, I would favor the creation of an independent agency . . . and would empower the
agency with all aspects of the regulation of not-for-profit organizations . . . .”).  But see
Karst, supra note 219, at 481–83 (noting possibility of eventual federal regulation, but R
arguing that increased state regulation is superior).  However, such an agency might be
vulnerable to capture by charitable managers.  Cf. Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative
Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation:  A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15
Cardozo L. Rev. 909, 913–15 (1994) (discussing problem of capture in context of
purportedly obsolete agencies).  Further, the English experience with a charities
regulatory agency, the English Charity Commission, has not been entirely happy.  See
generally James J. Fishman, Charitable Accountability and Reform in Nineteenth-Century
England:  The Case of the Charity Commission, 80 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 723 (2005) (providing
overview of English Charity Commission and associated difficulties); Debra Morris, New
Charity Regulation Proposals for England and Wales:  Overdue or Overdone?, 80 Chi.-Kent
L. Rev. 779 (2005) (same).
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current with the attorney general to enforce a charitable trust.311  And a
handful of states allow relator standing to enforce charitable trusts—that
is, standing for individuals in cases where the attorney general elects not
to pursue the matter.312  Perhaps most intriguing (albeit still theoretical),
Geoffrey Manne has urged “the creation of private, for-profit monitoring
companies” that would contract with charitable organizations “to monitor
both the financial and charitable aspects of the nonprofit’s operation.”313
Each of these proposals presents pros and cons in the particulars
that we pass over here.  Analyzing the specifics of the various reform pro-
posals is beyond the scope of this paper; hence the qualifier that our
findings offer “tentative” support.  For present purposes, it suffices to
note that the theme that ties each of these reforms together—and what
makes each potentially attractive in view of our findings—is that they are
more sensitive than the status quo to the incentives of the agents charged
with supervision.  Indeed, several, particularly donor standing, are de-
signed specifically to harness those incentives.
2. Cy Pres for Wastefulness. — Under the traditional understanding of
the cy pres doctrine, a court may direct the trustees of a charitable trust
to apply the trust property to another charitable purpose that approxi-
mates the donor’s original purpose if the original purpose becomes im-
possible, impracticable, or illegal.314  The principal justification for the
doctrine is the risk that, because a charitable trust may have a perpetual
existence, changed circumstances will render the trust’s original purpose
obsolete.315  As Bruce Mann has explained, “the law of charitable trusts
311. See supra note 44; see also Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 94 cmt. g R
(Preliminary Draft No. 8, 2007) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (allowing persons
possessing “‘special interest’ in the performance of a charitable trust,” including donors, to
bring suit for enforcement of trust terms).  Henry Hansmann urged this reform over
twenty-five years ago.  See Hansmann, Reforming, supra note 221, at 606–13.  For more R
recent analysis, see Evelyn Brody, From the Dead Hand to the Living Hand:  The
Conundrum of Charitable-Donor Standing, 41 Ga. L. Rev. 1183 (2007); Ronald Chester,
Grantor Standing to Enforce Charitable Transfers Under Section 405(C) of the Uniform
Trust Code and Related Law:  How Important Is It and How Extensive Should It Be?, 37
Real Prop. Probs. & Tr. J. 611 (2003); Iris J. Goodwin, Donor Standing to Enforce
Charitable Gifts:  Civil Society vs. Donor Empowerment, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1093 (2005).  For
a contrary analysis, see Rob Atkinson, Unsettled Standing:  Who (Else) Should Enforce the
Duties of Charitable Fiduciaries?, 23 J. Corp. L. 655 (1998).
312. See Gary, supra note 212, at 626–27; see also Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 94 R
cmt. e (Preliminary Draft No. 8, 2007) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing
relator standing).  A related idea is the appointment of a trustee ad litem.  See Kaufman,
supra note 211, at 736–37. R
313. Manne, supra note 37, at 229.  A public variant is Fishman’s proposal for local R
charity commissions with members appointed by the governor and attorney general.  See
Fishman, Improving, supra note 211, at 272–75. R
314. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 399 (1959).
315. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 67 cmt. a (2003) (“The cy pres
doctrine’s modern rationale rests primarily in the perpetual duration allowed charitable
trusts and in the resulting risk that designated charitable purposes may become
obsolete . . . .”); Posner, Economic Analysis, supra note 4, § 18.3, at 546 (“But since no one R
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has never regarded a donor’s wishes as inviolate, regardless of what any-
one, donors included, might think or want.  All the law promises is that it
will do its best to honor those wishes—literally if possible, by approxima-
tion if not.”316  The leading casebook offers the example of a “nine-
teenth-century trust to care for old horses retired from pulling fire wag-
ons and streetcars” as a good candidate for cy pres.317
Recently, however, there has been a movement to broaden the
grounds for cy pres to include “wasteful” allocation of resources.  The
idea is to account for “the increasingly frequent problem of trust funds
that have become excessive for their stated charitable purposes.”318
Under this reformed conception of cy pres, if the trust property so “ex-
ceeds what is needed for the particular charitable purpose . . . that the
continued expenditure of all of the funds for that purpose . . . would be
wasteful,” then a court “might broaden the purposes of the trust,” for
example by “direct[ing] application of the surplus funds to a like purpose
in a different community.”319  The 2000 Uniform Trust Code, the 2003
Restatement (Third) of Trusts, and the most recent preliminary draft of
the Principles of Nonprofit Organizations all adopt “wasteful” as a basis
for cy pres.320
Whatever the other merits of broadening the grounds for cy pres,
our findings suggest that cy pres in the case of an excess endowment may
have the salutary effect of minimizing agency costs.  Given the Trust’s
excess endowment, another $850 million would not affect the Trust’s
ability to fund the day-to-day operation of the School.  As a result, there
was little pressure on the trustees to maximize value and little risk for the
Attorney General that blocking the sale would immediately imperil the
School.  Indeed, opponents of the trustees’ diversification plan argued
can foresee the future, a rational donor knows that his intentions might eventually be
thwarted by unpredictable circumstances . . . .”).
316. See Bruce H. Mann, In the End, a Move Was Only Way Out, Phila. Inquirer, Dec.
15, 2004, at A23.
317. Dukeminier et al., supra note 20, at 738. R
318. Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Trends in American
Trust Law at Century’s End, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1877, 1902 (2000); see also Johnny Rex
Buckles, When Charitable Gifts Soar Above Twin Towers:  A Federal Income Tax Solution
to the Problem of Publicly Solicited Surplus Donations Raised for a Designated Charitable
Purpose, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 1827, 1864–92 (2003) (examining potential law reform to
address problem of surplus charitable funds).
319. Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 67 cmt. c(1) (2003).  The movement toward
allowing cy pres in cases of “waste” is in part a reaction to the infamous Buck Trust of
Marin County.  See Dukeminier et al., supra note 20, at 743–46. R
320. See Unif. Trust Code § 413(a) (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 509 (2006);
Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 67 (2003); Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs.
§§ 240, 440 (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2007).  For information on adoptions of the UTC,
see UTC Enactment Charts, supra note 44.  For discussion of the meaning of “wasteful” R
under the UTC, see David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000):  Significant
Provisions and Policy Issues, 67 Mo. L. Rev. 143, 179 & n.164 (2002) (explaining that,
under UTC, cases of waste would “normally involve situations where the funds allocated to
the particular charitable scheme far exceed what is needed”).
\\server05\productn\C\COL\108-4\COL401.txt unknown Seq: 73 12-AUG-08 14:51
2008] HERSHEY’S KISS-OFF 821
that the Trust had more money than it needed for its specific purpose
and hence the Trust did not need to sell its interest in the Company.321
By contrast, if the trustees were under pressure to use the Trust’s
excess endowment to fund similar schools in other communities, the so-
cial welfare loss from failing to maximize the value of the Trust would
have been more apparent.  Consider that the trust instrument gives pref-
erence to local orphans but also allows for admission of orphans from
across the country.322  Yet even though the Trust’s corpus has grown dra-
matically, the School “served no more children at the start of 2005 than it
did in 1963.”323  What is more, the Trust’s current plans for expansion of
the School are both modest and limited to the single existing campus.324
A further benefit of “waste” as a basis for cy pres is that it would draw
attention to considerations of scale versus scope.  Before seeking to ex-
pand a charitable trust’s scope, the trustees should exhaust possible ex-
tensions in scale.  In the case of the Trust, by contrast, there has been an
implicit expansion of scope to include the interests of the local commu-
nity rather than an explicit expansion of scale (i.e., more students and
additional schools).325
Put more broadly, our findings tend to confirm the theoretical intu-
itions that an excess endowment provides a cushion for managerial lax-
ity326 and invites imposition of local political preferences by state offi-
321. See Brief of Appellee, supra note 110, at 30 & n.16. R
322. See supra text accompanying note 74. Further, Milton Hershey founded a R
similar school in Cuba while the Hershey Company operated sugar factories there.  See
Brenner, supra note 21, at 137–38. R
323. D’Antonio, supra note 8, at 266. R
324. The School plans to expand to 2,000 students by 2013.  See Press Release, Milton
Hershey Sch., Hershey Trust Board Chair Announced (Jan. 23, 2006), available at http://
www.mhs-pa.org/newsroom/news-releases/4836/default.asp (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
325. The Trust has been involved in two prior cy pres litigations.  In 1999 the Trust
sought unsuccessfully to spend $25 million a year on a research and teaching institute.  In
1963 the Trust was allowed to divert $50 million to Pennsylvania State University for a
medical facility to be located in Hershey.  See Brody, Parochialism, supra note 8, at 987–89. R
Ironically, the same judge who issued the injunction against the 2002 sale had in the
context of the 1999 cy pres proceeding found that “‘the dominant intent of the Hersheys
[was] to care for as many children at the School as the income will permit.’”  Id. at 989
(quoting In re Milton Hershey Sch., No. 712-1963, slip op. at 7 (Ct. C.P., Orphans’ Ct. Div.,
Dauphin County, Pa. Dec. 7, 1999) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)).
326. See Henry Hansmann, Why Do Universities Have Endowments?, 19 J. Legal Stud.
3, 29 (1990) (arguing that large endowments enable trustees to withstand pressure from
both beneficiaries and donors).  Our agency costs justification of permitting cy pres on the
ground of “wastefulness” shares an analytical overlap with the proposal by Richard Posner
and others that charitable foundations be required to spend down all property received
within a limited timeframe.  See Fleishman, Foundation, supra note 310, at 235–48; R
Posner, Economic Analysis, supra note 4, § 18.5, at 547.  Perhaps the most prominent R
example is the Gates Foundation’s decision to terminate fifty years after the death of the
survivor of Bill Gates, Melinda Gates, and Warren Buffett.  See Sally Beatty, Gates
Foundation Sets Time Frame To Spend Assets, Wall St. J., Dec. 1, 2006, at A10.  Our
analysis also fits neatly with the literature on agency problems associated with excess
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cials.327  Recall that upon amending the state’s prudent investor law to
make it difficult for future trustees to sell the Trust’s interest in the
Company, the State Senate majority leader explained that “[w]e have to
be active and protect our economic assets.”328
3. Propriety of Social Investing by Trustees and Other Fiduciaries. — There
is ongoing debate about whether trustees and other fiduciaries may prop-
erly engage in social investing, that is, investing in “pursuit of an invest-
ment strategy that tempers the conventional objective of maximizing the
investor’s financial interests by seeking to promote nonfinancial social
goals as well.”329  As we have seen, the $850 million in assets not realized
by the Trust equates roughly to $67,000 per resident of Hershey, or
$62,000 per worker at the Company.330  By quantifying the loss to the
Trust, our findings bring into sharp relief the important policy questions
of (a) whether the gain to these other constituencies offsets the wealth
destruction experienced by the Trust, the Trust’s continuing exposure to
uncompensated risk, and the wealth destruction experienced by the
Company’s other shareholders, and (b) whether that question is even rel-
evant as a matter of law or policy.331
endowments in operating nonprofit firms.  See Core et al., supra note 39, at 4 (“[O]verall R
evidence suggests that excess endowments are associated with greater agency problems.”);
Raymond Fisman & R. Glenn Hubbard, The Role of Nonprofit Endowments, in Glaeser,
supra note 39, at 217, 218–23 (“[P]roviding managers with this precautionary savings R
device may allow them to ‘steal’ from the organization, by pursuing interests that diverge
from those of the donors . . . .”).
327. See Brody, Parochialism, supra note 8, at 940 (noting that attorneys general R
often seek to “confine the charity to its ‘community’”); see also supra text accompanying
note 198. R
328. See supra notes 193–198 and accompanying text. R
329. Langbein & Posner, supra note 46, at 73; see, e.g., Joel C. Dobris, Arguments in R
Favor of Fiduciary Divestment of “South African” Securities, 65 Neb. L. Rev. 209, 221
(1986) (arguing that it is “appropriate to consider moral factors when dealing with
fiduciary matters”); Michael S. Knoll, Ethical Screening in Modern Financial Markets:  The
Conflicting Claims Underlying Socially Responsible Investment, 57 Bus. Law. 681, 713–26
(2002) (arguing that socially responsible investor cannot influence market behavior
without undertaking significant financial sacrifice); Lewis D. Solomon & Karen C. Coe,
Social Investments by Nonprofit Corporations and Charitable Trusts:  A Legal and Business
Primer for Foundation Managers and Other Nonprofit Fiduciaries, 66 UMKC L. Rev. 213,
217 (1997) (“[W]hether bound by the common law prudent investor rule or the business
care rule, fiduciaries of nonprofit entities are permitted to consider social and
environmental factors when making investment decisions.”).
330. See supra note 302 and accompanying text. R
331. Our analysis has an analogy in the question of whether corporate managers
should consider the welfare of constituencies other than shareholders.  See, e.g., Einer
Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 733, 738
(2005) (arguing that corporate managers “have always had some legal discretion . . . to
sacrifice corporate profits in the public interest”); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic
Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of
Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 Stetson L. Rev. 23, 24 (1991) (arguing that residual
claimants should be sole beneficiaries of corporate fiduciary duties because they face
unique contracting difficulties); Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in
Corporate Governance, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1431, 1460–65 (2006) (arguing that
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Under orthodox trust fiduciary law, “[n]o form of so-called ‘social
investing’ is consistent with the duty of loyalty if the investment activity
entails sacrificing the interests of trust beneficiaries . . . in favor of the
interests of the persons supposedly benefited by pursuing the particular
social cause.”332  Because the Trust’s charitable purpose is to board and
educate needy children from across the country, not to subsidize life in
Hershey, Pennsylvania, the Trustees could not permissibly maintain the
Trust’s controlling interest in the Company for the purpose of promoting
the interests of the town and the Company’s workers.
Opponents of the 2002 sale argued that Milton Hershey would have
wanted the trustees to consider the interests of the community.  They
pointed to the provision in the trust instrument that privileged applica-
tions to the School from local orphans over orphans from the rest of the
country,333 arguing that it evidenced an intent to give the community
something of a beneficial interest in the Trust.334  But an equally plausi-
ble interpretation is that the Hersheys’ primary aim was to care for or-
phans above all other purposes.  If, after admitting all suitable local or-
phans, the School could accommodate more, then the School was to look
outside the immediate community for additional students.  Consistent
with this interpretation, the trust instrument provided explicitly that the
Trust’s income was to be “exclusively devoted” to the School.335
More generally, there are two inherent weaknesses in the what-the-
founder-would-have-wanted mode of reasoning.  First, charitable trusts
have perpetual existence.  Eventually, after the inevitable change of cir-
cumstances, assessments of what the founder would have wanted devolve
into rank conjecture.  Second, even if we could know with certainty what
the founder would have wanted, it is not obvious that we should defer to
those wishes if they have undesirable social welfare consequences.  Al-
though American law is solicitous of the dead hand, it does not blindly
enforce all donor wishes—for example, a parent’s gift to a child condi-
tioned on the child’s marrying someone of a particular religious faith is
management’s duty to shareholders should not be relaxed in favor of public interest as
agency and information costs will overwhelm any social gain).
332. Unif. Prudent Investor Act § 5 cmt. (1994), 7B U.L.A. 34–35 (2006).  For a more
general treatment, see Langbein & Posner, supra note 46.  Federal pension law follows the R
orthodox view.  See Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Fiduciary Standard Under ERISA
in Considering Economically Targeted Investments, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-1 (2007) (“The
Department has construed the requirements . . . as prohibiting a fiduciary from
subordinating the interests of participants and beneficiaries in their retirement income to
unrelated objectives.”); Ian D. Lanoff, The Social Investment of Private Pension Plan
Assets:  May It Be Done Lawfully Under ERISA?, 31 Labor L.J. 387, 390 (1980) (noting that
ERISA does not permit fiduciaries to sacrifice investment performance “in order to
advance the social welfare of a group”).
333. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. R
334. See In re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, 807 A.2d 324, 328–29, 331–32 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2002).
335. 1909 Deed of Trust, supra note 70, ¶ 8. R
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enforced only if judged reasonable.336  Indeed, the case for disregarding
the donor’s preference in the face of a contrary public policy is stronger
in a charitable trust than in other donative contexts such as a private trust
because a charitable trust is in effect subsidized by state and federal tax
exemptions.  To be sure, the presumption should be in favor of the do-
nor’s intent.  But in the case of a charitable trust, donative freedom is
constrained by the necessity of a bona fide charitable purpose that con-
fers a sufficient social benefit to justify the quid pro quo of perpetual
existence and exemption from taxation.337
But suppose that there was no doubt that the Hersheys would have
wanted to favor the community in the event of surplus funds, and sup-
pose further that the law allowed the trustees to take into account the
interests of the community in such a scenario.338  Even then, it is hardly
obvious that maintaining control of the Company would be an efficient
way to benefit the community or subsidize life in Hershey.  For example,
the Trust could have sold its interest in the Company, thereby realizing
the $850 million gain and diversifying its portfolio, and then it could have
paid out every dollar of that $850 million gain to the local community,
either in cash or through a program of community enrichment.  In this
scenario, the community would have received an actual $850 million
transfer from the Trust, the Company would thereafter be subject to the
pressures of the takeover market, and the Trust would have at least
achieved salutary portfolio diversification.
Instead, the Trust was forced to maintain its interest in the Company
(and so an undiversified portfolio), the community did not receive a cash
transfer, and the Company remained subject to the less efficient monitor-
ing of the trustees.  The bill for this inefficiency came due in early 2007
when, after further erosion of the Company’s market share, the Company
announced that it would close one-third of its assembly lines, layoff 1,500
336. See, e.g., Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825, 829 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1974)
(“A partial restraint of marriage which imposes only reasonable restrictions is valid, and
not contrary to public policy.”); Restatement (Third) of Property:  Wills and Other
Donative Transfers § 10.1 cmt. g (2003) (“Among the rules of law that prohibit or restrict
freedom of disposition in certain instances are . . . unreasonable restraints on alienation or
marriage . . . .”); Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 29(c) (2003) (“An intended trust or trust
provision is invalid if . . . it is contrary to public policy.”); Restatement (Second) of
Property:  Donative Transfers § 6.2 (1983) (“[A]n otherwise effective restriction in a
donative transfer . . . is valid if . . . the restraint does not unreasonably limit the transferee’s
opportunity to marry.”).
337. See supra note 206 and accompanying text. R
338. Indeed, as amended in 2002 in the wake of the aborted sale, see supra notes
193–198 and accompanying text, the Pennsylvania prudent investor law now deviates from R
the norm by expressly allowing the trustee of a charitable trust to consider “the special
relationship of the asset and its economic impact as a principal business enterprise on the
community in which the beneficiary of the trust is located and the special value of the
integration of the beneficiary’s activities with the community where that asset is located”
when making investment decisions.  20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 7203(c)(6) (West 2005).
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workers (12% of its workforce), and open a new factory in Mexico.339
The Trust’s controlling interest can shield the Company from the take-
over market, but it provides no defense against the vicissitudes of the
products market.
True, in late 2007 the Trust forced a shakeup in the Company’s top
leadership and expressed dissatisfaction with the Company’s “unsatisfac-
tory performance.”340  Indeed, in a letter addressed to the Company’s
Board of Directors, the chair of the board of trustees complained that
since January 2002, the price of the Company’s stock grew “at half the
rate of the S&P 500 Index.”341  Yet the Trust also pledged publicly to
maintain its controlling interest in the Company.342  That announcement
put a formal end to informal merger talks started in January 2007 be-
tween Cadbury and the Hershey Company.343  A merger with Cadbury
would have given the Company the international presence that it cur-
rently lacks.344  So long as the Trust remains unwilling to sell, the
Company’s suboptimal control structure will continue to hinder its
development.345
A similar analysis pertains to shareholder welfare.  To make the
abandonment of the sale welfare neutral (i.e., Kaldor-Hicks efficient)
with respect to shareholders, each of Hershey’s 13,700 workers on aver-
age would have to value blocking the sale at more than $199,000, or,
alternately, each of Hershey’s 12,771 residents on average would have to
339. See Food—Hershey Co.:  Work Force Will Be Cut 12% in Three-Year
Restructuring, Wall St. J., Feb. 16, 2007, at B5; Hershey Cutting Work Force 12%, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 16, 2007, at C2.  Local media coverage suggested that 3,000 local jobs would be
lost and replaced by 1,500 new workers in Mexico.  See Barbara Miller & Monica Von
Dobeneck, Hershey May Cut 3000, Workers Say, Patriot-News (Harrisburg, Pa.), Feb. 17,
2007, at A1.
340. Julie Jargon, At Hershey, Sweetness Is in Perilously Short Supply, Wall St. J., Oct.
10, 2007, at B1 (quoting Press Release, LeRoy S. Zimmerman, Chairman, Bd. Of Dirs.,
Hershey Trust Co. (Oct. 10, 2007), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/
documents/hershey-02232008L.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter
Trust Release]); see also Julie Jargon, Hershey CEO Richard Lenny to Step Down, Wall St.
J., Oct. 2, 2007, at A3 (describing effects of replacement of management and board); Julie
Jargon, Most of Hershey Board Replaced in Shake-Up, Wall St. J., Nov. 12, 2007, at A2
(same).
341. Letter from LeRoy S. Zimmerman, Chairman, Bd. of Dirs., Hershey Trust Co., to
Bd. of Dirs., The Hershey Co. 2 (Oct. 25, 2007), available at http://online.wsj.com/
public/resources/documents/hershey-02232008L.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
342. See Trust Release, supra note 340 (noting “Trust’s frequently reiterated resolve R
to retain its controlling interest in the Hershey Company” and arguing that there is “no
inherent conflict” between that principle and strong company growth).
343. See Julie Jargon, Matthew Karnitschnig & Joann S. Lublin, How Hershey Went
Sour, Wall St. J., Feb. 23–24, 2008, at B1.
344. See id.
345. The current chairman of the Trust Board is one of the lawyers who advised
opponents of the 2002 sale.  See Julie Jargon, Trust Head May Mold Hershey’s Future, Wall
St. J., Nov. 15, 2007, at C3.
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value blocking the sale at $214,000.346  True, the public shareholders
knew or should have known that the Trust had voting control over the
Company and those shareholders bought their shares at a discount re-
flecting the Trust’s continuing control.  Nonetheless, from an aggregate
social welfare perspective, canceling the sale preserved a suboptimal capi-
tal structure on the order of $2.7 billion.
B. Corporate Governance
Our analysis bears on two policy debates in corporate governance:
(1) the role of controlling shareholders or large blockholders in minimiz-
ing corporate agency costs, and (2) the role of the market for corporate
control (i.e., the takeover market) in minimizing corporate agency costs.
1. Controlling Shareholders in Corporate Governance. — The incidence
of controlling shareholders and minority blockholders is increasing
among public U.S. firms and is even more common among public com-
panies in Europe.347  We have shown, however, that the markets valued
the Company as being $2.7 billion more valuable (an increase of more
than 25%) when its managers were subject to market discipline instead of
supervision by the trustees as agents for the Trust.  This finding suggests
that a controlling shareholder, at least one whose agents are poorly moti-
vated, provides less discipline against corporate agency costs than the
takeover market.  Indeed, the existence of a listless controlling share-
holder or minority blockholder might have perverse governance conse-
quences if it insulates the managers by foreclosing the possibility of a
takeover.
To be sure, our results do not imply that a controlling shareholder
can never effectively monitor agency costs within the firm.  We cannot
disentangle the role of the agency costs owing to the Trust’s weak govern-
ance structure from the role of switching from a controlling shareholder
to the market for corporate control as alternative explanations for our
findings.  But our findings do suggest that corporate agency costs will not
be controlled if the individuals who make decisions for the controlling
shareholder have little to gain from better performance.  Although this
346. These figures were computed using the same employment and population
figures as before, see supra note 302, but substituting $2.7 billion for $850 million.  The R
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion holds that an action is efficient if those who gain from the
action benefit, in the aggregate, more than those who lose from the action, in the
aggregate.  As a result, it would be possible for the winners to compensate the losers,
leaving everyone better off after the action is taken.  In this case, if the workers (or
residents) valued blocking the sale, on average, at an amount less than those provided
above, it would not be possible for them to compensate shareholders for the wealth loss
from blocking the sale.  For a useful introductory discussion of efficiency measures, see
William T. Allen, Reinier Kraakman & Guhan Subramanian, Commentaries and Cases on
the Law of Business Organization 3–5 (2d ed. 2007); Francesco Parisi & Jonathan Klick,
Functional Law and Economics:  The Search for Value-Neutral Principles of Lawmaking,
79 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 431, 438–42 (2004).
347. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. R
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point has been made in general terms before,348 our empirical analysis
puts the problem into sharp relief, suggesting a pair of related implica-
tions—one concerning the future empirical research agenda and the
other concerning policy.
First, our analysis suggests that a blockholder’s organizational form
should be included as a variable in future empirical work on whether the
existence of the blockholder has a positive effect on firm value.  Indeed,
the failure to control systematically for agency problems within the
blockholder’s form may explain why existing studies generally do not ar-
rive at robust conclusions.349  By contrast, because our study is by neces-
sity limited to a single blockholder whose governance structure is evident,
we can speculate that it was the agency costs inherent to the Trust’s chari-
table trust form that caused it to be a deficient monitor.  With only one
firm, however, we are not able to identify this incentive effect separately
from Hershey’s other idiosyncrasies.  Accordingly, our hypothesis regard-
ing the importance of the blockholder’s organizational form calls out to
be tested in future studies.
Second, our analysis tends to validate the existing, generalized con-
cern about agency costs within a controlling shareholder’s internal struc-
ture.  As we have seen, the Trust was a poor monitor of the Company, but
the fact of the Trust’s deficient supervision does not negate the possibility
of efficacious supervision by a blockholder that is not impaired by its own
agency problems.  Thus, perhaps hedge fund activism, as championed by
Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock,350 will be more effective and occur
more frequently351 than activism on the part of mutual funds and pen-
348. See, e.g., Black, Agents, supra note 5, at 873 (discussing factors influencing R
monitoring by money managers); Coffee, Liquidity, supra note 242, at 1326 (“[A]gency R
problems at the institutional level can frustrate efforts to correct agency cost problems at
the corporate level, even if institutional shareholders own sufficiently large blocks to be
able to resolve their collective action problems.”).
349. See Holderness, supra note 7, at 60 (“First, it has not been definitely established R
whether the impact of blockholders on firm value is positive or negative.  Second, there is
little evidence that the impact of blockholders on firm value—whatever that impact may
be—is pronounced.”).
350. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 48, at 1062–70. R
351. Consistent with the notion that hedge fund managers will have an incentive to
engage in activism, April Klein and Emanuel Zur found that, in a sample covering 2003 to
2005, hedge funds did engage in significant activism and were generally successful in their
efforts.  See April Klein & Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism:  Hedge
Funds and Other Private Investors 59 tbl.6 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Law and Econ. Research
Paper No. 06-41, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=913362 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).  Klein and Zur, however, did not find that hedge funds target
underperforming firms, see id. at 56 tbl.3, and they found mixed evidence regarding
whether the hedge fund activism improved target firm efficiency, see id. at 57 tbl.4, 58
tbl.5, 63 tbl.8.  Another paper presents complementary evidence for a longer time series of
hedge fund activism.  See Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance,
and Firm Performance 47 tbl.5, 48 tbl.6, 50 tbl.7 (European Corporate Governance Inst.,
Fin. Working Paper No. 139/2006, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=948907
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).  In a sample covering roughly the same time
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sion funds.352  Unlike mutual fund and pension fund managers, who re-
ceive management fees on the order of 0.5% to 3%,353 hedge fund man-
agers receive performance rewards in the neighborhood of an additional
15%.354  Further, because hedge funds tend to have fewer investors, the
investors themselves may have more of an incentive to monitor
actively.355
2. The Market for Corporate Control. — Our results make a modest con-
tribution to the empirical literature that investigates the takeover model.
Consistent with previous studies of the effect of a takeover bid on share
prices,356 our finding of a large, significant positive abnormal return on
exposing the Company’s managers to the market for corporate control
suggests that the disciplining effect of the takeover threat improves share-
holder value.  Indeed, we improve on those studies in that we are better
able to exclude the alternative hypotheses that the observed increase in
the target’s price reflects (a) new information provided by the fact of the
takeover attempt itself,357 or (b) the accumulation of shares by a bidder
in advance of announcing the bid.358  We can exclude (a) because the
Hershey sale was not instigated by an outside party and the observed
price appreciation largely disappeared once the sale was abandoned for
exogenous reasons.359  We can exclude (b) because the attempted take-
period, a third study also finds that hedge funds appear to play relatively activist roles in
target firms and that they exhibit a high level of success with respect to their proposals.
See William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 Geo. L.J. 1375, 1405
(2007).
352. As pointed out in Rock, supra note 242, at 479–80, however, in some cases R
mutual fund and pension managers will indeed find it in their self-interest to engage in
monitoring and activism.
353. See Brad M. Barber, Terrance Odean & Lu Zheng, Out of Sight, Out of Mind:
The Effect of Expenses on Mutual Fund Flows, 78 J. Bus. 2095, 2102 tbl.1 (2005)
(providing expense ratios for large sample of diversified U.S. equity funds).  Management
fees are a subset of expenses, so the numbers presented here are upper bound estimates.
354. See William N. Goetzmann, Jonathan E. Ingersoll, Jr. & Stephen A. Ross, High-
Water Marks and Hedge Fund Management Contracts, 58 J. Fin. 1685, 1685–86 (2003).
355. In fact, it is common for the hedge fund managers themselves to have a
significant portion of their own capital invested in the fund.  See Erik J. Greupner,
Comment, Hedge Funds Are Headed Down-Market:  A Call for Increased Regulation?, 40
San Diego L. Rev. 1555, 1559 (2003).
356. See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 29, at 987–92 (surveying literature). R
357. See Jensen & Ruback, supra note 234, at 15 n.10. R
358. See Jarrell, Brickley & Netter, supra note 234, at 53.  Further, relative to studies R
that examine changes in state takeover law, our results do not suffer from the potential
omitted variables bias inherent in such studies.  Changes in state takeover laws may
themselves be the result of broader changes in the state’s business climate.
359. Although others have found that takeover premiums tend to disappear after a
takeover is abandoned, see Bradley, Desai & Kim, Rationale, supra note 284, at 194, it is R
difficult to rule out the possibility that a takeover is abandoned for reasons that are
germane to firm value such as a downward revision of expected future profit streams or the
implementation of a new takeover defense.  In our case, this endogeneity problem may be
ruled out because the sale was abandoned for reasons unrelated to the Hershey Company’s
underlying business prospects.
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over of the Company was invited by the Trust, before a prospective
outside bidder would have begun buying shares to obtain a toehold in the
Company.360
Like other existing studies of share price movement on news of a
takeover, we cannot rule out the possibility that the observed apprecia-
tion was driven by a capitalized control premium or expected synergies
between the Company and the eventual acquirer.  However, compared to
the existing studies, these effects should be attenuated in our study be-
cause the takeover announcement came from the target before a buyer
had been identified.  The existence of a bidder-specific control premium
or synergy was therefore uncertain when news of the trustees’ plan to sell
broke.
Although we improve on the existing literature in the foregoing
ways, we nonetheless characterize our contribution to the takeover litera-
ture as modest for two reasons.  First, given the possibility that the Trust
might have imposed something other than profit maximization on the
Company’s managers, we cannot exclude the possibility that the observed
price movement represents the market’s expectation of a shift in manage-
ment objective rather than the containment of corporate agency costs.  In
other words, our results may reflect only charitable trust agency costs.
Second, our study is by necessity limited to a single firm.  Given these
limitations, the existing literature, which includes a host of multiple-firm
takeover studies, supplies crucial interpretive context for our findings.
When multiple studies using different research designs with different
strengths and weaknesses produce similar results, confidence in the gen-
eral validity of those results increases.361
CONCLUSION
This Article uses the aborted 2002 sale of the Hershey Company by
the Hershey Trust as a quasi-natural experiment to investigate theoretical
claims in the literatures of trust law and corporate law.  In so doing, this
Article makes fresh contributions to both literatures, and it also contrib-
utes to the technical literature on event study methodology.
360. For a discussion of the role of upward sloping supply curves for shares in a target
firm as a determinant of takeover premiums, see Michael Bradley, Anand Desai & E. Han
Kim, Synergistic Gains from Corporate Acquisitions and Their Division Between the
Stockholders of Target and Acquiring Firms, 21 J. Fin. Econ. 3, 15–19 (1988).  For
evidence of this possibility generally, see Andrei Shleifer, Do Demand Curves for Stocks
Slope Down?, 41 J. Fin. 579 (1986), although the notion of nonhorizontal demand curves
for equities is controversial in both law and finance.  This debate has also been touched on
in the case law.  See, e.g., West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2002)
(“There are so many substitutes for any one firm’s stock that the effective demand curve is
horizontal.”).
361. Cf. Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities
Regulation, 2 Theoretical Inquiries L. 387, 505–06 (2001) (discussing similar convergence
of results between different methodologies in context of regulatory competition).
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Trust Law
Our analysis provides the first quantitative empirical assessment of
the prevailing scholarly view that agency costs are rampant in charitable
trusts.  Because a charitable trust must be for the benefit of a charitable
purpose, not an identifiable beneficiary, there is no one with both an
economic interest and legal standing to ensure that the trustee efficiently
pursues the trust’s charitable purpose.  State attorneys general have for-
mal authority to enforce charitable trusts, but the attorney general is typi-
cally a political official for whom supervision of such trusts has little politi-
cal payoff.  Further, when a charitable trust does achieve enough political
salience to attract the attention of the attorney general, the attorney gen-
eral’s political interests often militate toward imposing local political pref-
erences, which may not be congruent with the charitable purpose or the
interests of society more broadly.
Our findings imply agency costs in the high-profile, politically salient
Hershey Trust on the order of $850 million (about 15% of the 2002 value
of the Trust).  Moreover, instead of reducing the agency costs associated
with the Trust’s charitable trust form, the Attorney General’s intervention
to block the Trust’s sale of the Company made those agency costs perma-
nent.  The question thus arises, can these results be generalized?  The
answer is yes and no.  We do not claim that all charitable trusts host the
same magnitude of agency costs as the Hershey Trust or that all interven-
tions by state attorneys general are as maladroit as the intervention here.
Instead, we suggest that our results tend to validate the assumption in the
theoretical literature, heretofore based chiefly on qualitative anecdotal
evidence, of the prevalence of agency costs in charitable trusts and the
shortcomings in supervision of charitable entities by the state attorneys
general.  Accordingly, our analysis throws light on current policy debates
in trust law such as (1) alternative modes of supervision for charitable
trusts, (2) expanding the cy pres doctrine to address excess endowments,
and (3) the propriety of social investing by trustees.
Corporate Law
Agency costs are the central concern of the study and practice of
corporate law.  The difficult task is to align the incentives of managers
with the interests of shareholders, or at least to constrain the extent to
which managers can advance their own interests at the expense of share-
holders.  A growing empirical literature suggests that the takeover threat
posed by exposure to the market for corporate control and monitoring
by controlling shareholders or large blockholders are among the most
powerful levers available to induce managers to act in the best interests of
shareholders.  Our analysis contributes to this literature by suggesting
that, at least in the case of the Hershey Trust and Hershey Company, the
takeover threat provided more managerial discipline than the presence
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of a controlling shareholder.362  Although we cannot disentangle the role
of the Trust’s weak internal governance structure from the role of switch-
ing from a controlling shareholder to the takeover market as alternative
explanations for this finding, our results nonetheless highlight the need
to consider the incentives of a blockholder’s agents when analyzing the
efficacy of relying on the blockholder to police managerial agency costs.
The $2.7 billion increase in the value of the Company on exposure to the
takeover market is a damning indictment of the trustee’s failure as agents
of the Trust to maximize value.
Financial Econometrics
Although the event study technique is a well-accepted tool of finan-
cial econometrics, and single-firm event studies appear in the academic
literature and are routinely employed in securities litigation,363 such a
study poses special problems on account of the increased volatility associ-
ated with a portfolio of one.  The concern is that a single firm’s observed
abnormal returns might not be normally distributed, and if so, that we
might attribute statistical significance to an abnormal return that in fact
reflects only random variation.  To address this worry, we develop and
present a method of assessing statistical significance that uses an empiri-
cal distribution of abnormal returns based on randomization inference as
a substitute for using the critical values for statistical significance from the
standard normal distribution.  This randomization inference technique
has been used in other applications outside of financial economics, and it
bears a similarity to recently developed bootstrapping methods, but we
believe that we are the first to use it in an event study in the law and
economics literature.  Because the technique can easily be implemented
in most single-firm event studies, and because it improves confidence in
assessments of statistical significance, we commend its use in future sin-
gle-firm event studies.
362. We consider the potentially conflating influences of a capitalized control
premium or expected synergies in the text following supra note 360. R
363. See supra notes 291–292. R
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APPENDIX A:  EXTENDED PRICE DYNAMIC GRAPHS
FIGURE A1: HSY PRICE HISTORY
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FIGURE A2: HSY VS. CHOCOLATE COMPETITORS
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FIGURE A3: HSY VS. FOOD COMPETITORS
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FIGURE A4A: HSY VS. S&P 500
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FIGURE A4B: HSY VS. DOW JONES INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE
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APPENDIX B:  THE POSSIBILITY OF LEAKAGE
A common concern in event studies is the possibility that insiders
might use their advance knowledge of a pending material announcement
to trade for their own gain or for the benefit of third parties.364  In the
present case, leakage would have caused HSY to appreciate in a non-
random way before the July 25, 2002 sale announcement.  If the price of
HSY started climbing earlier as a result of leakage trading, our measure of
the abnormal return associated with the sale is underestimated.  Such a
scenario is consistent with the depiction of cumulative abnormal returns
in Figure 5a.  To examine the possibility of leakage more formally, we
present the abnormal returns for the ten days before and after the sale
window in Appendix Table B1.365
We do find some evidence of leakage during the two trading days
prior to the sale announcement, as the abnormal returns for those days
were about 5% and 3% respectively, both statistically significant at the
0.1% level.  If these abnormal positive returns indeed represent leakage,
our original measure of the effect of the sale announcement is underesti-
mated by about 8%.  Our confidence in this evidence of leakage, how-
ever, is weak, as the price movements during the ten day presale window
appear to be especially volatile.  Given the large negative abnormal re-
turns earlier in the ten day period before the sale announcement, the
positive abnormal returns on the two days prior to the sale announce-
ment could simply represent reversion to the mean.366  Moreover, on July
23 the Company issued a positive earnings announcement,367 which fur-
ther undermines the inference of leakage trading from the July 23 and 24
abnormal returns.  Accordingly, in the main text we do not increase our
estimate of the abnormal return associated with the sale announcement
to account for the possibility of leakage.
We observe no significant abnormal returns in the ten day period
after the sale window.
364. Under semi-strong form market efficiency, stock prices reflect all public
information, so there are potential gains from trading on nonpublic information.
365. Because in Appendix Table B1 we examine the ten trading days prior to the July
25 sale announcement, we used 100 trading days prior to those ten days as our estimation
period.  In Table 3, by contrast, we used the 100 trading days prior to July 25 for our
estimation period.  The results in Table 3 would not change, however, if we used the same
estimation period as in Appendix Table B1.
366. These results bring into view the related concern of volatility in a one-firm event
study.  We address the problem of a one-firm event study in supra Part III.C.4.
367. See Hershey Foods Corp.: Net Rises 20% Despite a Strike; Full Year Outlook Is
Raised, Wall St. J., July 24, 2002, at A10.
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TABLE B1:  EVIDENCE OF LEAKAGE BEFORE SALE ANNOUNCEMENT
Standardized
Date Actual Expected Abnormal Abnormal
Pre Sale Window
7/11/2002 0.027 0.001 0.026 2.737**
7/12/2002 −0.021 −0.002 −0.019 −2.000*
7/15/2002 0.006 −0.002 0.007 0.737
7/16/2002 −0.020 −0.005 −0.015 −1.579
7/17/2002 0.013 0.000 0.012 1.263
7/18/2002 −0.029 −0.007 −0.022 −2.316*
7/19/2002 −0.048 −0.009 −0.039 −4.105***
7/22/2002 0.004 −0.008 0.012 1.263
7/23/2002 0.039 −0.007 0.045 4.737***
7/24/2002 0.045 0.012 0.033 3.474***
Post Sale Window
9/19/2002 −0.020 −0.007 −0.012 −1.263
9/20/2002 0.007 −0.000 0.007 0.737
9/23/2002 −0.006 −0.004 −0.003 −0.316
9/24/2002 −0.023 −0.005 −0.018 −1.895
9/25/2002 0.003 0.005 −0.001 −0.105
9/26/2002 0.020 0.003 0.017 1.789
9/27/2002 −0.015 −0.008 −0.007 −0.737
9/30/2002 −0.012 −0.004 −0.008 −0.842
10/1/2002 0.015 0.008 0.007 0.737
10/2/2002 0.000 −0.006 0.006 0.632
Note: ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05 (i.e., abnormal return is statistically significant at
the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% levels respectively).
\\server05\productn\C\COL\108-4\COL401.txt unknown Seq: 89 12-AUG-08 14:51
2008] HERSHEY’S KISS-OFF 837
APPENDIX C:  HOW UNLIKELY ARE THE ABNORMAL RETURNS?
Hypothesis testing in econometrics involves comparing a test statistic
to critical values for statistical significance that are chosen from the stan-
dard normal distribution.  This is the method implied by the discussion
in supra Part III.C.  Use of the standard normal distribution, however,
assumes the applicability of a central limit theorem, which holds that the
sample average of abnormal returns converges to the standard normal
distribution, regardless of the population distribution.368  Unfortunately,
in our study we have relatively few sample draws arising from the sale
“shock” (and, arguably, those draws are not independent of each other),
which limits our ability to rely on a central limit theorem.369
However, for our primary results of interest (i.e., the abnormal re-
turn on the day the sale was announced and the abnormal return on the
day the sale was abandoned), it turns out that the observed abnormal
returns are so large that they would rarely occur by chance under any
feasible distribution of abnormal returns.  That is, we do not need to rely
on a central limit theorem or on any assumptions about the underlying
“true” distribution of abnormal returns for Hershey to have confidence
that it is unlikely that the observed abnormal returns were simply the
result of normal variation in returns.
This claim hinges on the Chebyshev inequality,370 which states that:
2
1
Pr
x µ α
σ α
 − > ≤
 
 
In our application, x is the observed abnormal return, m is the hy-
pothesized value (i.e., 0), and s is the standard deviation of observed ab-
normal returns, making the entire argument inside of the absolute value
operator equivalent to our standardized abnormal return.  Thus, for our
purposes, Chebyshev’s inequality states that the probability that the abso-
lute value of a standardized abnormal return is greater than some arbi-
trary value a is less than or equal to one over a squared.  Crucially,
Chebyshev’s inequality holds for any possible distribution, which means
that a claim of statistical significance derived from it does not require any
assumptions about the generation of the underlying data or convergence
via a central limit theorem.
Applied to our data, Chebyshev’s inequality implies that the likeli-
hood of observing the standardized abnormal return associated with the
day the Hershey sale was announced (21.250) by random coincidence is
less than or equal to 0.0022.  For the abnormal return observed on the
day the preliminary injunction was announced (3.917), the likelihood of
368. See William H. Greene, Econometric Analysis 116–18 (4th ed. 2000); James H.
Stock & Mark W. Watson, Introduction to Econometrics 52–55 (2d ed. 2007).
369. See Jack Johnston & John DiNardo, Econometric Methods 55–56 (4th ed. 1997).
370. See Russell Davidson & James G. MacKinnon, Estimation and Inference in
Econometrics 799–800 (1993).
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observing this by chance is less than or equal to 0.0652.  Finally, the likeli-
hood associated with the abnormal return on the day the sale was aban-
doned (9.833) is less than or equal to 0.0103.
